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Introduction 
A little-noticed and even less-advertised 'revolution'seems to be tak-
ing place against the exclusiveness of old established academic disci-
plines. Instead of adhering, for instance, to topical and time-structured 
history or the traditional confines of geography, literature, sociology, 
anthropology, and on occasion, linguistics, cross-sectional disciplines 
often referred to as "studies" seem to be emerging. Thus, some time ago, 
the Canadian Studies Association was established, apparently to pull 
together the various related disciplines in one great effort. In a note-
worthy way, its objectives appear to encompass the discussion of groups 
of Canadians of non-British and non-French descent. Some years back 
the Central and East European Studies Society of Alberta was formed, 
following the setting-up by the University of Alberta of a Division of 
East European Studies. Of course, that Division was not the first of its 
kind. By 1976, the Central and East European Studies Association of 
Canada came into being and it was under its aegis that the first versions 
of the papers comprised in this volume were presented at two confer-
ences. 
The term "Hungarian studies" has been known and applied loosely, 
depending on the context, for many years. One of its implications is the 
task for Hungarian Canadian and Hungarian American researchers of 
serving as mediators between their respective two cultures, "interpre-
ters," if called upon in either direction. Until recently, this significant 
objective has not been carried out at all or only superficially. In fact, 
comparatively little is known about Hungarian Americans and Hun-
garian Canadians, either as urban dwellers or rural settlers. Even today 
there is a tendency to reduce their rich culture to the presentation of a 
few popular dishes and some "folk" dances in colourful costumes, de-
clared by their makers as authentically Hungarian. Not much considera-
tion is given to the fact that practically every region in Hungary has had 
its own folkloric characteristics. 
The contributors to the present volume have been active for a com-
paratively long time in reviewing Hungarian studies, the scope of which 
has included what might be referred to as "Hungarian-Canadian" and 
"Hungarian-American" studies. One may conclude from this practice 
that there is much common ground among these various types of 
"studies." Nevertheless, there are great differences as well. Thus, for our 
purposes, "Hungarian Canadian (American) studies" implies the effort 
better to understand the immigration, settlement, cultural, and social 
adjustments, as well as achievements in humanities, science and other 
fields, of Canadians (Americans) of Hungarian descent, with the help of 
the methodology of the appropriate branches of knowledge. One of the 
foremost objectives for a student of Hungarian Canadian (American) 
studies to attain is the accumulation of sufficient data and materials for 
the determination of the nature and direction of the above processes and 
the factors affecting them. 
M. L. Kovacs 
Canadian-American Review of Hungarian Studies, Vol. VII, No. 1 (Spring 1980) 
The Hungarian General Staff and 
Diplomacy, 1939-1941 
N. F. Dreisziger 
The subject of the role of the Hungarian General Staff in the forma-
tion of Hungarian diplomatic efforts on the eve of World War II has 
been at once neglected and abused. It can be regarded as "neglected" in 
that, despite the mass of literature dealing with Hungarian foreign policy 
before and during the War, only a handful of historians focus on this 
question and treat it in a scholarly manner; and as "abused" in that 
usually it has been tied to the highly politicized issue of war-guilt, a ques-
tion which defies impartial analysis. There is no need here to review the 
historiography of the broader problem of Hungary's involvement in the 
Second World War; however, a few words should be said about litera-
ture that centres on the role of the Hungarian General Staff in foreign 
policy. In Hungary the theme has been treated by a number of scholars 
who, in general, condemn the "Horthyite military" for aspiring to politi-
cal supremacy in Hungary and for outdoing the country's civilian leaders 
— often without the knowledge or prior sanction of the latter — in the 
appeasement of the Germans.1 Opinions on this subject are not appreci-
ably different in North America. The earlier works of Professor C. A. 
Macartney notwithstanding, it is the impression of recent North Ameri-
can students of pre-war and war-time Hungarian history that the mili-
tary, in particular the General Staff, made a conscious effort to determine 
the direction of the country's foreign policy and that it was, by and large, 
successful in this effort.2 
There are no grounds for quarrel with many of the observations of 
Hungary's best scholars, and even less for disagreement with the overall 
conclusions of recent western studies. Still, there is need for a general 
reassessment of some aspects of this question, for in many ways the im-
pression created by Hungarian and Western works is somewhat mis-
leading. A careful study of the evidence reveals that the hold Hungary's 
soldiers attained over their country's external policies was rather pre-
carious, and that effective meddling by the military in the conduct of 
foreign policy was not a permanent feature of Hungarian war-time 
politics after 1939. Nevertheless, the influence exercised by the General 
Staff in foreign policy matters was at times extensive, causing much 
difficulty and embarrassment for the country's civilian leaders. It is an 
unfortunate fact of Hungarian history that the high point of the mili-
tary's influence was reached in 1939-1941, a period in which Hungary's 
leaders were confronted by several fateful decisions, including the ques-
tion of participation in the War. 
One reason for selecting this particular period as the focal point of this 
essay is the fact that 1939-1941 represents the most crucial years of the 
Hungarian historical development during the Horthy Era. Another is 
that in recent years both the preceding period and that which followed 
have received detailed treatment by scholars from Western countries.3 
In dealing with the events of this period, we shall try to avoid involve-
ment in the controversial issue of war-guilt, hoping that the present 
study will help to explain developments rather than fix blame on certain 
groups or individuals. Yet, because of the very nature of the topic, it 
seems well-nigh impossible not to express opinions as to the question of 
responsibility for Hungary's drifting into the War. Besides, it is hoped 
that this study will shed light on a much larger historical question, the 
problem of some East European governments'weakened determination, 
or even virtual inability, owing to friction between civilian authorities 
and military commands, to resist German diplomatic pressure. 
The nature and aims of Hungarian diplomacy during the opening 
phases of the Second World War cannot be well understood without a 
reference to the immediate post-World War I era, the formative years of 
interwar Hungarian policies and leadership. Most historians agree that 
this was a period of vast change in Hungary. But while war, defeat, revo-
lution, foreign intervention and civil war caused severe dislocation in 
many areas of national life, Hungary's officer corps survived this time of 
troubles with surprising cohesion. True, the size of the country's mili-
tary establishment was drastically curtailed by the peace treaty, but this 
fact had little effect on the officer class' esprit de corps. On the contrary, 
the real and alleged injustices that the country had suffered at the hands 
of peacemakers and left-wing revolutionaries, only inflamed the officers' 
nationalism and desire for revenge. 
This feeling of outrage against the peacemakers who had carved up 
historic Hungary and the nation's "internal enemies" who had taken the 
country down the slope of revolution, was not confined to the officer 
corps. It was also felt by the country's civilian elite. It is not surprising 
under the circumstances that the foremost national aim of Hungary in 
the interwar period became the reversal of the misfortunes that befell the 
country in 1919 and 1920, and the revision of the admittedly draconic 
provisions of the Treaty of Trianon emerged as the prime objective of its 
government. In this respect there was no fundamental disagreement 
between the country's civilian leaders and officer corps. Differences 
arose only in regard to the question of when and how to attain these 
aims. 
In the quarter century from the end of the First World War to the end 
of the Second, the Royal Hungarian Army possessed an influence in 
public affairs out of proportion with its size. The reasons for this were 
numerous. It was the Hungarian Army, more than its Austrian counter-
part, which appeared to have been the descendant of the imperial forces 
of Austria-Hungary. Because of the nature of the regime which was set 
up in Hungary after the revolutionary experiments of 1918-1919, high-
ranking officers of the former Habsburg Imperial forces were allowed 
the choice of continuing their careers in Hungary. As a result, that 
country "inherited" several hundred of the late Emperor Francis Joseph's 
colonels and generals, many of whom were German-speaking. The 
second reason for the Hungarian Army's high profile was the fact that in 
the post-1919 era, rightly or wrongly, the military were looked upon as 
the country's "saviours" from the Bolsheviks and other revolutionaries. 
The Army were also seen by many Hungarians as the most likely tool for 
breaking the chains that their country had been put into by the peace-
makers. Moreover, the interwar head-of-state, the Regent Miklos 
Horthy, was himself a member of the military profession, although as a 
naval officer he did not always see eye-to-eye with the army officers and 
did not always command their respect and devotion. More important 
than Horthy's military background was the fact that in 1932 Gyula 
Gombos, an army officer, became Premier. Gombos admired the Italian 
patterns of politics and, during his term in office, promoted like-minded 
officers to high positions in the honvedseg* and the civil service. Gom-
bos's programme was cut short by his death in 1936 and was not con-
tinued under his successors. 
The problem of the military's influence on foreign policy was not a 
serious issue until the second half of the 1930s. The country's military 
and its civilian government concurred on the question of treaty revision 
and, until 1937 or 1938, there seems to have been a consensus that the 
time had not yet arrived for action. A serious divergence in views be-
tween the civilian government and the officer corps came gradually into 
*The Magyar term for the Hungarian army. 
existence only as a result of the disruption of the European balance of 
power caused by the rise of the Rome-Berlin Axis. This disagreement 
eventually turned into a bitter, though covert, tug-of-war between the 
government and the General Staff. The emergence of Italian and, es-
pecially, German strength in Central Europe had accentuated the dif-
ferences of outlook between Hungary's civilian and military leaders. 
Most members of the former group looked askance at Hitler's and 
Mussolini's radical domestic and adventurous foreign policy moves. 
The latter, on the other hand, were impressed by the scope of Italian and 
German rearmament and admired the way Hitler had gradually and 
deftly freed Germany from the fetters imposed at Versailles. German 
economic and military strength and the effectiveness of Hitler's diplo-
macy contrasted sharply with the weakness of Hungary and the failures 
of her foreign policy. Relations between the country's civilian leaders 
and its more impatient military men became particularly strained during 
the late summer and autumn of 1938, when the Hungarian government 
refused to promise participation in the planned German invasion of 
Czechoslovakia. The invasion did not take place in 1938: the Munich 
"surrender" deprived Hitler of the strategic reason as well as a diplo-
matic excuse for his planned military adventure. Although Hitler had 
been cheated out of what he expected to be another triumphant march 
into another of Central Europe's ancient capitals, Munich appeared to 
have been a great victory for German diplomacy. But for Hungary, 
Munich was a disaster. Once German demands were satisfied, there was 
no reason why the Czechs and Slovaks should yield to further demands. 
At Munich, Hungarian aspirations for revision were not considered. 
After Munich, the conditions for the realisation of these aspirations 
were no longer favourable. In the end, in an arbitrary award, decided on 
by the German and Italian Foreign Ministers in Vienna, Hungary was 
given back a part of the territory she had lost to Czechoslovakia in 1919. 
But the so-called First Vienna award did not satisfy the Hungarian mili-
tary who continued to accuse their country's "timid" civilian leadership 
of "missing the boat" in September when a bolder policy might have led 
to a more drastically favorable revision of Hungary's northern borders.4 
In 1939 recriminations between the civilians and the military dimin-
ished in intensity. In September 1938 the soldiers had been angry with 
the civilians for getting nothing for Hungary during the Munich crisis; in 
subsequent months, they also became resentful against the Germans for 
failing to give adequate support to Hungary's territorial claims during 
the negotiations which preceded the First Vienna Award. Growing Ger-
man hostility towards Poland and the announcement in August of 1939 
of the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact, also perturbed Hungarian of-
ficers whose anti-Bolshevism was genuine. The German attack on Po-
land also upset many. Most Hungarians were greatly sympathetic with 
the plight of the Poles. It is well known that the Hungarian Government 
refused to co-operate with the Germans in September of 1939 and even 
opened the country's northeastern borders to Polish refugees. There can 
be little doubt that the Government's stand was whole-heartedly ap-
proved of by most of the country's soldiers. But the detente between the 
more cautious elements in the Government and the more impatient 
members of the military was not destined to last for long. Neither the 
internal political situation nor the course of international events in East-
ern Europe favoured the prolongation of such an accord. 
The crises of 1938-39 had not passed without leaving indelible marks 
on Hungarian politics. The international upheavals of these two event-
ful years were accompanied by internal changes, many of which strength-
ened the influence of the military in national affairs. In particular, the 
year 1938 witnessed the long-awaited beginning of a rearmament pro-
gramme.5 Even more important was the passage in 1939 of the Home 
Defence Act (Honvedelmi Torveny). This law re-introduced the prin-
ciple of universal liability for armed service, restricted certain political 
freedoms (such as the freedom of assembly and association), provided 
for military supervision of the press and industries involved in the pro-
duction of a wide range of war materials. The act created a new decision-
making body, the Supreme Council of Home Defence, made up of the 
Regent, the members of the Ministerial Council, the Chief-of-Staff and 
the Commander-in-Chief of the Army. From then on, there was a body 
above the civilian government, a body in which the Armed Forces had 
direct representation, to make decisions in regard to the vital question of 
war and peace.6 But the significance of the rearmament programme and 
the new home defence act was surpassed by the changes which had taken 
place in this period, particularly during the autumn of 1938, in the com-
position of Hungary's civilian and military leadership. 
Perhaps the most important of these changes was the dismissal of 
Kalman Kanya from the Ministerial Council. He had always been a 
cautious man who distrusted the Axis leaders as he distrusted the Hun-
garian military. Prior to Munich, he had been the most adamant oppo-
nent of the idea of Hungary's collaboration in a German invasion of 
Czechoslovakia. Kanya's successor was Count Istvan Csaky, a vain, im-
pressionable, but talented diplomat. Csaky shared neither his predeces-
sor's caution nor his distrust of the Axis. Kanya's departure from na-
tional politics, however, was counterbalanced a few months later by the 
replacement of Bela Imredy by Pal Teleki as Premier. During the Sude-
ten Crisis, Imredy had become a convert to the Axis cause and for some 
five months he sponsored measures that were designed to bring Hun-
gary's internal and external policies more in line with those of Germany 
and Italy. But his efforts alarmed Hungary's conservatives and liberals 
alike and he was manoeuvred into resigning from office. After assuming 
the premiership, Teleki made many efforts to prevent or delay the imple-
mentation of Imredy's pro-Axis programme. 
Another important change in Hungarian leadership during the autumn 
of 1938 was the appointment of General Henrik Werth as Chief-of-Staff. 
Werth was still another of the high-ranking officers of the General Staff 
with a German ethnic background. Moreover, he spoke German as his 
native tongue and had married a citizen of the Third Reich. There is no 
evidence that the above factors had played a significant role in Werth's 
selection, nor that there had been representations from Berlin asking for 
his appointment.7 But once established in his new post, Werth became 
one of the most persistent advocates of aligning Hungarian foreign and 
military policies with those of the Axis powers. Werth was to receive 
active support from General Karoly Bartha, the Minister of Defence in 
the period under discussion in this paper. 
The international developments of the first year of the Second World 
War had a further unsettling impact on Hungarian politics and, es-
pecially, on civil-military relations. The war, first in Eastern Europe and 
then also in the West, witnessed the crumbling away of a greater and 
greater portion of the international order established by the Paris peace 
settlements. This process increased most Hungarian leaders' expecta-
tions about new and more extensive revisions of the territorial settle-
ment in East Central Europe especially in the East, at the expense of 
Rumania. Most Hungarian leaders were confident that the long-awaited 
opportunity to regain Transylvania would soon present itself. They had 
every reason to think so. Rumania's international position continued to 
deteriorate after September 1939. The existence of the secret protocol 
which accompanied the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact was suspcctcd in 
diplomatic circles at the time. While its details were unknown, there 
were few doubts that the Pact's provisions regarding Rumania had 
ominous implications for that country's future. Indeed, as early as No-
vember, Moscow began to voice its interest in Bessarabia, the region in 
Rumania which had belonged to Russia before the First World War. 
Rumania was also a possible target of attack by Germany, either as part 
of a joint Russo-German military occupation on the Polish model, or as 
a result of a pre-emptive strike by the Wehrmacht, undertaken to fore-
stall a possible Russian move into the oil-rich Ploesti region. Despite the 
guarantee Britain had extended to Bucharest in the case of a German in-
vasion, Rumania had no real defence against the dangers posed by the 
new order which had unfolded in Central Europe in the fall of 1939. 
Rumania's difficulties gave rise to various plans in Budapest for the 
solution of the Transylvanian question in a manner satisfactory to Hun-
gary's expectations. How differently Hungary's civilian and military 
leaders approached this issue is illustrated by the plans that were ad-
vanced by ex-Premier Count Istvan Bethlen and General Werth. The 
scheme of the former, outlined in a secret memorandum to the Govern-
ment, started with the premise that Germany would lose the war. Ac-
cordingly, Bethlen argued, Hungary should remain neutral and preserve 
her strength for the attainment of her national aims at the end of the war. 
Bethlen hoped that by participating in some kind of a security arrange-
ment for post-war Europe, and by not annexing Transylvania but allow-
ing it to become an autonomous member of a loose East European 
federation, Hungary could solve the Transylvanian question according 
to her interests.8 
Werth's plans were quite different. The Chief-of-Staff was not willing 
to wait until the outcome of the war was settled. Long before the Russian 
threat against Rumania became acute, Werth urged his government to 
prepare for the recovery of Transylvania by force should an armed con-
flict develop between Moscow and Bucharest.9 In April 1940 Werth 
submitted a memorandum on this subject to Horthy and the leading 
members of the Government. The Chief-of-Staff discussed at length the 
probable outcome of the European war. Unlike Bethlen, he concluded 
that Germany would more than likely emerge as the victor, but even if 
she did not, a complete German defeat was impossible because of the 
superior strength of the Wehrmacht. Werth, who had just held discus-
sions with representatives of the German General Staff, informed his 
civilian superiors that the Germans had offered their co-operation against 
Rumania. But simple military co-operation was not sufficient according 
to Werth. Hungary should abandon her neutrality and become an ally of 
Berlin so that she could regain the lands she had lost in the wake of the 
First World War.10 
To Werth's disappointment, a Hungarian-German alliance against 
Rumania never came about. From the late spring of 1940 on, Hitler was 
preoccupied with the Western front and, for the time being, did not wish 
to undertake any military ventures in the East. Interestingly enough, 
Hitler's desire to maintain peace in Eastern Europe and the Balkans 
nearly gave Hungary an opportunity to achieve revision in Transylvania 
on her own terms. That, in the end, the solution of the Transylvanian 
question in 1940 should have been made on terms dictated not from 
Budapest but from Berlin, was in part the result of a conflict between the 
Hungarian Government and the military, in particular, a clash between 
Teleki and Werth. 
The approach that the Hungarian leadership adopted towards the 
question of Transylvania differed appreciably from that advocated by 
Werth. Teleki was repelled by the idea of abandoning the country's 
neutrality and joining Germany. Unlike Werth, Teleki was doubtful 
about the prospects of a German victory. He felt that the superiority of 
moral strength and physical resources was on the Allied side. He could 
not accept Werth's suggestion that Hungary should become an ally of 
Germany. He rejected the Chief-of-Staff's proposals in a letter to Horthy. 
He stressed to the Regent that Germany's victory was not a foregone 
conclusion and, therefore, it was not advantageous for Hungary to side 
with her completely. Werth, the Premier argued, did not see the problem 
of Hungary's interests from the point of view of a Hungarian.11 
Although Teleki rejected Werth's plan of regaining Transylvania with 
German military help, he did not give up the prospect of attaining a re-
vision of his country's eastern boundaries through some other means. 
The opportunity seemed to have presented itself in the summer of 1940. 
At the time Hitler was still hoping to force Britain to her knees and 
thereby to end the war in Western Europe. To do this Hitler needed 
peace elsewhere in Europe, especially in the southeast, from where came 
many of the foodstuffs, fuel and raw materials needed by the Wehr-
macht. In the meantime, the Russians had decided to act. At the end of 
June they confronted Rumania with an ultimatum demanding the re-
turn of Bessarabia. The Soviet move caused much hectic activity in 
Hungary.12 The honvedseg mobilized and frantic efforts were made to 
ascertain Rome's and Berlin's attitudes to a Hungarian occupation of 
Transylvania in case of a Russo-Rumanian conflict. But that conflict 
never came about. Rumania surrendered Bessarabia without a fight. 
And from Berlin came word that Germany would be most unhappy 
about any disruption of the peace in Eastern Europe.13 Even though the 
best opportunity for regaining Transylvania was now gone, the Hun-
garians continued their menacing attitude towards Rumania, demand-
ing at the same time that the dispute be submitted to a conference at-
tended by the statesmen of Germany, Italy, Hungary and Rumania. 
Teleki's aim was evident: threatened by a Hungarian-Rumanian conflict 
at the time when Germany's interest demanded peace in Eastern Europe, 
the Axis powers would be forced to support the Hungarian claims in any 
negotiations on the issue.14 But, for the time being, Hitler did not wish to 
act as a mediator. He rejected the idea of a four-power conference and 
told the Hungarians to negotiate with the Rumanians alone.15 
The Hungarian-Rumanian discussions achieved nothing. Rumania 
was no longer an isolated power which had to make concessions. She 
had embarked on a pro-Axis policy, and had acquired a new friend: 
Germany. The Hungarians could do no more than continue their intimi-
dating stance against Rumania and hope that Hitler would change his 
mind, and for the sake of peace in southeastern Europe, would intervene 
in the dispute. 
At the end of July Hitler changed his policy. Almost overnight it 
seems, he decided to see to it that all outstanding international disputes 
were settled in Eastern Europe. The reason for this complete turnabout 
in Germany's policy lay in international developments. In July, the 
Nazis failed to force Britain to come to terms with them. To deprive the 
British of their last ray of hope, Hitler decided to smash the Soviet 
Union in a single huge campaign next spring. With Russia under Ger-
man rule, Japan would be free to turn against the U.S., and Britain 
would have no hope of holding out against Germany. To prepare for this 
bold venture, Hitler needed tranquility in Eastern Europe, and to achieve 
this he had to settle the question of Hungarian-Rumanian relations. 
This was exactly what the Hungarians desired in August 1940, but they 
wanted Hitler to act as a mediator in the dispute and not as an arbiter. 
They did not want to see another Vienna Award announced in which 
Germany and Italy imposed a settlement favourable first and foremost 
to German interests. If everything else failed, Teleki was prepared to 
accept arbitration, but he wanted the Rumanians to ask for it: if Bucha-
rest called for such an award, Budapest could insist on certain pre-
conditions. Moreover, if the revision of the boundaries came about 
through arbitration requested by Rumania, the settlement would have 
greater legitimacy in the eyes of the world. 
The essential feature of Teleki's plan was to threaten war in south-
eastern Europe and compel the Rumanians to request Hitler's diplo-
matic intervention. But Teleki was double-crossed. At the critical mo-
ment, Werth informed the Germans that, as a final measure, Hungary 
was willing to accept arbitration rather than go to war.16 After such a 
disclosure it was easy for Berlin to call Teleki's bluff. In the end the fate 
of Transylvania was settled by another German-Italian dictum. The 
region was divided between Rumania and Hungary. 
Werth's indiscretion deeply perturbed the sensitive Premier. He de-
cided to resign and announced his decision in a letter to Horthy. Teleki 
disclaimed any personal antipathy towards Werth. He complained of 
not being able to "prevail against the military." He accepted part of the 
blame for that unfortunate state of affairs; he had allowed the soldiers to 
become "too powerful." As a result, he no longer felt suitable to carry 
out the demanding task of leading the country in such difficult times. 
Someone else would have to be appointed who would end the division 
between the Government and the honvedseg.xl 
Teleki followed up his letter of resignation with a memorandum out-
lining in detail the question of civil-military relations in Hungary. He 
began by saying that the existing legal framework of these relations was 
satisfactory. The problem was, he argued, that there had been a depar-
ture from that legal basis, and Hungary was drifting towards a sort of 
"military dictatorship" imposed from "below" rather than "from above." 
In Hungary, he continued, "there seemed to be two governmental ma-
chineries." One was the legal government, the other was the military 
establishment which extended to "all branches of civil administration" 
and whose activities the "lawful governmental system" was unable to 
supervise. What was needed, was to appoint a new premier who could 
end this state of affairs by gathering in his hands the highest executive 
powers. 
In the last part of the memorandum, Teleki discussed the role of the 
military in foreign affairs. He admitted that the soldiers had to gather 
information abroad and had to have their own staff for this purpose, but 
this task needed to be done in tandem with the intentions and policies of 
the government. In Hungary, much was lacking in the co-ordination of 
the activities of diplomats and soldiers abroad. He, as Premier and 
Minister of External Affairs, was not receiving all the reports Hungarian 
military attaches sent home from abroad. It was imperative, he stressed, 
that he should at least see instructions that the Chief-of-Staff despatched 
to military attaches. If this had been done, many unpleasant misunder-
standings might have been avoided. The Chief-of-Staff had caused great 
harm when he had informed the Germans that Hungary wanted arbitra-
tion in the future of Transylvania. In concluding his memorandum 
Teleki asked Horthy to convey to the military his request for the separa-
tion of civil and military authority in Hungary and the subordination of 
the latter to the former in all cases not exclusively military in nature.18 
In response to Teleki's protest Horthy agreed to see to it that several 
of the grievances were remedied; bu he refused to accept the Premier's 
resignation. Thus, Teleki remained at the helm of the Hungarian ship-
of-state for another six months. 
The half-year which followed the Second Vienna Award witnessed a 
further erosion of Hungary's neutrality. The two milestones of the proc-
ess are familiar to students of war-time history: Budapest's consent to 
the transit through Hungary of German troops destined for pro-Axis 
Rumania, and Hungary's accession to the Tripartite Pact. As well, civil-
military relations remained tense, a fact which became evident during 
the next crisis in Hungary's external relations: the German-Yugoslav 
confrontation in the early spring of 1941. 
The last months of 1940 saw a diplomatic rapprochement between 
Hungary and Yugoslavia. Budapest's efforts to seek friendship with Bel-
grade were sincere. Although the issue of the Hungarian irredenta in 
Yugoslavia remained unsolved, the need for a neutral friend in a sea of 
Axis neighbours was a real consideration in the minds of H ungary's best 
statesmen. The rapprochement led to the signing, in December, of a 
peace and friendship pact between the two countries. 
Better relations between Budapest and Belgrade were viewed with 
satisfaction in Berlin. The Hungarian-Yugoslav Pact of Peace was seen 
by Hitler as a stabilizing factor in southeastern Europe, and stability 
there was essential because of the approaching conflict with Russia. But 
Hitler's expectations were dashed when in March 1941 Yugoslavia's 
government was overthrown by anti-German elements of its military. 
Hitler, in his rage, decided to crush Yugoslavian resistance. To do this he 
needed the co-operation of Hungary. Accordingly, he despatched a mes-
sage to Horthy, promising to return to Hungary large areas which had 
been awarded to Yugoslavia by the peacemakers in 1919. Hitler's price 
was permission for the Wehrmacht to march through Hungary as well 
as Hungarian participation in the hostilities. The final Hungarian deci-
sion on the German request was taken at a meeting of the Supreme 
Defence Council on the first of April, almost a week after Hitler's plan 
had been brought to the Hungarian Government's knowledge. It is re-
vealing of the state of politics in Budapest that, prior to the convening of 
the Council, Horthy had replied to Hitler's message in a letter whose 
tone was quite affirmative,19 and that a tentative but complete agree-
ment had already been drawn up between Generals Paulus and Werth 
on the details of Hungarian-German military co-operation in the coming 
campaign.20 At the meeting itself, Werth, supported by several ministers 
including Bartha, demanded Hungary's unconditional participation in 
the German invasion of Yugoslavia. But Werth and his supporters were 
out-voted by those who felt that, for the sake of the country's reputation 
in the West, participation in the German campaign had to be limited and 
had to be tied to certain definite conditions. In insisting on these condi-
tions, Teleki and his associates had hoped to maintain some of Hun-
gary's neutrality, save the nation's honour and, particularly, retain the 
goodwill of Britain. The next day, when he learned that the imposition 
of the conditions on Hungary's participation in the invasion would not 
be enough to achieve the last of these objectives and might not even fore-
stall a British declaration of war, Pal Teleki committed suicide.21 
The Yugoslav crisis of the spring of 1941 brought to a close still 
another phase of Hungary's descent to the status of an Axis ally and 
satellite. It did not prove to be a final stage; the consequences of the crisis 
were not so drastic as Teleki had expected: the crisis had not brought a 
British declaration of war. With military activities in the Yugoslav lands 
having come to an early end for the time being, Hungary returned to the 
state of precarious de jure neutrality in the European conflict. But this 
state of affairs was not to last long, for the next crisis in Eastern Europe, 
Hitler's invasion of the USSR in June 1941, meant the realization of 
General Werth's hopes for a German-Hungarian military alliance. 
The story of the diplomatic and political antecedents of Hungary's 
involvement in the German invasion of Russia need not be repeated 
here.22 It should be enough to say that Hungarian participation in the 
preparations for the attack was not envisaged by Hitler: the Fiihrer dis-
trusted the Hungarians. Nor did Hungary receive an official invitation 
to join the war even after the outbreak of the German-Russian conflict. 
While German pressure for Hungary to join was there, the decision to 
enter the War was made in Budapest. And in this decision the country's 
military — in particular, Generals Werth and Bartha — played an all-
important role. 
While diplomatic relations between the German and Hungarian gov-
ernments were cool, as illustrated by Hitler's refusal to inform Budapest 
of his planned campaign against Russia, contacts between the two coun-
tries' army officers of high rank were frequent and close. Contrary to 
what may have been expected, the contacts were not sought by the Hun-
garians alone. In the months before the start of Operation Barbarossa, 
the German High Command had to take certain precautionary measures 
of which the Hungarians could not be left out. The German military 
wished to be assured that Hungarian defence works on the Russo-
Hungarian border were adequate against any possible Soviet incursion. 
Accordingly, they sent one of their staff officers to Hungary and, with 
the consent of the Hungarian command, had him inspect the new de-
fence works in Subcarpathia.23 The Germans were also concerned with 
what they considered to be the inadequate equipment and training of the 
honvedseg in certain areas; for example, in communications. As a re-
sult, they pressed for and obtained an increase in the number of German 
military advisers and training officers attached to Hungarian units. As 
well, close collaboration came to be maintained between the two coun-
tries' forces in the field of military intelligence operations.24 
In addition to these official contacts, there were direct, secret discus-
sions between high-ranking German and Hungarian generals on several 
occasions during the long months before the German invasion of Russia. 
Whether these discussions had resulted in the Hungarian military being 
informed about Operation Barbarossa is an open question. Communist 
historians in Hungary claim that certain German generals informed 
their Hungarian counterparts of Germany's true intentions as early as 
the autumn of 1940 and repeated their warnings about the imminence of 
a Russo-German war during the Yugoslav crisis.25 This claim is not 
borne out by reliable sources. Indeed, if any German officer informed 
the Hungarians, he did so in contravention of Hitler's orders. We have it 
on the authority of Field-Marshals Keitel and Paulus that any reference 
to Operation Barbarossa was forbidden to German officers holding dis-
cussions with the Hungarians.26 
Whether Hungary's military leaders were informed about Hitler's 
plans by their German counterparts, or whether they guessed the Fiihrer's 
intentions from the Nazis' all-too-obvious preparations, is irrelevant. 
The fact is that by early May, General Werth seems to have been in full 
knowledge of the German plans.27 And he did not remain silent. On the 
6th of the month he approached the country's new Premier, Laszlo 
Bardossy, with a memorandum. He argued that the need for new re-
sources would soon drive Germany into a conflict with Russia, and in 
this war the Germans would expect Hungary to co-operate with them. 
He urged that the Hungarian Government should anticipate the out-
break of the Russo-German war by offering a military alliance to Ger-
many. Bardossy answered Werth by questioning the imminence of war 
between the Reich and the USSR, and by expressing doubt about Ger-
many's willingness to come to a military agreement with a small country 
like Hungary.28 
Not satisfied with the Premier's reply, on the 31st the Chief-of-Staff 
approached Bardossy with another plea for a Hungarian-German mili-
tary pact. Arguing along the same lines as before, he asked for permis-
sion to take up this matter with German military leaders. Not having 
received a reply to his latest proposal, on 14 June Werth again submitted 
a memorandum to the Premier. He predicted that the question of war 
between Germany and Soviet Russia would be decided "very soon." He 
also assured Bardossy that, in view of the Wehrmacht's past record and 
the doubtful strength of the Red Army, it was certain that the Germans 
would achieve victory in a short time. Hungary's participation in the 
war would last for a very short while. The reserves could be demobilized 
by "harvest time." It is interesting to note why Werth felt that Hungary 
had to participate in the expected German invasion of Russia. Hungary 
was already committed to the Axis. Her Christian and nationalist ide-
ology and anti-Bolshevik outlook obliged her to participate. The preser-
vation of the country's territorial integrity and of its social and eco-
nomic order also argued for the elimination of the Soviet Union, a 
potentially dangerous neighbour. Another reason for participation, 
Werth stressed, was the question of Hungarian territorial aggrandize-
ment. Hungary's expansion depended on his participation in the Ger-
man campaign. The situation was critical, according to Werth. Rumania 
had already committed herself to participation in the German war 
against Russia. If Hungary refused to join, the Chief-of-Staff argued, 
she would not only have to give up hopes of regaining more of Transyl-
vania, but would have to face the prospect of losing the areas she had 
obtained in 1940.29 
Werth's latest memorandum was discussed by Hungary's civilian 
leaders at a meeting of the Ministerial Council on 15 June and was re-
jected. That same day the message came from Ribbentrop informing the 
Hungarian Government that German-Russian relations would be "clari-
fied" by the first week of July at the latest.30 The note from Berlin did not 
mention the question of Hungary's role in the coming showdown. Evi-
dently, Hungarian participation in the opening phase of the attack on 
Russia was not desired. More ominous was the fact that the Germans 
announced the planned visit to Budapest of a member of their General 
Staff for the purpose of conducting discussions with the Hungarian 
military command. In anticipation of these talks, Bardossy felt obliged 
to remind Werth of the Government's position on the question of the 
country's participation in the war. But the Premier's warning proved 
unnecessary, for the German emissary, General Franz Haider, came to 
Budapest a few days later with the aim of obtaining Hungarian co-
operation in minor matters only.31 
Prior to the 22nd of June no demand was made by Berlin on either the 
Hungarian Government or the military to effect the country's involve-
ment in the war. Nor did this situation change on the 22nd, the day of the 
launching of Operation Barbarossa. It was only on the following day 
that an ominous change took place in the attitude of the Germans. On 
that morning General Kurt Himer, the Wehrmacht's special representa-
tive in Hungary, visited Werth to convey the view of the German High 
Command that support by Hungary would be most welcome. This sup-
port, however, would have to be offered voluntarily: Germany would 
make no formal requests.32 
Himer's message to Werth introduced a new factor into the growing 
clash of views within Hungary's leadership on the question of participa-
tion in the war. Up to this time it was only the Hungarian military which 
demanded involvement. Now it became known that this was Germany's 
wish also. The civilian government was still opposed; in fact, the Minis-
terial Council once more rejected the idea at a meeting held on the morn-
ing of the 23rd.33 But the Cabinet does not seem to have been firm on its 
decision. A few of its members undoubtedly favoured participation in 
the war, while many others, including Bardossy himself, felt increasingly 
uneasy about Hungarian inaction. To mollify those who demanded a 
demonstration of Hungarian solidarity with Hitler's "crusade against 
Bolshevism," the Council decided to break diplomatic relations with 
Moscow. This move may have given some relief to those who wished to 
avoid tackling the larger question of the day: the issue of Hungary's role 
in the German war. But it was temporary relief only, for the question of 
participation in the conflict was to return very soon to haunt Hungary's 
leaders. 
When Bardossy was informed of the contents of Himer's message, he 
summoned Otto von Erdmannsdorff, Germany's Minister to Budapest, 
for an interview and informed him that the question of Hungary's par-
ticipation in the war was up to the civilian authorities to decide. His 
government would be willing to review the question, but only if it was 
asked to do so through diplomatic channels. Communist historians 
usually claim that Bardossy refused voluntary participation in the war 
because he wanted to exact a price for Hungarian help. It is more likely, 
however, that he was still in favour of staying out of the conflagration 
but did not want to admit this before the Germans. Accordingly, he tried 
to avoid Hungarian involvement by insisting on what the Germans were 
not willing to provide: a formal request for Hungarian assistance.34 But 
the pressure on Bardossy to yield continued to grow during the next 
forty-eight hours. On the 25th a message arrived from Rome bringing 
Mussolini's warning that continued inaction by Hungary could have 
unfortunate consequences for the country. Later that day came the news 
of Slovakia's entry into the war. The Axis front was now almost com-
plete, only Hungary was missing. And, on the next day, an incident 
occurred which resulted in the entry into the war of that country as well: 
the air-raid on the city of Kassa (Kosice) and other points in north-
eastern Hungary. 
Much has been written on this perplexing incident of modern Hun-
garian history and yet next to nothing is known as to who carried out the 
attack and why. The raid, which in Kassa resulted in about sixty casual-
ties and much material damage, was perpetrated by a small number of 
planes in broad daylight, in full view of Hungarian military authorities. 
Still, no positive identification of the aircraft was made, and commen-
tators on the incident have been left guessing as to the nationality and 
motive of the attackers. The Hungarian military blamed the attack on 
the Russians, a view which became the official explanation of the inci-
dent at the time. Yet, already during the war, rumours circulated in 
Hungary that the bombing was the work of the Germans who wanted to 
drag the country into the war. This version was accepted after the war by 
Horthy and his supporters as the true explanation. Communist his-
torians have consistently blamed German and Hungarian "fascists" and 
"militarists" for the incident, while a life-time student of Hungarian his-
tory, Professor C. A. Macartney, endorsed still another contemporary 
rumour, according to which the raid was carried out by Czech or Slovak 
deserters flying German planes, on their way to Russia.35 In 1972 the 
argument came round full circle when the present writer argued in an 
article that neither the "German" nor the "Slovak" version stood the test 
of evidence and that the most likely explanation of the riddle was that 
Russian planes bombed Kassa by mistake.36 Recently an American his-
torian reopened the debate by presenting some circumstantial evidence 
indicating that the raid may have been masterminded by one or more 
members of Hungary's officer corps.37 
Who bombed Kassa and why may never be known. And it does not 
really matter. What is more important is that the bombing precipitated a 
number of decisions in Budapest which ended in Hungary's entry into 
the war. The report of the attack was first received by Werth, who, ac-
companied by Defence Minister Bartha, hurried to consult with Horthy. 
On hearing the news, the Regent became agitated and called for retalia-
tion against Russia. By the time Bardossy arrived at the meeting, a 
decision had been arrived at in favour of immediate action. Bardossy 
insisted that before any steps were taken, the Ministerial Council had to 
be summoned. This was agreed to and the fateful meeting of Horthy, 
Werth, Bartha and Bardossy came to a hasty end. By the time the minis-
ters assembled the Premier had already made up his mind. The Hun-
garian military had wanted war all along. The Germans, whom he 
instinctively believed to be the real perpetrators of the air-raid, wanted 
Hungarian participation badly enough to resort to such vile means to 
achieve their ends, while the Regent clamoured for retaliation against 
Russia. In view of this situation, Bardossy believed that there was only 
one course for him to follow: to obtain the Cabinet's consent to a declara-
tion of a state of hostilities between Hungary and the USSR. The Cabi-
net consented without much disagreement. It is ironic that Bardossy 
may have been mistaken on two counts in his analysis of the situation. 
The Kassa raid may not have been a German "plot," and it is not certain 
that by calling for a reply to the attack Horthy meant a declaration of 
hostilities or only reprisals against a selected Soviet target.38 But before 
matters could be clarified, the decisions had been taken and there was to 
be no retreat. And so it came to pass that on the morning of 27 June 
1941, Hungary's involvement in the war was announced in Budapest. 
Viewed from an historical perspective, the events of 26 June 1941 
appear to have been the outcome of a trend in Hungarian politics which 
had its beginnings in the years before the outbreak of the Second World 
War. Ever since the premiership of General Gombos, the influence of 
Hungary's military had been growing in the country's affairs. As war 
approached in Europe, this increased strength of the military resulted in 
a tug-of-war between the country's civilian leaders and its generals on 
the question of strategy in a rapidly deteriorating international situa-
tion. The country's soldiers, with few exceptions, favoured closer associ-
ation with the Axis and a more energetic programme of "gathering in" 
the lands that Hungary had lost in 1919-20. The civilian government 
was often divided on these questions. Its best elements wished to follow 
a cautious approach: they wanted to avoid an irreversible commitment 
to Germany and involvement in a European war. 
The division within Hungary's leadership was not the only factor 
which worked to the advantage of the country's officer corps. The inter-
national situation was increasingly conducive to a pro-Axis orientation. 
The fact that more and more of East Central Europe came under Nazi 
control, undoubtedly enhanced the influence of Hungarian officers 
advocating closer co-operation with Germany; and Hitler's stunning 
victories in 1939 and 1940 helped to confirm the wisdom of their argu-
ments. In the mid- and late 'thirties it was still possible to argue that 
Hungary had much to risk by tying her fate to an aggressive Germany, 
but after the spring of 1940 such arguments carried little weight. 
Still another factor which had helped the growth of the military's in-
fluence in Hungary had been the increasing radicalization of the coun-
try's politics after the mid-'thirties. Fueled by the discontent caused by 
the Depression and the slowness of social reform, right-radical groups 
and movements mushroomed in some segments of Hungarian society. 
They often drew their inspiration from the success of German economic 
recovery and rearmament as well as an effective German foreign policy. 
Attempts to stem the rising rightist tide in Hungary brought only tem-
porary relief. The country's conservative and liberal elements could only 
fight a rear-guard action against the rightist onslaught. Since the time of 
Gombos, every Hungarian premier had come into office with the inten-
tion to reverse or at least to slow down this trend, but not one of them 
succeeded. Some, like Imredy, became converts to the rightist cause, 
while others collapsed or gave up under the strains and frustrations of 
the struggle. The most obvious victim of this process was Teleki, but 
there were others as well. And the departure of such men from the top 
leadership of the country as Teleki, Kanya and Bethlen had drastic con-
sequences for Hungarian policy-making. In their own time these men 
counterbalanced the influence of the radical right and the military. They 
restrained the Regent, this septuagenarian gentleman who was given to 
fits of temper and over-enthusiasm in times of crisis. In June 1941, how-
ever, Bardossy, the only man who could have restrained Horthy, lacked 
the moral courage to do so. 
The real tragedy of 26 June was that the two men who broke the news 
of the air-raid to Horthy happened to be two pro-German generals. By 
the time Bardossy arrived at the meeting, the ex-admiral was in agree-
ment with the soldiers on the need for immediate, emphatic action. As 
head of state, Horthy should have exercised more caution; while Bar-
dossy should have protested the haste of the soldiers. But, he seems to 
have lacked the resolve to resist when confronted by an emphatic and 
unanimous demand. Under the circumstances the Cabinet could do very 
little. A few of its members voiced their disapproval, but they were voted 
down. Only a statesman of much wisdom, foresight, and high moral 
scruples could have saved the country from the decision to join the Ger-
man war. Hungary had several such statesmen during the Horthy era. 
But in June 1941 not one of them could be found among the top leaders 
of the country. They had fallen victims to the power struggles of the 
previous three years. 
A fair assessment of the subject of the Hungarian military's relation-
ship to diplomacy should include an examination of the war years, up to 
1944 when the Horthy era came to an end in the midst of a Nazi coup 
d'etat. Such a study is beyond the scope of this essay (and has been 
beyond the energies of this writer in spite of persistent plans to embark 
on it). Fortunately, considerable work is available on the subject,39 
which enables us to make some relevant observations. 
The general belief among scholars not familiar with the best research 
on wartime Hungarian history seems to be that Hungarian diplomacy 
continued to be dominated by a pro-German orientation inspired mainly 
by the country's military until about the time of German reverses in 
North Africa and at Stalingrad. But the evidence does not support such 
an interpretation. On the contrary, the available data suggests that the 
hold which General Werth and his followers had on Hungarian diplo-
macy was short-lived. 
The fact is that Werth was removed from his post as early as Septem-
ber 1941. The circumstances of his dismissal cannot be related here in 
detail. It must suffice to say that the whole affair originated in a dis-
agreement over the extent of Hungary's participation in the German 
war effort during the summer of 1941. The limited nature of Hungarian 
military help to the Germans irritated Werth. To bring about a larger 
Hungarian role in the fighting in Russia, Werth approached the govern-
ment with another of his long memoranda in which he accused the 
civilian administration of obstructing the war effort and thereby con-
ducting a policy detrimental to Hungarian national interests. Werth also 
made promises to the German General Staff for the escalation of Hun-
garian military effort against the Russians. But he overreached himself. 
Premier Bardossy resented both the content and the manner of the 
Chief-of-Staff's protests and decided to complain to Regent Horthy.40 
At the same time Werth encountered opposition from an unexpected 
quarter. Another of the country's influential soldiers, Lieutenant-General 
Ferenc Szombathelyi, the commander on the Russian Front, spoke out 
against the Chief-of-Staff's views in a memorandum in which he deemed 
the outcome of the war uncertain, and the best policy for Hungary, a 
withdrawal of her troops from Russia. Next, Szombathelyi was sum-
moned to Budapest for consultation. After hearing both sides of the 
argument, Horthy asked for Werth's resignation and appointed Szom-
bathelyi as the Chief-of-Staff.41 Although Szombathelyi was also an 
ethnic German (his original name was Knauz), he proved to be a loyal 
supporter of the pro-allied orientation of Premier Nicholas Kallay (1942-
1944). This change in Hungary's military leadership was a significant 
one and has been called a "reversal of policy" whose causes remain "one 
of the mysteries of Hungary's role in World War II."42 
What happened in September 1941 was not really a "reversal of 
policy" nor is it a "mystery." It can more accurately be described as a 
return to the situation which had prevailed before that eventful spring 
and summer of 1941. For blind and one-sided alignment with Germany 
was never the policy of Hungary's leaders, and the country's military, 
however influential and however meddlesome, did not completely domi-
nate foreign policy except for a brief period in 1941. Prior to 1941 their 
attempts to gain an upper hand in diplomatic decision making had been 
repeatedly frustrated. Gombds's drive to create a new Hungary on the 
Italian model was obstructed. During the Czechoslovak crisis, the mili-
tary's advice was disregarded. Next, their new-found ally, Imredy, was 
driven from office. Werth's 1940 proposal for a military pact with Ger-
many was dismissed. His demands next spring for unconditional co-
operation in the German invasion of Yugoslavia was not heeded, though 
by this time the military almost had its way. Still later the Chief-of-
Staff's calls for a German-Hungarian alliance against the USSR fell on 
deaf ears until the crises of late June unnerved the civilian government. 
The balance-of-power between the civilian leaders and the military had 
gradually become more and more precarious as the war progressed, and 
as Nazi armies scored one triumph after another. In the summer of 1941 
the balance tipped in favour of the Hungarian military or, more pre-
cisely, its pro-German elements. But the supremacy of the General Staff 
in diplomacy proved to be a brief one; unfortunately for Hungary, it also 
proved to be one in which irreversible decisions were taken. Of course, it 
is by no means certain that Hungary could have remained neutral in the 
war much beyond 1941 even if Werth and his supporters had not been 
there to exert an impact on the country's affairs. One should not forget 
the fact that by this time Germany wielded enormous power in East 
Central Europe. One only has to think of the pressure which Berlin put 
on Budapest early in 1942 to bring about a great increase in the Hun-
garian war effort. Yet the country's civilian government, headed after 
March of 1942 by Kallay, was in command of policy and used it, as much 
as the difficult circumstances permitted, to further Hungarian, as op-
posed to Axis, interests. 
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Hungary has, since the end of World War 11, staggered from a slavish 
obeisance to Soviet directives; through a heretical and violent outburst 
in 1956; an innovative, yet failed plan to decentralize industry and gen-
erate efficiency and profit; to a current impasse, which sees centralized 
controls returning, while the doctrinal laxity generated in Kadar's fa-
mous dictum, "those who are not against us, are with us,"1 has fostered a 
situation in which official declarations of socialist solidarity meet with a 
public ennui supported and accompanied by the inscrutability of macro-
economic theory linked to dialectical postulates. 
Wandering around the streets of the inner city of Budapest, does not 
give the casual visitor the impression that he is in the centre of a society 
in which the austere maxims of Marx and Lenin really touch the lives of 
many people. The chic young men and women staring at the window 
displays on Vaci utca, the murmur of the polite and often multi-lingual 
conversations in the crowded coffee shop of the Duna Intercontinental 
Hotel, and the musty chandeliered, decaying elegance of the Gerbaud, 
now the Vorosmarty cafe, where an older clientele dip into their creamy 
cakes, sip their brandy, and fondle their glasses of soda water while in 
heated discussion about the results of the latest soccer game, defines this 
second city of the Austro-Hungarian Empire as surviving in its own way 
despite the alien and imposed constraints enforced by the presence of 
Soviet troops. The wags of the city, cheerfully and with a droll cynicism 
characterize Hungary as, "the best barracks in the whole camp." 
To a North American, the crowded and yet frequently available buses 
and the streets busy with shoppers carrying net bags full of an assort-
ment of groceries, is an archaic and nostalgic sight. The form of the city 
mirrors Vienna, with its ring streets and broad avenues. The older 
homes of the departed aristocracy, now largely transformed into em-
bassies and offices for official state enterprises, line Nepkoztarsasag ut 
(Avenue of the People's Republic), which is still called Andrassy ut, 
because its socialist nomenclature is too awkward, much as 6th Avenue 
in New York City has never been fully accepted as "The Avenue of the 
Americas." Further away in the hilly region of Buda, is Rozsadomb, 
another centre of the grand style of the late 19th century, now more 
fittingly an area where the new rich and powerful graciously display 
their achievements. In this area on frequent occasions, the black, chauf-
feur driven Chevrolet of Janos Radar passes on its way to deliver the 
aging leader of the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party to his residence 
high in these hills, or to take him to the headquarters of the Party on the 
banks of the Danube. 
The apparent political and economic tranquility is to a considerable 
extent symbolized by KLadar, once the hated courier of Soviet interven-
tion in 1956, who has been instrumental in calming the fractious ele-
ments, both in the Party and outside it, into accepting the reality of 
Soviet domination, while yet allowing a considerable degree of internal 
laxity in the definition of what socialism entails. Kadar is the central 
figure in a peculiar drama in which the stage is set by the Soviet Union. 
The actors, props and stage hands are the Hungarian Apparatus, and 
the sparse audience, the Hungarian population, watching and critically 
commenting on the performance in hushed whispers, so as not to dis-
tract the players, and hoping, if not for a happy ending, at least for a 
pleasant diversion. 
Kadar's popularity in Hungary is unmatched by any other leader in 
the Soviet Bloc. He has managed to all but erase the memories of the 
depredations of the Rakosi regime, and to enhance the separation be-
tween public and private spheres, which increases the distance between 
an imposed socialism and the bourgeoisie value sub-structure which 
continues in spite of strenuous attempts to alter it.2 
This enterprising compromise of Hungary's has not been a simple 
matter to achieve. The major instrument in this alteration has been the 
emphasis on planning and coordination, managed by experts who have 
replaced inexpert functionaries who were loyal to the demands of the 
Soviet Union. With this emphasis on planning, a dual Hungary3 is in 
process of forming, in which the state and society are two separate 
entities with little attention paid by the masses to public pronounce-
ments unless they intrude on the defences constructed to insulate and 
protect their privacy. 
This duality and the protective distancing developed, is most visible in 
the activities of the 'political planner', who is no longer the committed 
Party worker informing on the indiscretions of his co-workers, but a 
management expert using the tools of the social sciences to acquire use-
ful information to enhance productivity, irrespective of what may be felt 
and thought by those performing the tasks. This role of expertise has 
fostered the generation of research institutes in which data gathering on 
attitudes and opinions is seen as a prime mechanism for the ultimate 
achievement of an enhanced commitment to socialism. 
This shift in emphasis began a few years after the Kidar regime con-
solidated its hold, when in 1960 the acceptability of social science re-
search was announced with the publication of three articles, one on 
social science methodology, another on the reaction of young people to 
jazz, and a survey on the uses of leisure and moral and political con-
cerns.4 In the ensuing years, both a Sociological Research Institute and a 
Public Opinion Research Centre linked with the Radio were established. 
The formation of the Sociology Institute was initially placed in the 
hands of Andras Hegediis, the Prime Minister during the final months 
of the Rakosi regime. However, the transformation of Hegediis from an 
unquestioning and loyal servant to a critic of Soviet policy culminated in 
1968, when he signed with others a proclamation condemning the War-
saw Pact nations' invasion of Czechoslovakia. At this point Hegediis 
was replaced at the Institute by Kalman Kulcsar, a more acceptable, if 
apolitical figure, who is still at the helm of the Institute. 
Hegediis brought into the Institute a number of young people, who 
were not all formally trained in the social sciences, amongst whom were 
several students of Gyorgy Lukacs. Hegediis and his staff saw the alter-
natives which Sociology could adopt in its milieu,5 and his leadership 
was based on a toleration for a diversity of perspectives. In recent years, 
however, some of the researchers have concentrated inordinately on the 
contradictions within the policy formulations of the Party, which has 
resulted, for some, in exile, and for others, enforced silence. Conse-
quently it has become increasingly obvious that the desired and ac-
ceptable stance of the social sciences in Hungary is that of a hand-
maiden to the Apparatus in its desire to eliminate ideologically based 
criticisms, and to achieve a greater commitment to socialist values. This 
end-of-ideology approach has not, however, resulted in the attainment 
of the planned enhancement of social cohesion. On the contrary, the 
available data show if anything a conscious lack of personal investment 
in socialist shibboleths. The basis for this assertion is founded on a range 
of studies completed to date, especially in the area of Public Opinion, 
which show a clear and unmistakable lack of interest on the part of most 
sectors of the population in the nature, form and substance of the gov-
ernmental machinery to which they are subject.6 It would, however, be 
premature to see this indifference as an indicator of the essential ille-
gitimacy of the political form of the nation. Rather these responses may 
simply be defined as a measure of the distance between what most 
people would see as important issues which concern them directly, as 
opposed to those that are fixed and consequently not subject to debate 
or discussion. 
In spite of the lack-lustre evidence produced to date, these studies 
continue to be supported by the Agit-Prop directorate of the Central 
Committee. Several possible explanations for this are given by the 
workers in the area. One is that the development of the critical faculties 
of the people has not had a sufficient time to develop,7 and consequently 
these studies should not be halted by circumstances which will be altered 
in time. There is also an awareness on the part of researchers in the field 
that the population is quite suspicious about the uses to which such in-
formation may be put. The breaking down of this wariness to respond is 
also seen as requiring time.8 Finally, these studies continue, even given 
the dearth of useful data, as they are defined as contributing to the 
development of more refined and accurate methodological procedures.9 
As long as these studies do continue, they are indicators of the domi-
nance of the 'liberal' component in the leadership structure, who care 
less about day-to-day ritual allegiance and more about long-run macro-
economic and social developments. 
This gap in information and the general thrust of development on the 
part of Hungary's leadership suggests that there is a covert conflict 
between the assumptions implicit in the original Marxian postulates 
concerning the 'new man', combined with the planner's desire to generate 
an informed and aware public, and the announced lack of interest in 
these issues exhibited by the population. The ideological directives de-
signed to develop this ideal, appear to have actually enhanced the pri-
vatized and publicly irresponsible individual Nietzsche called the Last 
Man.10 
No shepherd and one herd! Everyone wanteth the same; everyone is 
equal; he who hath other sentiments goeth voluntarily into the mad-
house. 
We have discovered happiness . . . say the last man and blinketh there-
by. 
The unanticipated outcome of this new emphasis on manipulation 
has reopened the door to a virile return of extreme bourgeois-like indi-
vidualism," in which political and economic controls are seen by many 
as hurdles to be vaulted, rather than as guidelines and constraints en-
hancing the development of a higher moral order. 
Given the inert public audience, and the continued attempts to cajole 
it into a concern with the commonweal on the part of the Agit-Prop and 
its technically proficient yet ineffective consultants, the outcome obvi-
ously disappoints those inclined toward a pristine Marxian orthodoxy. 
However, it is possible to see in this, that the rational emphases with a 
coordinated society linked to the distant achievement of Utopian goals, 
displaces the concept of morality with cooptation, while ethical action is 
replaced by a systemic concern in which the major stress is on technical 
manipulation and management.12 Man in this guiding perspective be-
comes an exterior creature, devoid of substance, who fulfills his quotas, 
and readily accepts his place, and who never reacts in any way but those 
defined from above as acceptable. The growth of this simplistic creature 
devoid of passion and desire, who conforms to both the formal and sub-
stantive criteria of rationality, returns us to the 'iron cage' of organiza-
tion that so overwhelmed Max Weber.13 
In Hungary, this separation of the world of the planners and the 
people simply confirms the irrelevance of the initial visions of the end of 
the divisiveness of toil and the isomorphism of the general and individual 
wills. These issues are distant from the programmatic demands of co-
ordination, and it is largely left to Western Marxist scholars to continue 
the debate over these critical issues.14 The dissociation of ideology, ef-
ficiency and morality from the private concerns of the population has 
fostered in Hungary an alienation from public policy pronouncements 
which is only relieved by a traditional fatalism and a cynical coffee house 
humour in which individuals seek solace and relief from the stresses 
imposed by removing themselves from the battleground and focusing on 
simpler, immediate and more mundane pleasures.15 
The appeal of this Hungarian resolution is widespread among the 
populations of the other Soviet Bloc nations, and tourists from East 
Germany, Poland, and the Soviet Union flock to the sohisticated de-
lights of Budapest. 
For those few within Hungary who are unable to quietly tolerate the 
contradictions, ostracism has been refurbished as a technique for re-
moving potential dissidents. For yet others, defection to the West re-
mains an alternative, when and if the opportunity presents itself. Among 
those who remain, silence is acknowledged as the most effective posture 
in coping with the charade of benevolent domination.16 
Nearly 150 years ago, De Tocqueville in viewing the United States 
feared the potential for despotism in a nation committed to individual-
ism. In Hungary today, the managed, humanized socialism which has 
developed illustrates more the outcome, rather than a prelude to totali-
tarianism.17 
Each of them, living apar t , is a stranger to the fate of all the rest; his 
children, and his private friends constitute to him the whole of man-
kind. As for the rest of his fellow citizens, he is close to them, but he 
does not see them; he touches them, but he does not feel them; he exists 
only in himself and for himself alone; and if his kindred still remain to 
him, he may be said at any rate to have lost his country. 
Other Variations 
The Hungarian practice of inadvertently encouraging an alienation 
from public involvements is an extreme, yet effective mechanism for 
keeping Hungary quietly within the socialist camp. The examples of 
some of the attempts to bring public concerns and private interests 
together have not been lost sight of in Hungary. For example, the at-
tempt in Czechoslovakia to re-establish ties to its Social-Democratic 
past resulted in invasion and a renewal of Soviet-defined orthodoxy. 
None of the other alternatives which have developed come close to 
affording the privacy available to Hungarians. Roumania has, for ex-
ample, forcefully maintained a high order of internal orthodoxy and 
control, while its foreign policy links to Israel symbolize a search for a 
modicum of autonomy from the Soviet presence. In Poland the strong 
religious tradition embodied in the Roman Catholic Church's defense of 
Polish nationality against the encroachments of the Protestant, Ger-
manic West, and the Russian Orthodox East, remains the one potent 
moral force containing the strains of an inefficient economy. The Church 
retains a powerful capacity to minimize the potential repression which 
might be used by the hand-maidens of the Soviet Apparatus to ensure 
acquiescence to their directives. This tie between the Polish Party and 
the Church remains all the more anomalous, as publicly the Church is 
the standing challenge to the Marxist faith. 
East Germany presents the unique case of successfully combining 
doctrinal orthodoxy and public involvement with industrial and agri-
cultural efficiency. The reconsolidation of the East German Apparatus 
and the Trade Unions after 1956, and the subsequent building of the 
Berlin Wall has led to the development of a more sectarian and garrison-
like posture, more closely tied to the Soviet Union's aspirations than 
anywhere else in the Bloc. There are several possible reasons why the 
leadership of the GDR is as successful as it is. Firstly, there is the ever-
present model of the good bourgeois life provided by West Germany 
and the felt necessity to develop a more stringent and cohesive ideologi-
cal argument to buttress doctrinal purity. East Germany's comparative 
poverty contrasts with the abundance of its Western neighbour, and 
provides a niche for more pristine emphases.18 Secondly, there is the 
severe limitation on travel imposed on the citizens of the GDR, which 
prevents them from savouring alternatives.19 Finally, in the GDR the 
remnants of Prussian respect for authority may simply combine readily 
with the latest accretion of totalitarianism. 
Yugoslavia and Albania present two heretical postures, one based on 
relative affluence, the other on poverty. In the case of Yugoslavia, an 
early decision was made to establish its own fellowship, in which the 
leadership of Moscow was rejected. With the aging of Tito, overtures to 
bring these errant souls back into line are repeatedly suggested, but 
Yugoslavia remains too involved with its own problems to be easily 
courted. In Albania, isolation and poverty have combined to foster an 
extreme set of controls in which the orthodoxy of the Soviet Union 
looks bland and compromised. 
The greatest deviation from Soviet orthodoxy is not to be found with-
in the boundaries of its satellite states but in the rise of Communist 
Parties in Western Europe, where the possibilities of assuming power 
are imminent. The announced intentions of these parties is to seek their 
own paths rather than follow the model provided by the Soviet Union. 
The combination of a volatile political tradition in such countries as 
Portugal, Spain and Italy, which have been subject to the totalitarianism 
of fascism, and the moral emphasis visible in their uncontaminated and 
untried Marxism, suggests that their pronouncements may well enhance 
the confusion and perplexity of what is entailed in socialism. It is per-
haps not surprising to see that Janos Kadar will be among the first of the 
satellite leaders to go to Italy to discuss the dimensions of what portends 
to be another schism in the fabric of socialist solidarity.20 
The extent of the variations so far developed, illustrates the visible 
forms of compromise taken to reduce the strains and alter the impact of 
directed economic growth. The continued existence of the myriad prob-
lems faced by these countries and the variations in the interface between 
technique and naked domination point to the general complexities in 
the struggle for control and the strange allies that will be sought out in 
order to maintain hegemony by the Party. 
Resolution 
There is no precise way to describe the many possible scenarios that 
may be forthcoming from these modifications in doctrinal emphasis. If 
Hungary's example is, as suggested, an extreme yet acceptable position, 
within the defined limits, then the two elements, bureaucratization and 
privatization, pose a tenuous resolution to the unsolvable problems of 
ideological control and the hopes for the development of a new and 
higher socialist morality. It should not be forgotten that one of the cen-
tral sources behind the modifications in orthodoxy results from the effort 
to raise the level of living. The achievement of relative affluence has had 
a greater impact in calling into question the traditional controls than 
any other single result of the technical efforts directed within Eastern 
Europe. The paradox of affluence in these societies, as in the West, is 
that it has neither generated the hoped for relaxation in social divisive-
ness, nor enhanced the moral component of social relations. On the con-
trary, the rise in the standard of living has fostered an unbridled indi-
vidualism in which crass manoeuvering for advantage seems a likely if 
undesired outcome. With this loosening of constraints over individual 
action, the problem of control becomes, to the governing body, one in 
which private excesses ought to be regulated so as to provide for the 
common good. This regulation and manipulation take the place of indi-
vidual belief and commitment. Yet regulation without a common value 
core provides the seed of its own ultimate destruction. No contract was 
ever created which does not contain enough loop-holes for the artificer 
to wander through in maximizing his own interests. The rise in the 
standard of living through technical means is a prime factor in the tran-
sition from sectarian exclusiveness to churchly laxity. This change in 
organizational style increases the distance between ideology and organi-
zation, and minimizes the expressive involvements of individuals in the 
very structures which control and regulate their instrumental energies. 
The result appears to portend what Durkheim called the 'moral medi-
ocrity'21 of an unrestrained individualism in which the vitality of the 
social sphere is replaced by Faustian excesses which are unconstrained 
by normatively internalized limits. This is a perplexing outcome for 
those who look for more in humanity. Yet this separation of the public 
and private spheres of meaning has captured the interest of many in the 
West who also see a decline in the coherence of liberal political struc-
tures.22 
To those in Eastern Europe to whom the assertion of creating a 'new 
society' and a 'new man'carry reminders of the murderous depradations 
of the past combined with crass and empty moralizing, the option of 
substituting private meanings for public irrelevancies does offer, if not 
the same range of options as in the West, the possibility of a lonely yet 
euphoric sense of deliverance. How far this can go is, of course, a moot 
point. Much as the Reformation created Weber's 'iron cage' of con-
formity, there are no doubt traps in this alienating construction. While 
we can see the deadening social outcomes to the masses in the Soviet 
Union and its satellites, who are burdened with the organized unac-
countability of totalitarianism, and who have only begun to savour the 
possibilities of carving out their lonely, private nichcs, the challenge is 
inviting. 
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Searching for Land: 
The First Hungarian Influx into Canada 
Martin L. Kovacs 
It is a well-established fact that the first groups of Hungarian immi-
grants to the Canadian West1 came from south of the border, where they 
had found employment and often spent several years working in coal 
mines, foundries, and factories mainly in Pennsylvania. In this context, 
the question arises as to what compelling reasons had prompted these 
people to leave their jobs in the United States and undertake the strain 
and expenses of a transfer to the west of Canada. The study of the news-
papers from the mining areas in the eastern United States reveals the 
main characteristics of an economy free in the extreme from social and 
safety legislation of any kind. In conformity with the leading ideas of the 
age the American business magnates firmly believed that their task was 
practically exhausted in the achievement of the greatest possible profit 
and that it was up to the individual worker to protect and represent his 
interests as best he could. Consequently, what we would nowadays call 
industrial disputes were the order of the day. In the ensuing strikes and 
violence the Eastern and Central European immigrants, including, of 
course, the Hungarians, were usually thrown in between the two warring 
camps of the workers and the employers. As a rule, it was the immigrants 
who had to bear the brunt of any fight. Thus the employers could use 
newly arrived immigrants to become strike breakers and force a settle-
ment with the strikers. On the other hand, it was not unusual for the 
trade unions to utilize immigrant miners or factory workers as shock 
troops against sheriffs and suffer severe losses when shooting occurred. 
As to job opportunities, the inexperienced and untrained immigrant, 
often illiterate and usually without any command of English, was last to 
be employed and first to be dismissed particularly during times of eco-
nomic recession or depression. Moreover, owing to the same qualities it 
seemed natural for him to receive the most dangerous and therefore least 
desirable assignments in factories, foundries or underground in the 
mines. Yet in view of such circumstances, it would have been cheaper, if 
not more humanitarian, to employ persons with skill and greater com-
mand of English, and thus reduce the likelihood of accidents. Nonethe-
less, reports abound in the press about minor and even major industrial 
calamities also in later years. Such items were reported regularly and in 
detail by the American Hungarian press. By the late 1890s the Amerikai 
Nemzetor (American National Guard) and afterwards the Szabadsag 
(Liberty) were the principal distributors of news among Hungarians in 
America. The American Hungarian press supplied the newspapers of 
Hungary with source material concerning industrial accidents in the 
eastern United States. Such information was not only published in 
many newspapers of Hungary, but often received editorial comment as 
well. The main motive behind this approach lay in the government's 
desire to counteract success stories continually arriving from overseas, 
and to discredit and undermine the immigration movement as a whole. 
Whatever their original intentions, such reports serve to show some 
darker aspects of the life of Hungarian immigrants in America and 
present instances, in their midst, of alienation of varying severity. 
A single issue of a newspaper contained accounts of industrial acci-
dents and other mishaps symptomatic of alienation during an apparently 
brief period of the summer of 1895. Thus, owing to the cracking of a 
blast furnace at the Carnegie Steel Works at Braddock, Pennsylvania, 
nine workers lost their lives and sixteen were wounded; except for the 
foreman, all were Hungarians. In an explosion at the Cornwall mines 
near Lebanon another Hungarian worker was hit by a piece of iron 
which broke his ribs, killing him. At Scranton, Andras Kruni's right leg 
was amputated after its having been crushed by a cart in the Jessup coal 
mine. At Wilkesbarre a Hungarian miner was buried by coal and per-
ished of severe lacerations. A Hungarian factory hand at the National 
Sugar Refinery, Yonkers, was pulled by his apron into a machine and 
later expired in the hospital bed. Fear of illness and abject poverty 
prompted two Hungarians to end their lives with revolver shots.2 
Worries of various kinds, cares, tensions and perhaps the very fact of 
migration, often proved too nerve-racking. Thus an immigrant, upon 
reaching the border of Hungary, turned violently insane and had to be 
removed from the train.3 Apparently little change was seen in this re-
spect as time went by. A letter written by a Hungarian immigrant in 
America and published by the Hungarian newspaper reports 
. . . seldom is the day that a dozen or fourteen men should not be killed 
by the iron and the Americans only laugh that yet another Hunky is 
finished. There is enough men, one couldn' t see so many maimed per-
sons even in a war as in America, whose hand or leg has been cut off by 
the iron. . . . The American is very angry because Hungarian and other 
immigrants come, because he cannot make a living due to him. Besides, 
the poor Hungarian is despised and cannot very well get a job since 
they cannot talk with him.4 
Not much improvement could be noticed, despite the passage of 
years, in the way of life of the coal miners either. According to a report in 
1903 the working time of coal miners underground lasted from five in 
the morning until seven at night. This would prevent them from seeing 
the sun at all for weeks on end. In the opinion of the writer of the report, 
every Hungarian immigrating to America would do well to tell his rela-
tives: "I'm kissing you for the last time, I'm hugging you for the last time, 
1 shall be gone forever — since 1 don't know whether I will ever return 
alive from the coal mines."5 Apparently one of the worst years on record, 
in respect to economic development, occurred in 1907 and 1908. Begin-
ning in the middle of 1907, the United States coal and steel industries 
were hit by an extremely severe depression. In consequence, thousands 
of workers were dismissed and lost their bread. Also, 1907 witnessed one 
of the most tragic disasters in the history of mining, at Jacob's Creek 
near Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, on December 19. According to an article 
in a Hungarian newspaper this particular mine was known to have an 
extremely bad safety record; a great many workers had been killed in 
various accidents there, including more than one hundred miners. In the 
current disaster 315 men including 110 Hungarians were reported to 
have lost their lives. The journalist was moved to make the following 
comments: 
This new world is very strange. Everything is greedy here Even the 
earth. . . . It wants the life of that despised foreigner The stay of the 
derided and ridiculed Hungarian in the bowels of the earth is nothing 
but struggle and agony. He earns a few cents for himself and accumu-
lates heaps of money for the mining companies. All this is not enough. 
He must throw in his body as well, as sacrifice for the interior of the 
earth. Let also the body be reduced to carbon . . . so that the coal for 
sale might be augmented with charred bodies.6 
The receiving society's feeling of superiority and general attitude to 
"foreign" immigrants were clearly and outspokenly indicated through 
labelling certain groups with mocking nicknames. The most frequent 
such name used in reference to Hungarians was the word Hunky. It is 
not quite clear whether the word had derived as an abbreviation of the 
word 'Hungarian' or come from the name of the ancient horse-riding 
nomadic tribe of the Huns. The adjective Hun has become very pejora-
tive since its unfortunate use by the Emperor of Germany in connection 
with the Boxer Rebellion in 1900-1901.7 Nevertheless, some of its depre-
cating implications might have been anticipated in the older nickname 
Hunky. In any case, Hungarians of the time felt hurt and degraded 
through its use and complained bitterly about it. What kind of adverse 
value judgment contemporaries felt the sobriquet contained can be seen 
from this particular newspaper story: 
The ignorant foreign worker is driven by the hundred into the mine 
infiltrated with gas and thousand other dangers — and none of them 
will come back. Will the public opinion be upset? Oh n o ! . . . What does 
it matter, they are only Hunkies. — In the city of Gary a certain Andras 
Ribar who was singing in the street in Hungarian during the night was 
shot dead by a policeman. . . . The mayor of the city of Gary felt 
prompted to say . . . "Andras Ribar who has been killed was not a man 
but only a Hunky." 8 
Towards the end of 1910 the Szabadsag (the Hungarian language news-
paper of America) strikingly summarized the labour safety position in a 
large cartoon on its front page. Healthy muscular young workers are 
seen to march into a factory through its right-hand entrance; through 
the exit on the left a large group of cripples, one-legged and on crutches, 
and elderly are trudging outside. These victims of the factory are led by a 
legless man placed on a hand-cart propelling himself with his hands.9 
At that stage very little, if any, financial or other assistance was 
available for those workers who were permanently or partly incapaci-
tated. Thus, some of them could find only one solution for their troubles 
at the final stage of alienation, in the form of suicide. 
An ex-peasant from the Nyirseg, for two years a miner, found a par-
ticularly gruesome way to demonstrate his despair over the fact that he 
could not obtain work owing to an illness. While at work in the mine he 
had apparently put aside a stick of dynamite which he now placed in his 
mouth and detonated. The pieces of his body had to be collected within a 
circle some thirty feet in diameter and they were buried in the midst of 
the great and understandable sympathy of his Hungarian fellow work-
ers.10 
The traumatic experiences of Hungarian peasants in American fac-
tories and mines have filtered through into folksongs and poetry as well. 
The songs sung on the shores of the Huron and the Erie are at the same 
time interesting specimens of how English language elements have pene-
trated the American Hungarian language: 
A letter went f rom America somewhere [in Hungary] 
It is so sad that even its seal shows mourning 
My dear mother do not weep for me, it is all in vain. 
It's a small matter, only one miner will be missing f rom the mine ." 
The other folksong holds up the lack of interest which Francis Joseph, 
the Emperor and King of Austria-Hungary, was supposed to have felt 
towards the problem of emigration in Hungary. 
Francis Joseph is travelling in the direction of Eger. 
Three 'bodies1 are leaving for the new country. 
Francis Joseph is asking them what is new? 
"The taxes are too high, the country cannot bear them."1 2 
A poem, published in the Canadai Magyar Farmer (Canadian Hun-
garian Farmer) under the neutral sounding title of A Hunok (The 
Huns), deals in an epic manner with the suffering and accidents of Hun-
garian peasants as foundry workers. At the same time, it reflects the 
identity crisis felt owing to a clash between the folk pride felt about the 
supposed Hungarian-Hun relationship maintained in many legends of 
the peasants as well as in medieval chronicles, and the poor American 
image of the Huns. 
Migration has eternally continued on this earth . . . 
Atilla's late descendants have set out to move, 
They, the disloyal degenerate offspring, the helpless weaklings, 
Who are taunted as Huns by the people of America, 
Keep on toiling in terrible drudgery day and night 
Where the poisonous fumes of the fire are densest. 
There the Huns are pushed by members of hostile races, 
The Huns, the despised offspring of the great Hunnish army 
Of whom their ancestors had been once in deadly fear. 
Who would stand up for them, they who are alone; 
They, the toilers designated for death by flames! 
Their lean bony faces glow in the fierce glare, 
Contempt of deadly danger glitters in the eyes of each. 
The ardour by which the world had been subjugated once upon a time, 
Once again flares up in the degenerate progeny. 
Woe is him, who turns dizzy even for a moment; 
He will vanish without a trace from this planet. 
Not even dust will be left in the hungry blast furnace, 
The red-hot radiation will not even be dimmed. 
Another hand will take his place in no time. 
Who cares! The offspring of the Huns are a dying race. 
They do not possess a brother in this world. 
Also their glory now amounts to nothing, but a fairy tale and dream! 
He who is not reduced to ashes, will lose his leg, 
His hard-working arms, or the sight of his eyes. 
And then . . . that the grotesque sufferers cannot be seen. 
They are transferred to a distant island. 
There they will be extinguished slowly and forgotten, 
The destitute regiment of the poor quasi Huns. '3 
The poem appears to have been composed on the basis of the romantic 
Hun-Magyar kinship often stressed in folk legends, and it contains a 
definite message about the sorry fate of many a peasant factory-hand of 
the time. Besides, a clear doubt is expressed about the future of pre-1914 
Hungary and latent fear concerning the chances of survival of Hun-
garians as a nation. 
A newspaper item in Hungary written by a Hungarian visitor to 
America, provides a less sentimental and more realistic evaluation of 
Magyars as workers. In the opinion of this observer the fact that the 
Hungarian is a hard worker is acknowledged by the Americans; how-
ever, the Hunky is despised owing to his unassuming and simple way of 
life. They do not seem to approve of his apparent greediness to earn 
much money within a short time and at any price so that he can return to 
his native village and purchase land there. Consequently, the Hungarian 
worker is not very choosy as to work; he is not above becoming a strike 
breaker in a strike and therefore, the American employer will often 
resort to pitting Hungarian immigrants against the organized American 
workers. Since he does not even want to reach the American standard of 
wages, he is likely to keep down the level of wages. The writer of the 
article found that most Hungarian immigrants employed in the mines in 
iron and steel foundries were subject to dismissal without notice, since 
no legislation existed protecting the worker, or if it did, it was not 
carried out. No concern was shown towards the life and bodily health of 
the individual since everyone was expected to look after himself. "In this 
respect the American employer is ruthless and merciless."14 
Under these circumstances it is not surprising that Peter Nemeth 
should have contrasted the positions of Hungarian workers in Canada 
to those of their fellow-countrymen in the contemporary United States. 
He did this pointedly in the Amerikai Magyar Nepszava (American 
Hungarian People's Voice): 
. . . here in Canada Hungarians are respected and honoured Things 
and persons called Hungarian are synonymous with "best."This claim 
sounds almost incredible when we Hungarians living here in a strange 
world have been accustomed to being degraded and disparaged every 
now and then and to being called Hunkies.15 
No doubt in addition to the attraction of land, to the possibility of 
returning to farming, their ancestral occupation, this quiet appreciation 
— north of the border — of the person and personality of the Hungarian 
immigrant was a factor in persuading him to settle on the Canadian 
prairie. 
NOTES 
1. For further information with respect to emigration from Hungary and immi-
gration to English-speaking America, see M. L. ICovacs, "Aspects of Hungarian 
Peasant Emigration from Pre-1914 Hungary,"in I. Volgyes, ed., The Peasantry 
of Eastern Europe, 2 vols. (New York, 1979), I, pp. 119-132. 
2. Felsomagyarorszdg ['Upper Hungary'], August 28, 1895. 
3. Mihaly Karako, of Kenezlo, Szabolcs, since no proper medical facilities were 
available at Csacza, the famous border crossing place where several hundred 
thousand emigrants passed on their way to America, had to be placed under 
police arrest for his own sake. Nyirvidek ['Nyir Area'], March 23, 1902. 
4. Nyirvidek, April 27, 1902. 
5. Nyirvidek, March 22, 1903. 
6. Resicai Lapok ['Resica News'], January 16, 1908. The reporter, of course, is 
indulging in rhetorics when generalizing without restraint: "America is now in 
our eyes a country of misery and horror." 
7. References to the episode, often only partly accurate also with respect to the 
Huns, have circulated widely, as, for instance: "Huns . . . the barbarous race of 
Tartar origin, invading Italy under Attila, the Scourge of God, a.d. 451-53. 
Name applied to and claimed by the modern Germans. Derived from the ex-
Kaiser's advising the German troops sent to China in 1900 to act like the Huns 
under Attila." Charles Annandale, Home Study Dictionary (London, n.d.), 
355. 
8. Resicai Lapok, July 15, 1909. 
9. Szabadsdg ['Liberty'], October 31, 1910. 
10. Nagykaroly es Ermellek [places in eastern Hungary], March 18, 1911. 
11. Resicai Lapok, January 14, 1912. The Magyarized English words in the Hun-
garian text: 'majner' = miner; 'majna' = mine. 
12. Resicai Lapok, January 4, 1912. Eger : a city in Heves County in northeastern 
Hungary. 'Bodi' (body) seems to have been taken over from the practice of 
counting how many 'bodies' have entered or left the shafts and underground. 
13. Canadian Hungarian Farmer, November 15, 1913. 
14. Temesvdri Hirlap ['Temesvar News'], January 4, 1913. 
15. Peter Nemeth, "The Canadian Hungarian Farmsteads" [A Kanadai magyar 
tanyak], in Geza D. Berko, ed., The Festive Album of the Canadian Hungarian 
People's Voice Jubilee, 1899-1909 (New York, 1910), 79. Peter Nemeth was a 
very recent immigrant at that stage from the United States and, as a journalist, 
had a reasonably good grasp of the life and social status of the Hungarians 
there. Nevertheless, the fact that, for several decades, a "war" for immigrants 
had been going on between the two otherwise friendly countries must not be 
lost from sight. On top of that, Nemeth's newspaper, the Kanadai Magyarsag 
(Canadian Hungarians), later Canadai Magyar Farmer (Canadian Hungarian 
Farmer), heavily depended on government support. Yet the self-employment 
and relative independence of the farmers of the later peasant communities on 
the Canadian prairie were to justify many of the early expectations. Cf. Kovacs, 
"Aspects of Hungarian Peasant Emigration . . . ," pp. 121-123. 
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Aspects of Hungarian Settlement in 
Central Canada, 1921-1931 
N. F. Dreisziger 
In many respects the history of Canada's Central and East European 
ethnic groups is an unexplored field. This is especially true in the case of 
Hungarian Canadians. Aside from the work of Professor M. L. Kovacs 
on the Saskatchewan settlements, and a sociological study by the late 
John Kosa on some one hundred Ontario families, no professional 
scholar so far has done research on the history of these people.1 No sub-
stantial work has been undertaken, for example, on their largest settle-
ments, the Hungarian neighbourhoods of Central Canada's big cities.2 
This paper is a part of a larger effort to fill in this great gap in Hungarian 
Canadian historiography, mainly dealing with a critical period, the 
1920s, when the most significant growth in Hungarian immigration 
took place, and when Central Canada's largest Magyar "ghettos" emerged 
in Toronto and Montreal. Besides offering some statistical information 
on the subject, the author will try to find out the contributions by various 
factors to the bringing about of the same. By doing so, we hope to make 
some progress towards answering the question, why immigrants flocked 
to the cities just at that time, in clear contradiction to Canada's "offi-
cially stated immigration policy . . . 'Only Farmers Need Apply."'3 
According to the 1971 census, 131,890 people of Hungarian origin 
lived in Canada. In this context, the census records reveal two important 
characteristics. First, it was a highly urbanized group; second, its core 
was to be found in Central Canada. According to the official statistics, 
81 percent of Hungarians resided in cities, compared with only 76 percent 
of Canada's population as a whole. Only nine percent of Hungarian 
Canadians were referred to as farm residents. The census also shows that 
almost 60 percent of Hungarians lived in Central Canada, mainly in 
Ontario.4 
The picture presented in the 1971 figures sharply contrasts with the 
group's distribution during the early part of this century, their formative 
period in Canada. Detailed figures exist only for 1921 and they list 
13,181 Hungarians. Of these, only about one ninth lived in cities with 
populations of 30,000 and over and only about 14 percent in Central 
Canada, mostly in Ontario. The rest lived mainly in Saskatchewan.5 
The half-century between 1921 and 1971 saw great changes in the 
group's extent of urbanization and geographic distribution. The casual 
observer might seek explanation for these developments in the massive 
industrialization undertaken during and since the Second World War, 
and in the post-war influx of new immigrants. Indeed, both of these 
developments should be regarded as contributory factors. But a close 
examination of Hungarian Canadian records reveals that the greatest, 
most important impetus towards these changes had come between 1921 
and 1931. Indeed, a study of the census figures of these two years reveals 
this decade as a watershed for Hungarian Canadians, separating their 
predominantly rural past in Saskatchewan from a largely urban future 
mostly in Central Canada. 
The decade separating the censuses of 1921 and 1931 caused important 
differences in the immigration and settling patterns of the group. The 
fact is that the years 1924-1930 saw the immigration of Magyars to 
Canada on a scale unprecedented and unequalled until the coming of the 
refugees of the late 1950s. The roots of this trend seem to go back to 
developments outside Canada. In East Central Europe, the First World 
War and its turbulent aftermath had seen the demise of the Austro-
Hungarian Empire and the dismemberment of the Kingdom of Hungary. 
These events caused grave and long-lasting problems for an already 
weak economy because of which a growing proportion of the popula-
tion became desirous of leaving their homeland and beginning a new life 
overseas. Before 1914 most Hungarian emigrants were heading for the 
United States. By the early 1920s, however, the Republic's gates were 
virtually shut to East Europeans. Hungarians wishing to leave war-torn 
and impoverished Europe had to look for solutions elsewhere. When the 
wartime ban on Hungarian immigration was lifted by Ottawa in 1923, 
many Magyars decided to come to Canada. The following spring the 
"new immigration" to Canada began and by the end of the decade ciose 
to 28,000 Hungarians had made their way to the Dominion. 
The size of this population movement was limited only by the reluc-
tance of the Hungarian government to allow a mass-exodus, and the 
insistence of Canadian policy-makers that only "bona-fide" agricultur-
alists (farmers and farm-workers) should come to the country. Although 
the Canadian government tried its best to keep non-agrarian elements 
out, many Hungarians who were not really peasants, or did not really 
have in mind working on the land after arriving, managed to come to 
Canada — even if to the West, the enforced destination of the vast 
majority of newcomers. Their subsequent migration to cities, no doubt, 
helped to increase the rate of urbanization of the Hungarian-Canadian 
group during the second half of the 1920s. 
But even new Hungarian immigrants from rural Hungary were differ-
ent in many ways from the Hungarian pioneers who had come to Sas-
katchewan and Manitoba a generation earlier. Being the products of the 
twentieth century, they underwent better schooling (relatively speaking) 
and had gathered broader experience as soldiers during the war or its 
aftermath, including a taste of life in the big cities and in foreign coun-
tries. They had also been exposed to new political ideologies and sys-
tems. It is not surprising, under these circumstances, that many of them 
lacked the perseverance necessary to "make it" in prairie farming. Many 
early pioneers tended to stay on their homesteads because they knew no 
other lifestyle. For the bulk of the newcomers working on a farm was not 
so much a calling or tradition, but a means to save some money to pay 
debts, or the passage of a loved-one, or to return "rich" to Hungary. For 
these people a well-paying city job was just as attractive as or even more 
so than farming. When the demand for farm labour declined, or when 
urban employment promised to be better paying or more steady, the 
new immigrants seldom hesitated over moving to the city and even leav-
ing the prairies altogether. 
Given the nature of the new immigration, it is not remarkable that in 
the 1921-1931 period Hungarian-Canadian society should have under-
gone not a mere three-fold increase, but also two other marked demo-
graphic changes. One was their dispersal across much of Canada, the 
other, their rapid urbanization. A brief look at census data will illustrate 
the magnitude of these processes. Between 1921 and 1931, despite the 
enormous influx of newcomers, Saskatchewan's Hungarian population 
increased by only 48 percent. In this same time Manitoba's more than 
doubled, and Alberta's increased five times. More importantly, On-
tario's already substantial Hungarian population underwent an eight-
fold increase, and Quebec's grew from less than a hundred to over four 
thousand. In 1921 slightly more than two-thirds of Hungarian Canadians 
lived in Saskatchewan. A decade later, less than a third did.6 
The progress of the group's urbanization seems equally remarkable. 
In 1921 some 9,748 of Canada's 13,181 Hungarians were rural residents. 
Not more than 3,433 lived in towns and cities. A decade later, over 
twenty thousand did, very nearly half of the group. In 1921 only 11 
percent lived in cities. By 1931 this figure grew to 30 percent.7 From 
being the 25th most urbanized ethnic group in 1921, Hungarians ad-
vanced to the rank of 12th in the course of a decade. The original group 
of five cities with over 200 Hungarians grew to more than a dozen, half 
of them with at least a thousand.8 
Central Canada played a major role in the transformation of the dis-
tribution of the Hungarian-Canadian population in this period. It was in 
this region that the greatest growth took place, and it was the cities of the 
Lower Great Lakes-St. Lawrence Valley which attracted the most Hun-
garians. These places had acted as recipients of Hungarian immigrants 
in an earlier period, in the decade before 1914. We know that Hungari-
ans, coming in some instances from the United States, in others from the 
prairies, had appeared in many parts of southern Ontario soon after the 
turn of the century. By about 1914, Hamilton, Welland, Brantford, 
Windsor, Niagara Falls, Gait, etc., all had nuclei of Hungarian colonies.9 
Little or no population growth seems to have taken place in the midst 
of Hungarian Canadians between 1921 and 1923. These were the years 
of the post-war economic depression when the wartime ban on immigra-
tion from Hungary was still in effect. But in 1924 things began to change; 
the recession ended and the immigration of Hungarians was once again 
permitted by the Canadian government. The result was the renewed 
growth of the Hungarian element in Central Canada's towns and cities. 
The first signs of the new expansion came in the region which had ex-
perienced the greatest influx during the pre-war years: Southern On-
tario. In 1926 a journalist from Hungary toured this region and, in addi-
tion to encountering his countrymen in their older, pre-war centres, 
found some in Oshawa, St. Catherines, Port Colborne, Thorold, and St. 
Thomas. But the region's largest Hungarian conglomeration was in 
Hamilton. In fact, the observer described this city as the "Hungarian 
capital of Eastern Canada." Hamilton's Magyar neighbourhood, after a 
growth until the post-war economic slump of the early twenties, declined 
to a couple hundred people. But with the return of better economic con-
ditions in 1924, and the settling in of the new immigration, it began to 
flourish again. By the time of the 1931 census, it numbered well over two 
thousand.10 
The largest centres of Hungarian life in Canada today are to be found 
in Toronto and Montreal. Neither city possessed a Magyar community 
worthy of note before 1914. It was only during the mass immigration of 
the 1920s that viable Hungarian neighbourhoods developed in them. 
Of the two cities, Montreal was the first to have a small core of a Hun-
garian population. During the pre-war days, several families and single 
people took up residence in the city. The size of the city's Hungarian 
community did not change for many years, but after 1925 it began to 
grow. Organizational life started with the establishment of a congrega-
tion by the United Church in the spring of the following year. This was 
followed, two years later, by the founding of a Roman Catholic parish. 
In the meantime, the colony's first lay organization, the Hungarian 
Social Club, also appeared on the scene. Subsequently, others came into 
being, including the Szekely Cultural Society, the German-Hungarian 
Club and a sick-benefit association. By the end of the decade, Montreal's 
Magyar population was approaching the 3,600 mark, and may have 
even exceeded that figure during the winters as a result of the usual 
influx of unemployed agricultural workers." Montreal's Magyar popu-
lation surpassed all other Hungarian Canadian centres in size. Its posi-
tion, as the most influential centre as well, depended not only on the 
growth potential of the much older centres such as Winnipeg, but on the 
rate of increase of the newly established Magyar neighbourhood in the 
rival metropolis of Toronto. 
Toronto's Hungarian community had a rather late start. A few immi-
grants from Hungary, mainly Jews, had settled in the city prior to the 
war, but were not joined by too many others until the 1920s. Organiza-
tional life among Hungarians in Toronto had its beginning in 1926. In 
the spring of that year the Presbyterian Church founded a mission 
among Hungarian Calvinists. Two years later both the Lutheran and the 
United Churches followed suit. In the meantime the community's grow-
ing Roman Catholic congregation was also being served by missionaries; 
but late in 1929 the Hungarian Catholic Club, Toronto's first important 
lay organization, was formed. It soon began working towards the estab-
lishment of a Roman Catholic Parish.12 
Despite its size, well over a thousand people by the end of the decade, 
Toronto's Magyar community remained a satellite of the older southern-
Ontario communities in smaller urban centres. Hungarian Toronto's 
proximity to centres like Hamilton and Welland prevented it from be-
coming an influential organizational centre in the 1920s. A generation 
later this very same geographical factor was to help the city's Hun-
garians eventually to assume leadership and outshine all its rivals. 
By the time of the 1931 census five Central Canadian cities contained 
Hungarian communities with over a thousand members: Montreal, 
Hamilton, Welland-Crowland, Toronto, and Windsor.13 This represented 
a remarkable change considering that ten years earlier the largest colony, 
Brantford, numbered less than 300. Even more striking is the fact that 
the largest of these new Magyar colonies grew up in Montreal, a city 
which had hardly had a Hungarian population in 1921. 
The growth of the urban settlements of Central Canada heavily re-
flected the group's geographic redistribution within Canada. By 1931, 
Ontario's Hungarian population, a mere 13 percent of the Canadian 
total ten years before, surpassed that of all other provinces, including 
Saskatchewan. It constituted a full third of the national total. Together 
with Quebec's four thousand Hungarians (mainly residents of Mon-
treal), Central Canada accounted for 44 percent of the country's Magyar 
population.14 
Limitations in space preclude a long discussion of the causes of these 
impressive changes. It should be enough to say that both the "push" and 
"pull" factors of immigration seem to have been active in the process. As 
far as the former are concerned, we need only to refer to a few Western 
Canadian developments. Thus, by the second half of the decade only 
marginal land was available for homesteading. At the same time, the 
general economic prosperity inflated the price of good land and placed 
rapid mechanization within the reach of farmers. The boom was fol-
lowed by the great bust of 1929-30 which witnessed the collapse of the 
wheat economy. These developments contributed to the driving away of 
people, especially newcomers, from the prairies. As the cities of the West 
could absorb only a small portion of these people, the work-seekers had 
to try their luck in the East. 
The "push" of the West was supplemented by the "pull" of the East, 
that is, the attractions of the cities of the Lower Great Lakes-St. Law-
rence River region. Until 1929, the main factor at work here was the 
availability of jobs. The expansion of manufacturing, service industries, 
and public works created a demand for both skilled and unskilled labour. 
In the Niagara Peninsula the main employer of immigrant labour was 
the Welland Canal improvement project. Also important were the blast 
furnaces and shops of Welland and Hamilton.15 In Toronto the demand 
for immigrant workers, especially unskilled labour, was rather limited; 
nevertheless, the city did offer a livelihood to numerous immigrants 
including (after 1926) many Hungarians. In the Province of Quebec, 
Montreal provided employment for thousands of unskilled and semi-
skilled people. In many of the city's industries, wages were low and work 
lasted only while the port of Montreal was open to navigation. The 
resulting hardships — low incomes and long periods of unemployment 
— made these industries unattractive to native Canadians. Immigrants, 
often thankful to have any means of income, moved in and became the 
chief source of cheap labour in the city.16 Montreal's special attraction 
for Hungarians was its Hungarian Consulate whose offices most Magyars 
in Central Canada visited at one time or another during their first years 
of stay in Canada. 
The more Central Canada's Hungarian neighbourhoods grew, the 
more attractive they became to Hungarians outside them. The degree 
and quality of social and religious life that was made possible by large, 
fairly compact urban groupings, proved almost irresistible to many 
newcomers from Canada's agricultural, mining, or lumber frontiers, 
whose craving for social and spiritual fulfillment had rarely been satis-
fied since they had left Hungary. This factor continued to attract Hun-
garians to the cities of Central Canada long after the job market had 
collapsed with the coming of the Great Depression. 
The push of the prairies and the pull of the eastern cities did not 
equally affect all sections of Hungarian Canadian society. Census sta-
tistics show exactly which elements of Canada's Magyar community 
participated least and most in this great migration. They reveal, for 
example, that the trend towards urbanization was not strong among 
second-generation Hungarian Canadians. Less than 38 percent of these 
were urban dwellers in 1931. New-immigrant Hungarians, on the other 
hand, were 56 percent urbanized. Moreover, the data also reveal the 
existence of an inverse relation between the immigrants' length of resi-
dence in Canada and their extent of urbanization. In fact, the least 
urbanized Hungarian-Canadian group were the immigrants who came 
before 1910. Only 29 percent of them lived in towns and cities in 1931. 
The percentage for the 1911-1920 group was 39. For the post-war 
groups the ratios were markedly higher. It was 54 percent for those who 
came between 1921 and 1925. For the very numerous 1926-1930 group it 
was 62.4 percent. To put it simply, less than a third of the "old" immi-
grants had ended up in the cities by 1931, while almost two-thirds of 
those who arrived in the late 1920s had become urban residents. More-
over, the ratios were even higher in Central Canada. In Ontario approxi-
mately three-quarters of the post-1926 arrivals had become city dwellers 
by 1931.17 
The growth of Hungarian neighbourhoods in Central Canada's cities 
in the 1921-31 period was primarily the result of the new immigration. 
So many of the new arrivals abandoned the prairies and flocked to 
Central Canadian cities that already existing Hungarian cores vastly in-
creased in size, and large Magyar neighbourhoods came into being 
where none had existed before. The size and impact of this migration 
can only be understood when we realize that 92 percent of the popula-
tion of Ontario's Magyar urban groupings was made up of post-1921 
arrivals. The equivalent figure for Montreal's Hungarian population is 
even higher — about 97 percent.18 These figures suggest that what really 
happened in the period under discussion here was nothing less than the 
birth of a new and different Hungarian Canadian entity, an ethnic group 
concentrated in Central Canada, more precisely, in Central Canada's 
cities. 
Little is known at present about the genesis of this new, increasingly 
"Central Canadian" Hungarian population. From a few, rather unreli-
able sources historians can trace the milestones of its development. They 
can even speculate on the causes of its beginnings, although in this con-
nection too, more extensive research is needed. Least known of all is the 
actual process of internal migrations which resulted in the Hungarian-
Canadian group's drastic demographic redistribution during the 1921-
1931 period. What this paper has tried to argue is that the birth of the 
"new" Hungarian Canadian groupings in the 1920s was primarily the 
outcome of post-1924 immigration. If this indeed is the case, a fuller 
understanding of this process can come first and foremost from a careful 
and exhaustive historical study of the nature of this immigration and of 
the life stories of its members during the first several years of their stay in 
Canada. Such a study would require a major archival and aural research 
effort. One hopes that the opportunity for undertaking it will come 
before the passage of time and the inevitable deaths of this migration's 
participants will have made aural research impossible, and the disap-
pearance of more and more of such primary sources as personal letters, 
diaries, and photographs will certainly render any research on the sub-
ject more difficult. 
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Nowadays very few observers are aware of the existence not only of a 
considerable body of prairie poetry and other early writings in Hun-
garian, but of the fact that one or two of the pioneers, now in their 
eighties, still continue to give vent to their emotions in their ancestral 
language. Perhaps even scarcer are those who appreciate the signifi-
cance, cultural and social, of the one-time communities of Magyar 
peasant farmers of the Canadian West. The objective of the present 
study is to discuss, to some extent at least, these important aspects of 
Canadian prairie history. 
Prior to the 1920s, Saskatchewan contained most of the Hungarian 
Canadian settlers and practically all of what might be termed "bloc 
settlements." Particularly during and since the Great Depression con-
siderable out-migration has taken place from the province, mainly to 
Ontario and, in a smaller measure, to British Columbia. The number of 
Hungarian-Canadian residents of the province may be estimated at 
about 16,000 with more than 3,000 residing in Regina.1 
A folk community 
Bekevdr, situated some ten miles south of present-day Kipling, was a 
Hungarian-Canadian farmer community established in 1900.2 For sev-
eral reasons this settlement can be regarded as the major centre of Hun-
garian-Canadian folk culture in the West and as being almost unique, for 
that matter, on this continent. One factor is that the community very 
closely resembled a folk society, so eminently described in anthropo-
sociological literature.3 To express it in a nutshell, the pioneers of Beke-
var had come largely from three regions of the old country.4 All were 
part of the folk society at large which had preserved the folkways, cus-
toms, and traditions of the rural style of life that had already become 
extinct in Western Europe many decades before, together in a great 
measure, with its cultural expressions. Newcomers to the great plains at 
the beginning of the century were left largely to their own devices and 
were expected to conquer from "Mother Nature" and civilize a virgin 
area of the prairie. They obviously did what they could, which in the 
long run included the transfer of as many institutions and other cultural 
traits of their native communities as appeared feasible and useful within 
their new environment. 
Not unlike in other rural communities of the prairies, the churches 
became the strongest and most important institutions in this settlement 
of Calvinist Reformed and Baptist farmers.5 Communal cohesion was 
strengthened by systems of kinship, neighbourhood, and co-villager 
groupings, as well as by practically exclusive use of the native tongue. 
Also such "idioms" as costume, gestures, facial expressions (often de-
riving from the greater movement of the lips and the mouth, character-
istic of Hungarian speakers), and other bodily movements tended to act 
in the same direction. Consequently, their ways, the folkways, appeared 
strangely out-of-date for farmers of British background whose ancestors 
had already lost touch with folk society and who, being already well 
established by the time of the arrival of the newcomers, were inclined to 
look down upon them as inferior, which circumstances proved to be one 
of the strongest socio-cultural boundaries around Bekevar.6 
Self-sufficiency 
The new colony had to be almost self-sufficient socioculturally, pro-
viding its own entertainment, building its own homes, barns, stables, 
and furniture. Its members made many of their own tools, unless brought 
along from the old country. They produced material for clothing, which 
they cut and sewed up for the family. In sum, they carried out all the 
major and minor operations connected with farming in accordance with 
the ways of the folk tradition adhered to since time immemorial in their 
native communities. These ways included a strong emotional attach-
ment not only to the soil, but to the landscape as a whole. They tended to 
regard everything around them as somehow human, somehow personal; 
hence sloughs, hills, domestic animals, and even unusual trees were 
given personal names. There was a belief, at least with a number of the 
farmers, that spirits of the departed still retained an interest in the living 
and that supernatural phenomena might occur in their physical environ-
ment.7 
Socio-cultural changes 
The major changes that have occurred in the Hungarian Canadian 
colony can be summed up briefly: most of the institutions such as the 
baptismal, wedding and, to a large extent, funeral rites in the Hungarian 
styles have been replaced by the ceremonies of the society at large. Other 
institutions have been transferred to Kipling to merge with similar insti-
tutions, as in the case of the former Reformed congregations which now 
appear under the name of the Bekevar Presbyterian Church.8 The small 
schools of the colony — named, in certain cases, after folk heroes of the 
ancestral tradition — have given way to a centralized school in Kipling 
and to a high school that transfers the student into a non-Hungarian 
environment, reduces facility in the ancestral tongue, and at the same 
time provides major incentives for the complete mastery of the language 
of the surrounding society through the availability of higher education 
and the possibility of socioeconomic mobility. A side product of the 
same process is the free mingling between members of the young genera-
tion coming from several ethnic groupings with resultant spectacular 
increases in interethnic marriages and steep decline in the command and 
use of their forefathers'language. However, most members of the former 
Bekevar population above about thirty are still able to speak fluent and 
largely correct Hungarian, yet they seem to be resigned to the impending 
disappearance of their culture. This state of affairs seems not only simi-
lar to, but in most places of the province, far more pronounced than in 
Kipling.9 
The Bekevar culture 
Particularly, the pre-1914 Hungarian immigrants tended to come 
from folk communities of the "advanced" kind (already considerably 
affected by the technological change taking place in their native coun-
try); nonetheless, they preserved most characteristics of the folk com-
munities, though usually in attenuated forms.10 
The term culture is applied here to convey a process as well as its 
results or products. The process that refers to the production of some-
thing artistically, culturally, or expression-wise new or unique may be 
termed "creativity" and its outcome creative art. The Bekevar culture is 
both inherited and adapted to the ever-changing circumstances. Thus, it 
is both repetitive and digestive. In these respects, it does not differ 
greatly from the cultures (sub-cultures) of other Hungarian Canadian 
communities.11 However, until recently Bekevar could be regarded as a 
creative centre whose people, besides fulfilling adaptive and repetitive 
functions, proved capable of creating cultural "goods" on a compara-
tively large scale. As a result, many poetical texts — including that of a 
very long epos12 — as well as numerous such prose items as short stories, 
reminiscences, and diaries, survive. Some of them have also appeared in 
print. Still, creative activity at Bekevar also possessed — amongst others 
— an abstract, yet instrumental function. Owing to the psychological 
starvation caused by distance from one another just as much as by socio-
cultural nearness to the sharers of the culture, face to face presence was a 
major requirement for the members of the community; hence, after a 
while each member of the community came to know the others. Knowl-
edge in this context meant a more thorough and deep knowing than 
would be the case in an urban situation. This knowledge rested on a 
large cluster of common expectations derived from the possession of the 
same folkways, mores, and traditions including the ancestral tongue. 
This intimacy of communication was accompanied by a high degree of 
lack of contact with the outside society. The closeness of the interaction 
resulted in an emotional atmosphere in which the actors readily and (as 
a rule) without any prompting would reveal their momentary sentiments, 
whether joyous or traumatic. It was a society in which there were mech-
anisms built in for the purpose of reducing what nowadays would be 
referred to as "stresses," or expressed differently, for the achievement of 
periodical catharsis (or outlet) to pent-up emotions. Some of these 
remedial activities were music, singing, and poetry. 
Music 
The approach to music was twofold; for the few who were able to play 
musical instruments, the experiencing of the satisfaction derived from 
playing them in a creative fashion and the psychological interacting 
with their listeners had a greatly supportive effect. The passive music 
lovers tended quickly to transmute their passivity into a creativeness of 
their own either by becoming partakers of the melody through joining in 
and singing, or by yielding to the human instinct of moving their limbs 
and bodies in the rhythm of the music. The types of music that prevailed 
at Bekevar were not exclusively folk music of the kind that have been 
made widely known and socially acceptable through the musical collec-
tions and compositions of Bela Bartok13 and Zoltan Kodaly,14 but they 
also incorporated, in accordance with the rules of the general cultural 
change, snatches of tunes and words taken from such sources as oper-
ettas, musical plays, and songs composed by professionals for a variety 
of purposes and occasions. It is a folk-characteristic to be receptive to 
what is coming from the other segments of society, particularly from the 
urban settlements.15 The average informant would treat the researcher 
to a mixed diet of traditional, gypsy, operetta, and patriotic songs with-
out much awareness of any difference among them.16 Most of the inter-
viewees would be prepared to share their accomplishments in singing 
because of their inclination to be proud of their musical heritage.17 Al-
though there existed at Bekevar several orchestras and bands (albeit not 
at the same time) which usually comprised young men, their musical 
creativity has never reached, at least to the knowledge of the present 
writer, the level of composing new tunes apart from the adapting of old 
ones to their own style. 
Poetry 
Poetry, as well, may act as an instrument of catharsis. Poems can be 
regarded as attempts to cleanse the mind of painful doubts about one-
self, about the community, about society at large, about such feelings as 
love of various types, solidarity, loyalty, or such aspects of nature as 
land, seeding, harvesting, animals, and of course, moods related to 
them. They also might represent purification on a large scale through 
experiencing vicarious heroism in extolling the deeds and qualities of 
one or more charismatic persons on the communal or societal level. 
Nevertheless, the remedy of catharsis could be applied on the personal-
heroic level by the writing of an epos of the autobiographical sort.18 In 
this, heroism is emphasized through the expressive denial of it. The 
person becomes a hero through not acting like one. 
Statements may be made in prose about anything. However, poetry 
and music, particularly when combined to form songs, prove to be a way 
more expressive and relieving of emotional reaction to influences of the 
environment, whether social or physical. Poetry is a kind of artistic ex-
pression that gradually emerged over many centuries or even millennia, 
in which process rhyme and meter served to aid in the memorization and 
retention of the lines, not only for the sake of the retention of the con-
tents. Some of the pieces of poetry of old delineated and presented 
shorter or longer accounts of the history of a group, a community, or a 
tribe, as a rule describing the unusual and heroic deeds and events of the 
time.19 
Also in this respect the people of Bekevar were a folk community who, 
without paying much attention to actual dates or minor details, tended 
to have a strong consciousness of the history and significance of the 
establishment of their colony and found occasion to describe their 
memories and views as well in poetical forms. The poetry of Bekevar in 
the first few years of the colony was virtually identical with the literary 
output of Kalman Kovacsi,20 the minister of the Reformed congregation, 
who was very much addicted to the cult of Louis Kossuth21 and the con-
comitant anti-Habsburg sentiments and politics of the contemporary 
opposition in the old country. Therefore, he was disposed to choose 
topics from this circle of notions in his poetic works dealing even with 
anniversary celebrations, as in the case of the jubilee, in 1911, which 
commemorated the foundation of Esterhaz twenty-five years before.22 
However, the Tenth Anniversary Celebrations of the foundation of 
Bekevar, in 1910, though marked by a considerable amount of publicity 
— through the displaying of the banderium, and by flags, speeches, and 
the entertainment of large groups of visitors — had no poems or songs 
written for the occasion.23 
A folk poet 
Quite different are the intellectual tendencies and the emotional bases 
which characterize another and longer poetical effort. The author, Ben-
jamin Szakacs, the Eldest, the one-time bird (village mayor) of the folk 
community Botragy in the old country,24 had assumed the tone of the 
speech of the Old Testament prophets from his continual study of the 
Bible. 
Also this poem amalgamates aspects of old-country history with 
those of the past of the colony. It tends to be critical of the traditional 
social system of the ancestral society with the generalization that "it had 
not created happiness, its people have never been happy." But, the 
people as such (in fact, the whole nation) is taken to task, in that "it had 
never reached the stage of having been able to make a wise election."The 
poet, following biblical precedents, pinpoints the reason for their in-
clination to not being above committing sins.25 "So the successive inva-
sions of the old country by foreign powers were due to rightful divine 
punishment for internal discord on the part of its aristocrats, and war 
followed as if the consequence of a curse. The divine punishment was 
caused by reluctance to cooperate, since lack of concord and peace must 
end in disaster." The sufferings of peoples derive from their being too 
short-sighted to realize that Jesus was the greatest representative of 
peace, and from their reluctance to know God. The poet identifies the 
obtaining of land as a quasi-magic26 event by which all newcomers were 
electrified into persistent toil. The lines also express the improvident, yet 
necessary, tendency of the penniless new settlers to select wooded land 
as their homesteads for the sake of the availability of trees for building 
and heating purposes, not anticipating the price to be paid later in the 
tremendous effort of clearing the land which was, as a rule, hilly and 
rocky.27 Not only were the first cottages unassuming, but the dwellers 
also lacked complexity of personality. Looking back from the distance 
of a long time the author sees the blissful vision of the community's 
thorough harmony during its first few years, when 
the hearts of the people constituted the church, as yet unbuilt; they 
were seeking their fellows' company, since they bore no hate towards 
one another. The church services were eagerly looked forward to [to 
obtain psychological support as well f rom discussion and company]. 
He who lived with us, dwelt with us; we shared one another 's joys and 
woes.28 
Indeed, the whole environment, too, is presented as almost idyllic, 
with the forests and meadows teeming with pheasants, prairie chickens, 
and snowshoe rabbits. Every little slough is full of water, crowded with 
flocks of ducks. Besides, death is described as an infrequent visitor, and 
even illnesses as practically absent. The poem ends with an exhortation 
towards "concord, humility, and peace." The whole mood of the lines 
reflects the deep involvement with religiosity of the traditional type so 
characteristic of the early folk community.29 
Then the year 1925 — which was, at the same time, the landmark for 
the first quarter-century of the existence of the community30 — was 
generating poems that reflected the outlook and emotions of many of 
the people of the colony. One of these poetical endeavours resulted in 
the creation of what was regarded as the "hymn of Bekevar" written by 
Alex Daku.31 It revealed the religious inclination of the pioneers and, 
further, expressed their gratitude for having been given the colony as 
their place of abode, and their desire that it should be "the home of 
brotherly love and peace." 
Much more complex and revealing is the poem written by George 
(Gyula) Izsak,32 in connection with the same occasion, entitled "The 
Conquest of Our New Home." In the first place, not only is the poem as a 
whole longer, but each of its seven eight-line stanzas tended already 
externally to create the impression and mood of an ode, to which the 
poem indeed amounts through its contents. The first stanza is designed 
to sum up the nineteenth century self-image of the people of the old 
country, strengthened by the experiences of the First World War and its 
dramatic aftermath: despite the sacrifices of the wars to contain the in-
vasion of western Europe by the Mongolians and the Osmanli Turks,33 
Hungary stood dispossessed and reduced to poverty.34 The next two 
stanzas sum up the settling of Bekevar a quarter of a century before in 
the country of the "Aurora Borealis." It is not really the actual settling 
which is expressed in the second stanza, but the mood of resolution and 
dauntlessness with which the small "caravan" of the founders set out in 
search of a new home. The next stanza reflects the mood of the colonists 
after the "conquest" of the prairie. It shows that the colony incorporated 
people from diverse regions of the old country and stresses the contrast 
between the hunting way of life of the migratory Indians and the one 
which produces "golden wheat in the rich virgin soil." One line already 
hints at the ambivalence of the early pioneers who were at times in doubt 
whether they had acted wisely in exposing themselves to the trials and 
tribulations of pioneering on the prairies and in giving up the emotional 
support of the well-known native community and landscape.35 The 
fourth stanza is a direct reference to the nostalgia of the recent immi-
grants, which makes their native region appear in their memories charm-
ing and attractive far beyond reality and, conversely, their environment 
on the prairie far less appealing than in actuality. Indeed, a few settlers 
of the colony could not resist the temptation of far-away landscapes, or 
more correctly, their former village communities. However, some of 
them who returned to the old country found before long that their emo-
tional states had reversed and soon, yearning for the colony of Bekevar, 
set out for it once again.36 
For George Izsak the era of what may be referred to as "the Spiritist 
Controversy"37 was indeed very memorable and significant. To the un-
initiated the next stanza does not seem to have much to do with the 
Bekevarians; it much rather seems to address itself to the Magyars in 
general. However, the lines very tactfully and diplomatically remind the 
main actors in the conflict, with most of them still alive in 1925, that in 
the Spiritists' view the main victim of the struggle around 1910 was 
nothing else but "brotherly love." Of course, the term may be an indirect 
allusion to the fact that the first minister of the community and the men-
tor and theoretician for the Spiritists of Bekevar, was forced by the anti-
Spiritist opposition to leave the colony forever.38 Nonetheless, he was 
not ever forgotten by his followers and his statement containing his 
reminiscences and good wishes was read out and published in connec-
tion with the Twenty-fifth Anniversary Celebrations in 1925.39 The use 
of the term curse is a reference to a long-standing myth mainly in the 
Hungarian romantic tradition according .to which the Magyars'afflic-
tion had been the scourge of continual discord and factional fighting.40 
Yet it is pointed out that everything comes to an end, and that even the 
internal strife at Bekevar would change into productive and prosperous 
times for the colony. The prairie had been turned into fertile soil, with 
wheat growing in abundance; yet enough pasture was left to maintain 
large numbers of cattle and horses. Nevertheless, the same stanza reflects 
the feeling of insecurity in the 1920s with the apparent prosperity lacking 
any solid foundation: "how long will good fortune last?"The last stanza 
constitutes a terse summation of the thoughts and emotions of the poem 
as a whole. The last line of every stanza is a reminder for "the God of 
Hungarians" not to overlook them. The phrase "magyarok lstene"(also 
implying "the Magyar God") may be a very ancient phrase that still 
refers to their pre-Christian era.41 
The initiator and one of the founders of the colony, John (Janos) 
Szabo,42 did not survive the year of the Twenty-fifth Jubilee. Although 
his health had been gradually deteriorating, his passing away was a 
shock not only for his kin, but also for his friends and co-villagers. 
George Izsak, a relative and admirer of Szabo's, had a religious outlook 
that was — not unlike the former's — tempered with Spiritism, and felt 
prompted to pour out his emotions in a historico-lyrical poem named 
after the deceased.43 After an excusably exaggerated introduction ("even 
the ground becomes soaked with the tears of the women"), the author 
refers to Szabo's great feat in "having conquered a large area for our 
fellow-Magyars." However, he does not leave unmentioned the fact, 
although with some imprecision, that "the red Indian people had lived 
there fifty years ago." The merits of the founder are succinctly expressed 
with the help of a few contrasts: a herd of wild buffalo roaming on the 
prairie as opposed to the wave-like movements of the sea of wheat in 
newly broken land; will the man who had given shelter to many, find 
shelter somewhere in his new life? Will anyone now comfort him who 
had been a comforter to many? Szabo, "whose brotherly love provided 
the bond for all, the wise adviser, the master singer, now lies in a casket 
with a still heart."44 The poet envisages reverence for the deceased on the 
part of Bekevar, "not only while Hungarians persist there, but while 
Buda yet stands in the old country."* The last two lines may be regarded 
by the initiated as significant: "In time a pretty flower will grow from 
your dust . . . but your spirit will keep on guiding and directing."45 The 
application of the words "dust" and "flower" are not really meant meta-
phorically; they constitute an allusion to transmogrification of the soul, 
or rather, the eternal transformation of matter into new life, paralleled 
by the release of the soul from its body and not yet reembodied (as 
expressed in the last line); that is why Szabo's soul-spirit was expected to 
provide further guidance and direction through the poet, the one-time 
head of the Bekevar Christian Spiritists' Association.46 
Another sequence of rhymed reminiscences deals with the informal 
description of the ecology of the region and the struggle of the pioneers 
with the physical and mental obstacles which were hampering them in 
civilizing the landscape. Apparently, Beni Szakacs, Sr. had inherited 
appreciably from the poetical talents of his father whose lyrical creativity 
has been discussed above. The poet recalls the early days when the 
church service was still conducted by the Rev. Kalman Kovacsi at the 
"•Reference to the line "the Magyar is still alive; Buda still stands erect. . . ." K. 
Kisfaludy's (1788-1830) elegy "Mohacs." 
Kossuth School47 where practically all members of the community would 
meet on Sundays. Also for him the past assumes a golden hue when 
viewed from the distance of some seventy years. First of all taxation was 
in those days almost negligible, not amounting to more than a cent per 
acre, and good shoes were to be had for less than two dollars. There was, 
in addition, a local mill at which flour cost them only two dollars per 
sack.48 Further, he was witness to a great abundance of wildlife: 
They practically covered the peri [as the pioneers called the prairie] 
and the sloughs; when the farmer went into the bush only a small dis-
tance he could shoot f r o m eight to ten snowshoe rabbits at a go. Be-
sides, the ketries [as 'cartridge' was named at Bekevar in those days] 
was inexpensive and, with a well-aimed shot one could hit f r o m eight 
to ten ducks. 
The author cannot recall ever having seen between Kipling and Kennedy 
any trees whose diameters exceeded one inch. In his recollection the 
reason for this circumstance had been a prairie fire just before the turn of 
the century. People from Beni Szakacs's neighbourhood were compelled 
to go as far as mosimaimton49 (Moosomin town) in search of wood. The 
prairie fire of 1900 occurred as a consequence of a devastating drought 
— devastating, except for Sexsmith and Toppings,50 who could make 
hay in what in other years was Bender Lake. Of course, such a drought 
was unbelievable a few years later when the sky could not be seen owing 
to continual rain for days on end. Then, the meadow was bountiful with 
grass and the cattle were so fat that they could hardly move; nor were 
they inclined at all to run around, since, in addition to having been fat-
tened on the big pasture, their hide was soaked by the steady rain. White 
Lake contained such quantities of fish that whoever desired to do so 
could capture them with hook or net. In his youth he and his uncle, 
Charles Szabo,51 were in the habit of catching fish once a week, which 
operation would yield about ten fish apiece. 
Since there was no school yet in their township, he and other children 
attended a school situated in a small log cabin at Kennedy.52 That is 
where they learnt their first English: "not too many Hungarians were 
knowledgeable in it." However, after school he had chores to perform 
on his father's farm; he had to feed the horses and milk the mulika 
("milch-cow"), for which work he received the princely wages of one 
dollar a week provided his pap (pop, father) remembered it. He still 
recalls with disgust and disappointment the case of the old woman for 
whom he had been sawing and splitting wood for three long weeks and 
did not receive more than a dollar in the end. 
Because our poet did not start studying English until his teens, he 
experienced great difficulties in the process. For instance, he could never 
pronounce the "th" in the word mother, "because one has to twist one's 
tongue." He found communication with English speakers straining and 
ineffectual. In fact the only sentence he could say was "do you see my 
cattle?" This circumstance at times resulted in curious situations and 
occasional frustrations, as on the occasion of his great yearning for 
prunes. Being fond of that fruit, which was on sale at the stor (store), it 
was to his great sadness that he did not know its English name. However, 
he did know the colours black and white. When asked by the storekeeper 
what he wanted, his answer was "I want something black." The man 
began smiling and led him around; they inspected every box in the store 
until they came upon the one containing the item. "These are prunes," 
said the storekeeper and that was a great object lesson for the boy, well 
remembered even in his old age. 
One memory leads to another; old Beni recalls another memorable 
event from the past, when Andrew Izsak and Peter Biro persuaded him 
to go to Esterhaz53 (only the very old pioneers remember the proper 
name of the oldest Hungarian Canadian settlement in Saskatchewan, 
which can easily be mixed up with Esterhazy, the later town). The three 
arrived in Whitewood in the evening and Beni was deputized to find a 
hotel room. He found one, but, unfortunately, it contained only one 
bed, across which the three were obliged to lie. This experience was far 
from pleasurable. On the other hand, the accommodation cost them no 
more than seventy-five cents. This left the three of them with another 
"six bits," for which they were able to buy a bottle of brandy (conse-
quently they reached Esterhaz singing at the top of their voices). 
Erdujhelyi on the prairie 
Another early poem connected with Saskatchewan and dealing with 
aspects of life in it came from the pen of one of the main actors in the 
conflict that has been named "The Hungarian Question," which took 
place as a minor yet not unimportant portion of the later part of the 
Manitoba School Question. The Rev. Melchior (Menyhert) Erdujhelyi 
(1860-1925) was a Hungarian priest who, with his very arrival in Sas-
katchewan in 1908, added to the tensions which gradually led to a bitter 
confrontation owing to the unbridgeable differences between the politi-
cal objectives of the Archbishop Langevin and the desire of the Hun-
garian-Canadian parishioners and a group of Liberal intellectuals. The 
Hungarian Question controversy took place between approximately 
1908 and 1912.54 It was during this period of time that Erdujhelyi man-
aged to write the poem entitled "Harvest in Canada." 
The nine stanzas are descriptive, partly philosophical, and mixed with 
a measure of historical contemplation. They also reflect the nostalgia of 
the recent immigrant and the feeling of alienation of a priest who was 
denied a status within the church which would have been commensurate 
with his qualifications, experiences, and self-respect. The poem is intro-
duced by a terse and appreciative description of early Saskatchewan at 
harvest time. 
We are allowed to visualise the large number of people required for 
harvesting about 1910, despite the availability of "the whirring swather." 
The workers perspire while they are gathering the crop and deliver it into 
the barns. The writer sees in the Hungarian Canadians' wheat crop the 
most beautiful ornament for prosperous Saskatchewan. The priest, also 
an expert farmer, who had studied various aspects of wheat farming and 
had a farm in Bacska,55 one of the most fertile wheat-growing regions of 
Hungary of the time, and who also took up a homestead in the Szekely-
fold56 Hungarian-Canadian settlement north of Cupar and carried out 
all the manual work connected with farming, could state with authority 
that "you can feast your eyes with pleasure on its [Saskatchewan's] 
durum wheat which is just like the one in Bacska." In the third stanza the 
poet claims, with pardonable pride and exaggeration, the fact as "ac-
cepted" that the Hungarian Canadian is the foremost of farmers and can 
work harder than the members of any other ethnic group.57 Yet this 
happened, he points out, despite the circumstance that having arrived 
without any capital they had to start right from the bottom of society. 
They achieved advancement, since they proved indefatigable in break-
ing the sod and turning the wilderness into fertile land. The sixth stanza 
contrasts the early penury with their position in 1910 when the settlers of 
older vintage could already afford "to ride about proudly on their pranc-
ing horses and live happily in abundance and plenty."58 Perhaps, just a 
trace of self-pity can be detected by the observer in the lines of Erduj-
helyi who, at this stage, was receiving a very small income even com-
pared with the stipends of other, much more junior clergymen. 
This is the point at which questions start to throng our author's mind. 
He stresses the contradiction between the diligence of these immigrants, 
the wealth, the fertile land of their native country and their need to 
emigrate to a distant overseas country where they will one day lose their 
ethnic identity. It is in the last stanza that he volunteers the answer to the 
riddle by referring to, as well as representing the viewpoint — in rather 
unrestrained language — of many Hungarians in connection with the 
state of affairs of their native country: 
Poor Hungary! You native country of heroes, you have been afflicted 
by the German curse for a thousand years. Your people cannot prosper. 
You cannot be free; you are smarting under a heavy burden, the Aus-
trian yoke. 
This stanza expresses very succinctly a puzzling fact, or rather a fact 
which appears puzzling in retrospect. How was it possible with this type 
of feelings and public utterances, not only in Saskatchewan but all over 
the world right up to the spring of 1914, to experience a volta face and 
suddenly see Hungary on the side of Austria in the great conflagration 
that was to follow in a few months time that same year? 
Early experiences 
Some of the poems concern reminiscences of persons and episodes of 
the past when life, although theoretically much more difficult, appeared 
in retrospect to be golden and thoroughly enjoyable. This was so prob-
ably because most of the pioneers at that stage were young and rooted in 
the less sophisticated, but safer, ways of their folk community in which 
everything and everyone within the settlement was known to all and the 
strong social and cultural cohesion provided a sense of safety to all. 
Stephen Toth,59 who originally lived in the vicinity of Whitewood, but 
later married a Bekevar girl and settled down to farming at Bekevar, had 
happy memories amongst other matters and persons, of Mrs. Charles 
Fodor60 of Whitewood. In his poem written in her memory, he recalls 
the common recollection of the pioneers of contemporary Bekevar of 
their respective arrivals around 1900. Her log cabin in the shade of 
poplars functioned almost as an informal clinic and recreational centre 
at which the newcomers were provided with advice, information, and a 
new hope as to their future on the prairies. 
How many homeless persons did she admit into her home; 
She always provided the breadless with food. 
There came also the first settlers in Kaposvar, 
Who had settled there in 1886. 
They came on cold winter days on hot horses 
To the city of Whitewood to drink steaming tea in Mrs. Fodor ' s house. 
Only a few survive to recount the romance of that era. 
They spent many a joyful evening in that house 
In Mrs. Fodor 's good and clean company. 
All this was true not only of the Kaposvarians before the turn of the 
century, but of the groups of new arrivals who settled southeast of 
Whitewood in and around the later Bekevar, and became new claimants 
for the hospitality and humanitarian inclinations of Mrs. Fodor. 
But this home was a blessing not only for the north, 
But also for the south: it was about 1900 that there came 
A handful of people into the wilderness of the prairie. 
The place is called Bekevar nowadays, 
Where the tiny group established a settlement. 
Thereafter they would go to the city of Whitewood 
Into Mrs. Fodor ' s kind hospitable home. 
Many of us are connected through numerous sweet memories of this house: 
With its kind-hearted and clean hostess. 
She was the motherly figure for the pioneers. 
Let her memory be preserved in our hearts. 
Let her kind spirit hover amongst us. 
May her ashes rest peacefully in the Whitewood cemetery. 
Mrs. Fodor was an outstanding woman pioneer. 
She was capable of holding her own in a foreign country. 
She saw to the education of her children and thus 
Excellent scholars came from her family. 
Another type of early experience concerning the life of the pioneers is 
presented by Beni Szakacs in a more descriptive style.61 The prairie fires 
had been a scourge of the great plains even after large portions of land 
had been broken up by the pioneers of the area, including the Hungarian 
Canadians. In Beni's interpretation the life of the pioneers, as they 
gradually established themselves as farmers, went on in the following 
manner: 
The Hungarians came to Canada in 1885, 
Replacing diverse groups of Indians. 
The many Magyars were swarming over 
The land to become Bekevar. 
They came here and took up land. 
They would work with great joy. 
He who had only a horse and a cow 
Would make them into a team 
In order that his plough should work. 
After having purchased his small walking plough 
On credit, he would, while following it, kick this way and that. 
He kept on doing so all the time 
Because lumps of soil would fall back into the furrow. 
He just could not have any rest on the endless prairie. 
The poor man had his rump so active in this operation 
That not even a sharp-shooter could have 
Achieved a direct hit on it 
However great his skill. 
The farmer would cut down tall trees in the forest 
For the cottage 
And strip off their bark, 
And thus he placed them one upon the other. 
He fitted them into the shape of a square . 
He put logs across on top 
And virgin sods above; 
Lo and behold, the house was ready. 
This was quite good in fine weather, 
When there was no rain; 
However, when it was raining, it was sad. 
Nowadays only the poorest 
Possess such a chicken coop. 
The Hungarians of today already 
Live in houses which are like palaces. 
We took up our land in 1905. 
It had very good soil, to our great joy. 
We built our sod house on it 
As well as our karaj ( 'corral ' ) for sixty cattle. 
There were also two heaps of hay 
Not yet built up into stacks. 
It was fall. My parents were gone to Whitewood; 
This village was forty miles away f r o m us. 
One had to go there to buy food. 
Forty miles may not appear excessive to you, 
But if you have to take a cart 
Your bones will truly rattle and shake 
While you approach your destination through rocks and undergrowth. 
After my parents had departed from home 
With the weather very fine and oppressively hot, 
I and my two sisters, I ten and they seven and four, 
Were in charge, with me also as the handyman. 
Suddenly at sunset big smoke arose. 
A prairie fire was being driven by a pleasant westerly. 
Like a thousand trains burning with a thousand furnaces 
It was racing across the plains straight in our direction. 
Having heard of the prairie fire, 
I quickly prepared water and sacks. 
My two young sisters also took up posit ion, 
In order that we might save our little world through defiance. 
Thank God; when it seemed that everything would catch fire 
Our many good neighbours appeared on the scene 
And nothing was destroyed. 
As can be seen in the simple and natural folk-poetical wording of the 
poem, the community was a real community at that state in the sense 
that they were well aware of the doings of one another and were ready as 
they had to be, for communal action when disaster threatened. As to the 
poetical skill of the author, it is worthwhile to take note of the brevity of 
expression and almost ballad-like presentation of events. One might say 
that with a few strong strokes and the application of some vivid verbal 
colours, the poet succeeds in depicting, in one broad picture, the main 
features of the past and present of the colony in his youth. 
The lyrical vein 
On a higher level the minds of some of the poets would encompass the 
whole of the province of Saskatchewan. One of the pioneers of Bekevar 
in his younger days expressed his emotions in a short, but memorable, 
lyric poem entitled in its original Hungarian spelling "Szaszkacsevan."62 
Szaszkacsevan 
The pretty one, 
Where that girl dwells 
For whom my heart swells. 
Another such woman 
There 's surely none 
In any part of 
Szaszkacsevan. 
She is as dear, I t row, 
As a slim doe: 
Her voice as sweet 
As a fairy's, indeed. 
I wouldn ' t leave that lass 
For aught that the world has, 
Including all its 
Riches. 
As an instance of simple and pleasant expression of the enjoyment of the 
new environment, a shorter poem is presented: 
In the very core of dense, dark forests, 
I live my days in a quiet, beautiful colony. 
A m o n g the upright people of the good Magyar race, 
Nothing reaches here of the din of the outside world. 
Each person here has his work and function. 
One day is just like the others. 
Envy has no chance here; revenge is not in evidence. 
We spend the day engaged in hard toil. 
Wherever I glance around me in the area, 
Cheerful people teem, reaping and stooking. 
I listen to the merry songs; I watch their glowing cheeks. 
1 myself feel joyful in their midst.63 
Finally, we shall pause to consider two items of folk poetry proper — 
that is, poems of which the authors are unknown and which were most 
probably created in a light-hearted fashion in the course of everyday life. 
In both cases the charm of the words and rhymes sounds exquisite in the 
original and the translation provides only a poor substitute for it. How-
ever, these also provide the historian with useful information. 
Although nothing could be uncovered about Kate, the "actor" of the 
first poetical item, the stanza may be regarded as containing the struc-
ture of the situation and the fate of one and all pioneering women: doing 
the farming and household chores to distraction, not to mention the 
giving birth to and the looking after of a dozen or more children. 
Kate's a 'baking, 
Ironing. 
In foolish mood: 
A'scrubbing. 
As to the second little gem, it was Imre Dezso who, on retirement 
from farming, purchased in 1925 and continued on a smaller scale with 
the store set up by George Izsak. He and his wife could only with diffi-
culty make a living; the "anonymous" poet had an eye only for the 
humorous aspect of the position. "Uncle Dezso" passed away in 1928 
and thus was spared the experiences of the Great Depression.64 
Uncle Dezso's tiny shop 
Is smaller than where chickens hop. 
When two shoppers take the floor, 
There's no room for him any more. 
Poetical creativity at Bekevar 
One of the most telling traits of the culture centre of Bekevar was its 
relatively great poetical and other literary creativity. Practically all 
culture-minded members of the community attempted to or did write 
poetry at some time in their lives; however, besides Kalman Kovacsi, the 
most successful, persistent, and productive poets of the Bekevar-Kipling 
area have been George lzsak, Beni Szakacs the Elder and the Eldest. In 
fact, the younger of the two Benis — now 85 — has tangibly shown his 
great poetical ability until recently through creative production of a few 
elegant poems for some festive occasions, but only to an ever-diminishing 
audience. Some of the poetry of Bekevar has contained lasting and 
intrinsic beauty and value, yet all surviving poems constitute part not 
only of the cultural records of the community, but specimens of a unique 
but vanishing culture. Though the decline of poetical creativity had 
begun to be noticed in the early 1960s, no young Hungarian Canadian 
poet writing in Hungarian has emerged in the Kipling area. Of course, 
the manuscripts of quite a few poems of older vintage survive, besides 
the known ones, and possibly may remain undetected and unappreci-
ated. The passing away of the folk poetry of Bekevar is yet another sign 
of the receding of the Hungarian-Canadian folk culture. 
NOTES* 
1. In 1961, there were 16,059 Canadians of Hungarian origin in Saskatchewan, 
with about only 86 females per 100 males. About 10,000 of them were listed as 
rural. Census of Canada, 1961, Series 1.2, Population Bulletin 1, 2-5. 
2. For a more detailed history of the Bekevar-Kipling area, see M. L. Kovacs, 
Peace and Strife: Some Facets of the History of an Early Prairie Community 
(Kipling, 1980)—obtainable from Kipling District Historical Society, Box 131, 
Kipling, Saskatchewan, Canada, S0G 2SO. Townships 10, 11, and 12, Ranges 
4, 5, and 6 contain the largest part of the Bekevar region south of the town of 
Kipling. Cf. M. L. Kovacs, Esterhazy and Early Hungarian Immigration to 
Canada (Regina, 1974), 51. 
3. See, for instance, R. Redfield, The Little Community (Chicago, 1955). 
4. The Counties Bereg, Jasz-Nagy-Kun-Szolnok and Szabolcs. Ecologically, Bereg 
and Szabolcs constitute a unit under the name Tiszahat and the third county 
falls in one called Nagvkunsag. Cf. L. Kosa and A. Filep, A magyar nep taji-
torteneti tagolodasa [The Ecological and Historical Distribution of the Hun-
garian People] (Budapest, 1975), 151-152, 185. 
5. The twin-spired "Great Church of Bekevar" was built after the pattern of the 
Reformed Church of Debrecen, Hungary, in 1912. It is no longer in regular use. 
Its functions have been taken over by the "Bekevar" Presbyterian Church, 
Kipling. See Kovacs, Peace and Strife, 27-33. 
6. There is a strong temptation for the average person to infer from the degree of 
mastery of the dominant language achieved by an immigrant, to his cultural 
background and mental capacity and to categorize him accordingly in respect 
of social distance. Cf. N. Sealy, "Language Conflict and Schools in New Bruns-
wick," in M. L. Kovacs, ed., Ethnic Canadians: Culture and Education {Regina, 
1978), 311. 
7. Many of the folk customs of the village communities concerned the dealing with 
supernatural occurrences. See T. Domotor, Hungarian Folk Customs (Buda-
pest, 1972), 49. 
8. See note 5 above. 
9. The principal Hungarian Canadian settlements in Saskatchewan were Esterhaz-
Kaposvar-Esterhazy, Sokhalom-Stockholm, Cana, Otthon, Lestock-Leross-
Magyar, Szekelyfol-Mariavolgy-Arbury-Quinton-Cupar, Pinkefold-Plunkett, 
Szent Laszlo-Howell-Prudhomme, Matyasfold-Wakaw, and Bekevar-Kipling. 
10. A very detailed analysis of the diverse changes affecting the folk society and its 
economy between the time of the abolition of serfdom and the beginning of the 
First World War is provided in I. Szabo, ed., A parasztsag Magyar orszagon a 
kapitalizmus koraban [The Peasants of Hungary in the Era of Capitalism, 
1848-1914], 2 vols. (Budapest, 1972). 
* The poetry quoted in this paper has been translated from the Hungarian original 
by the present writer. If not otherwise stated, interviews referred to in this study took 
place in Kipling, Saskatchewan or its area. 
11. Sokhalom-Stockholm shared cultural leadership with Kaposvar among Hun-
garian Canadians of Roman Catholic persuasion from the 1920s on. 
12. John Szatmari (1869-1947), a member of the wider Bekevar community, de-
scribed his life story, immigrational and farming experiences in an epic poem, 
unique amongst eposes, of which some 140 pages survive. The present writer 
has completed a study of the poem, which he hopes to publish together with the 
translation before long. 
13. Bela Bartok (1881-1945) is famous for his collecting and studies of Hungarian 
folk song and folk music. He helped to develop a characteristically Hungarian 
musical style. The opera "Bluebeard's Castle" and the mime-play "The Miracu-
lous Mandarin" might be mentioned as the most outstanding of his composi-
tions. 
14. Zoltan Kodaly (1882-1967) worked together with Bartok in the collection and 
editing of Hungarian folk songs. His musical idiom is milder than that of Bar-
tok. Perhaps the best known of his compositions are the "Psalmus Hungaricus" 
and the opera "Hary Janos." 
15. Cf. Redfield, 123. 
16. A good example of this was the interview with T. Tar, Kipling, July 30, 1976. 
17. Numerous informants allowed themselves to be persuaded to sing portions of 
songs in the Bekevar and other Hungarian Canadian settlements in the course 
of these seven years. 
18. The Szatmari epos (see note 12 above) is both autobiographical and cathartic. 
19. Homer's Iliad and Odyssey would come to mind in this context. 
20. See Kovacs, Esterhazy, 42-45. 
21. Concerning the significance of L. Kossuth (1802-1892), see note 23 below. 
The memories of Kossuth were probably the most vivid in eastern Hungary, 
wherefrom most of the Bekevarians hailed. The city of Debrecen, in which 
Kovacsi had received his education, was, as it were, the "seat" of the Kossuth 
cult. Besides, the first school district of Bekevar bore the name "Kossuth." 
22. The Compromise of 1867 was an uneasy one with L. Kossuth passionately op-
posing it from abroad. The successive pro-Compromise governments had to 
face the liberal anti-Habsburg opposition which represented the majority of the 
nation. Cf. C. A. Macartney, Hungary (Edinburgh, 1962), 176-179. Also see 
note 23 below. 
23. There is no doubt that the influence of Kalman Kovacsi upon the cultural life of 
the members of the folk community of Bekevar was momentous and persistent. 
The poems that he wrote at Bekevar were listened to when declaimed and read 
when published in the Hungarian paper of the time, the Kanadai Magyar 
Farmer (Canadian Hungarian Farmer). The subject matter, the mood and the 
images, all projected well, represent the outlook of the Hungarian Canadian 
settlers of the pre-1914 period. Two of his odes were fondly remembered in later 
years as well and their texts were preserved and the poems themselves were 
recited by heart on suitable occasions in the colony. The March 15 Celebrations 
provided an annual rehearsal for the Kossuthist and anti-Habsburg sentiments 
of Bekevar. Kalman Kovacsi's A szabadsag iinnepere (On the Festival of Free-
dom) was written for the occasion of the sixty-second anniversary of the be-
ginning of the Hungarian War of Independence in 1848. The celebrations of it 
(March 15) constituted also the major socio-cultural event of 1910. The text of 
three of the ten stanzas, translated below, fairly reflects the politico-emotional 
climate of the time. 
True Magyar souls, this world around, the mood 
Of psalm and prayer, today and hence, exude. 
'Tis Easter, with the dawn of vanquished doom 
And Magyar freedom charging from its tomb. 
That with its vanishing in the blood-stained dusk that follows, 
Our flag-poles have been turned into gallows; 
And that the hurrahs were drowned by unbearable pain, 
My nation, do not remember, do not grieve again. 
Let the watch fire blaze! Let black despair disappear — 
The shades of Kossuth and Rakoczi hover near. 
We are watched over by the Lord in war unfazed, 
Who once the lofty Tower of Babel razed. 
The fiery souls of the heroes fallen for liberty 
Roam over the whole world restlessly. 
Awaiting the war-cry, all these will march along 
Who still wear the manacles of the oppressor strong. 
Do you see? How, like a comet flashing 
The valiant Csaba and his gallant army come dashing. 
Nor will he return to his heavenly habitation 
Until the huge, world-rescuing confrontation 
Will finally end in a victory resounding 
Until there will come from Freedom's temple bounding, 
Expelled by a flaming sword the many profiteers 
And at the Christmas candle of peace for many years 
All men will chant their song of gratitude. 
The Tenth Anniversary Celebration (July 1910) was a major event in the proc-
ess of the emergence of the Bekevar identity. See Kovacs, Peace and Strife, 35-
41. 
24. Beni Szakacs, the Eldest (1871-1959), having been the bird of Botragy village, 
found himself in violent conflict with the village notary and departed for 
Canada. He became also in Bekevar one of the communal leaders. His poetical 
gift was inherited by his son, the present-day Beni Szakacs, Sr. 
25. Beni Szakacs' ethico-religious views inclined towards greater strictness over the 
years. The Baptist congregation appeared to express his views to a greater 
extent, and so he joined it. 
26. Cf. B. Malinowski, "Magic, Science, and Religion," in J. Needham, ed., Sci-
ence, Religion, and Reality (New York, 1925). 
27. Thus, the land taken up by the first settlers of Bekevar was more wooded and 
less fertile than the quarter-sections selected by later-comers. 
28. An observation echoed by other elderly informants. 
29. Moreover, of course, the church would be the most important social institution 
in the early prairie communities. See Kovacs, Peace and Strife, 20 and 27-33. 
30. Bekevar celebrated its Twenty-fifth Anniversary in a "Jubilee Festival" on July 
19-21, 1925, which was attended by several hundred visitors as well, including 
the Hon. H. W. Newlands, Lieutenant-Governor of Saskatchewan, and Armand 
Hann, the Consul General of Hungary. For accounts see the KMU ("Canadian 
Hungarian News") July 19-21, 1925 and the (Regina) Leader, July 25, 1925, 
and Kovacs, Peace and Strife, 119-123. 
31. Alex (Sandor) Daku (1880-1964), having retired from farming to Kipling in 
1944, spent much of his time on communal and church affairs. Kovacs, Peace 
and Strife, 12. 
32. George (Gyula) Izsak (1884-1960) belonged in the cultural nucleus of Bekevar. 
He worked himself up to become an intellectual and a well-to-do man only to 
lose almost everything during the Depression. He was a most productive Hun-
garian Canadian poet, writing well into the 1950s. His historical reminiscences 
provide some of the most useful source material in the past culture of the colony. 
Later, he became a community and church leader in Toronto. Kovacs, Peace 
and Strife, 90 and 206. 
33. These are some of the most traumatic experiences in the Hungarian identity. 
See Macartney, 32-33. 
34. Reference to the Peace Treaty of Trianon, June 4, 1920, ibid., 206 207. 
35. Very few members of peasant societies were leaving their native countries with 
an intention other than "to get rich quick" and return to the ancestral villages 
and buy land there. Cf. W. I. Thomas and F. Znaniecki, The Polish Peasant in 
Europe and America (Boston, 1920), vol. 5, pp. 8ff. 
36. One such person was J. Szatmari. See note 12 above. However, very few Beke-
varians returned to the old country for resettlement there. 
37. The Spiritism of the Bekevar kind served to promote the intellectual-cultural 
"appetite" of the participants besides deepening their religious interests. G. 
Izsak was the first and only head of the "Bekevar Christian Spiritists' Associa-
tion." However, Spiritism was strongly and effectively opposed by the majority 
of the Bekevarians. (Interviews with several informants in Kipling, Saskatche-
wan, Canada.) 
38. The Rev. K. Kovacsi, the first minister, was forced to make an exchange of 
ministries with the Rev. John Kovacs in Otthon. (Interviews.) See Kovacs, 
Peace and Strife, 44-45. 
39. On July 19-21, 1925. See KMU, July 19-21, 1925. 
40. Also a theme of the Hungarian National Hymn by F. Kolcsey (1790-1838). 
41. Cf. V. Dioszegi, A pogany magyarok hitvilaga [Creeds of the Heathen Magyars] 
(Budapest, 1967). 
42. John Szabo (1852-1925), the initiator of the founding of the colony and also its 
name giver. Kovacs, Peace and Strife, 4-8. 
43. J. Szabo was one of the main supporters of the Spiritist movement in the settle-
ment and also a kinsman of G. Izsak. 
44. Reference to the claim that many of those who had accepted Szabo's hospitali-
ty, food, and good advice in the beginning, later turned against him in the 
course of the Spiritist Controversy. 
45. The statement expresses Spiritist beliefs. 
46. The Association was at its heyday between about 1908 and 1912. (Interviews.) 
47. In the first seven years of the existence of the colony the Kossuth school, No. 
948, was at the same time the social-cultural hall as well as the quasi-church for 
the community. Two other early schools were the Magyar and the Rakoczi. 
The three school districts were established: Kossuth and Magyar in 1905 and 
Rakoczi in 1910 (Education Department Records, Saskatchewan Provincial 
Archives, Regina). 
48. The Rev. John Kovacs set up and operated a flour-mill, first in the neighbour-
hood of the manse, later in Kipling. (Interviews.) 
49. Many English words were magvarized by the Bekevarians. 
50. Two of the earliest Anglo-Canadian settlers northwest of Bekevar: Jim Sex-
smith (1859-1957) and William H. Toppings (1858-1943). 
51. Karoly Szabo (1879-1956), the elder son of John Szabo, moved to British 
Columbia in the 1920s. 
52. Kennedy, a settlement northeast of Bekevar, east of Kipling, contains numerous 
Hungarian Canadians, many of whom are still in close contact with the Kipling-
Bekevar community. 
53. Esterhaz was the first Hungarian settlement in what has become Saskatchewan. 
For further information see Kovacs, Esterhazy, 17-19. 
54. See M. L. Kovacs, "The Hungarian School Question," in Ethnic Canadians, 
333-358. 
55. Bacska constitutes an ecological unit in the southernmost portion of the plain 
between the rivers Danube (Duna) and the Tisza; now its largest part is in Yugo-
slavia. Cf. Kosa-Filep, 59-61. 
56. A comparatively sizable settlement of Bukovinian Szekelys next to Mariavolgy, 
another community of the same origin. Concerning the Szekelys, and their role 
in the Hungarian Question controversy, see Kovacs, "The Hungarian School 
Question." Cf. note 54 above. 
57. Not possessing the mastery of the English language and other essential social 
skills, the Central and East European peasant farmers simply had to succeed on 
the land. 
58. It might be a reference to the handerium (a group of local horsemen dressed in 
folk costumes to act as escorts on festive occasions). 
59. Stephen Toth (1888-1964) established himself at Bekevar through an 'inven-
tion' of his when he constructed a mechanical saw. He went around to the farms 
and offered his services, which were welcomed by the farmers who had pre-
viously no option but to saw firewood by hand. He was in several respects one 
of the progressive Bekevarians. As well, he wrote a number of poems. His 
widow, Mrs. Julia Toth, became interested in social activities through "Steve." 
60. One of the early pioneers, Peter Debreczeni (1882- ), recalls that he received 
full board with the Fodors in 1902, when they were already elderly. At that 
stage they had six Hungarians with them as boarders. His impression about 
Mrs. Fodor was similar to that expressed in Stephen Toth's poem. (Interviews 
in Abbotsford, B.C.) 
61. Beni Szakacs (1895- ), now "Sr." — the son of Beni Szakacs the Eldest — has 
likewise developed into a fine poet. He has written a number of poems, often 
dealing with his family, with his feelings about changes around him, and of 
course, with his experiences in his long life. 
62. Berti Daku (1900-1978) was still in his twenties when he poured out his emo-
tions in this poem. What is more, the item was found by the Hungarian news-
paper to be worthy of publication. KMU, December 21, 1929. 
63. The title of the poem is "Otthon" (formerly the name of a market village for the 
second-oldest Hungarian Canadian colony of the same appellation southeast 
of Yorkton). "Otthon" (home) is one of the infrequent geographical designa-
tions of Hungarian origin still officially used. The writer of the poem, Christine 
Stanik, the daughter of an early homesteader in the settlement, had the ambi-
tion to become a teacher. The poem was published in the Canadian Hungarians 
[Kanadai Magyarsag], one of the earliest issues of the earliest Hungarian lan-
guage newspaper (as far as the present writer knows) printed in Canada (Sep-
tember 1905; initially it was a monthly). 
64. KMU, June 30, 1928. These two short ditties were recollected by Mrs. Emma 
Szakacs in the course of one of the numerous interviews with her and her hus-
band, Vilmos Szakacs. 
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Modern Hungarian Poetry in Canada 
John Miska 
It is a pleasure to write this paper on Hungarian poetry, not only be-
cause I am myself of Hungarian origin but also because there exist out-
standing achievements in this field. Contemporary Hungarian literature 
in Canada is in its flourishing state. Magyar authors are active in literary 
groups and authors' associations across the country, publishing their 
works in anthologies, annals, literary magazines and weekly newspapers 
within and outside this country. Indeed, the comprehensive bibliography 
on ethnic and native Canadian literature, recently completed by me, also 
includes about 350 citations of Hungarian reference material and books 
of poetry, prose and drama.1 
Dr. Watson Kirkconnell, the late student and mentor of ethnic Canad-
ian authors, stated in one of his last papers: 
. . . But an up-to-date literary community really materialized af ter the 
great migration of 1956, and the founding of Kanadai Magyar sag and 
Magyar Elet as vehicles for the outpourings of that community, pres-
ently gathered up in book form. Preeminent in this new wave in 
Toronto were Ferenc Fay, with several volumes of distinguished verse; 
Andras Tamas, whose Orzom a hazat is masterly and mature and 
Marton Kerecsendi Kiss, whose Hetedhetorszag: Mesejatek is alight 
with imagination. . . . The laudable growth of a whole circle of Magyar 
poets came with the founding of the Hungarian-Canadian Authors' 
Association (Kanadai Magyar Irok Kore) in 1969, with a series of 
striking books of poetry and prose entitled Antologia; a kanadai 
magyar irok konyve, edited by Janos Miska of Ottawa and Lethbridge. 
All contributors deserve to be cited, but under pressure of space 1 shall 
mention only Erno Nemeth, Sandor Domokos, Ferenc Fay and Gyorgy 
Vitez. . . .2 
Indeed, our ethnic and native Canadian bibliography deals with 57 
authors of Hungarian descent, 47 of whom have published, within the 
last two decades, 86 volumes of poetry, prose and drama. According to 
these figures, the over 100,000 Magyars in Canada encompass 57 writers: 
one author for every two thousand Hungarians — quite an impressive 
figure by any standards. 
What are the reasons for this mushrooming in creativity? First of all, 
Canada received a host of Hungarian intellectuals, teachers, research 
scientists, lawyers, and authors, following World War II and the 1956 
uprising in Hungary. A more tangible reason than this, however, is that 
Hungarians, as do many others in east Europe, tend towards emotional-
ism, inclined to give vent to their innermost feelings in rhyme and 
rhythm. The Magyar language, owing to its agglutinating structure, 
lends itself to the interpretation of fine intricacies which are so much a 
part of lasting poetry. Poetical expansion is an organic part of Hungarian 
artistic traditions. Hungarians consider poetry a sacred art and those 
who practise it are almost looked upon as Old Testament prophets. 
This projection is not quite so absurd as all that if Hungarian litera-
ture is examined in the light of the past. Hungarians, throughout their 
long history, have often lost confidence in their politicians, their military 
leaders and even their literati, but they have retained relatively unshak-
able faith in their poets, and not without foundation. It was the "initi-
ated" poet who kept up the spirits of his people when times were hard. 
Therefore, the poet sought to provide leadership even during the nation's 
attempts to effect escape from four centuries of foreign oppression. He 
was the seer who raised his voice against the futility of war yet he pro-
vided the slogan "freedom" in 1956. 
The expatriate Hungarian poet hopes to continue as a "champion of 
freedom," in the memory of the "Old Country." Many of his followers in 
exile consider him a source of spiritual inspiration and a saviour of the 
traditional culture. These self-imposed crusading functions reflect the 
heroic-emotional aspect of Hungarian Canadian poetry. 
* 
* * 
Of the many talented authors writing in Hungarian perhaps Ferenc 
Fay is the most exciting poet. At 56, Fay has authored several volumes 
of outstanding poetry, including The Writing Will Be Discovered, A 
Song of Indebtedness, The Lamentations of Jeremiah, Crying for My-
self, The Flood, and Petrifaction.3 He also contributes regularly to lead-
ing Hungarian literary periodicals published outside Hungary. 
Writing in the tradition of the "Occidentalists" (Nyugatosok, Mihaly 
Babits, Dezso Kosztolanyi, Arpad Toth, and Attila Jozsef) Fay occupies 
the void existing between two worlds: the world of rural existence, ex-
perienced in his childhood, and the urban way of life. His wide scope 
extends from the parched land of Pecel, his hometown near Budapest, to 
the asphalt-milieu of his acquired home, Toronto. 
The land and its people constitute the main themes of Fay's poems 
together with a personalized, anthropomorphic God and the image of a 
subjective universe in the background. But these concepts appear to be 
only tools wherein Fay provides the most suitable metaphors through 
which to project his image of the world onto a canvas larger than life. In 
the poem Batar bacsi (Uncle Batar), an old man with bearded wheat 
growing over his eyes rocks the sun on his knees, while the trees sit 
intent, like amused dogs, in a circle around him. In another poem, Isten 
(God), the Lord ripens fruit of the field in his huge peasant palms and 
treads on the earth with unseen footsteps. In the poem Pecel, Fay's 
father sticks the sun to his hat as one would a rose, and cheerful stars 
shine on his sun-tanned forehead. 
In his earlier poems Fay appears to nurture an almost compulsive 
homesickness for Pecel, a town he describes in his poems as a speck of 
dust that he was at one time eager to shake off his shoes. His self-inflicted 
torture is somewhat more comprehensible in the light of his personal 
tragedy. Here is an educated person who, having given this country 
thirty of his best years, is compelled still to support a large family by 
scrubbing the floors of Hungarian churches and prosperous community 
halls in Toronto. 
But the main reason for Fay's devotion to his native town Pecel is his 
awareness of the historical role played by the Hungarian rural society in 
general. The Hungarian village has been regarded as the source of 
national consciousness over the centuries. The Magyar language and 
cultural heritage have managed to survive — in a homogeneous peasant 
society — the systematic onslaught of Latin, Turkish, German, Russian 
and other alien influences. The impact of a dynamic nepi kultura (folk 
culture) has resulted in a national revival through the work of such 
authors as Gyorgy Bessenyei, Mihaly Csokonai, and Sandor Petofi or 
through the work of our contemporaries, Gyula Illyes, Laszlo Nagy and 
Ferenc Juhasz, in addition to the influence of such composers as the 
nation-minded Ferenc Erkel, Ferenc Liszt, Bela Bartok and Zoltan 
Kodaly. 
In this country, the countryside plays a minor part in the development 
of Canadian identity. This may be attributed to the fact that the relation-
ship to the land tends to be an economic one without much emotional 
attachment. Farming in Canada, unlike that in Hungary, is regarded as 
only an occupation, rather than a vocation. Occupations as such lack 
any meaningful permanence as far as social or national continuity is 
concerned. In Fay's poetry the images of Pecel, of Uncle Batar, and of 
the parched land of the town are regarded as symbols of Hungarian 
identity, without which no meaningful poetry and, consequently, no 
worthwhile human existence can be posited. 
Some of his reviewers note Fay's emotional inclinations. The fact is, 
however, that the Fay approach is based upon the personification of the 
universe and — as Fay has demonstrated time and again — the most 
effective way of implementing that technique consists in presenting a 
subjective world in emotional terms. 
Another equally talented member of Fay's generation is the priest-
poet Tamas Tuz, whose real name is Lajos Makko. Born in 1916 and 
educated in Roman Catholic seminaries, Tuz has published ten volumes 
of poems, including Angel, Say it in Half, On the Threshold of a Coun-
try, On Restless Wings, Fingerplay in the Mirror, Selected Poems, and I 
have been there,4 as well as a book of short stories and literary essays. He 
has resided in Canada since 1956. 
In contrast to Fay's naturalistic-realistic approach to poetry, Tamas 
Tuz is a student of the surrealist and metaphysical schools. He has a 
philosophical mind; the stoic outlook is integral in Tuz's poems. 
His career falls into three distinctive phases covering the period be-
tween 1940 and 1970. The early poems are a manifestation of his inno-
cent faith in man. Despite his reservations about the then existing social 
and political order, these poems radiate warmth, self-assurance and a 
sense of personal and national identity. Because this is the age of the 
great populist movement in Hungarian literature, Tuz has not remained 
indifferent to the dominating philosophies of leading Magyar authors of 
the day as for example, Laszlo Nemeth, Gyula Illyes, Lorinc Szabo, 
Laszlo Mecs. 
The second phase marks a deviation from the early idealized represen-
tation of man. This is the period of devastating war resulting in destruc-
tion, mass-migrations and other human misery. Man, according to 
Tuz's biblical-surrealistic analogy, has fallen from his Creator's grace 
and finds himself in total isolation in an alien environment. 
The final phase completes the cycle: man comes to terms with his fate 
and, in a higher, metaphysical state of mind, makes peace with his 
Creator. 
Tamas Tuz, owing to his experimental poetry and to his willingness to 
give preference to the global rather than the national, has become a poet 
of consequence on both sides of the Hungarian border. His creative 
genius lies in his talent for giving vent to his emotional and intellectual 
self in terms of universal techniques. The Hungarian clergy of all reli-
gious denominations have given the world a host of outstanding poets. 
Tamas Tuz is one of these. 
A second group of poets is represented by members of a younger 
generation who left their native land at a tender age and spent their 
formative years in Canada. A few who have made English their creative 
language, such as George Jonas, Gyorgy Porkolab, and Steve Buri, are 
not discussed here, while others — quite a few of them — have decided 
to make good in Hungarian. 
Perhaps the most gifted in the latter group are Laszlo Kemenes Gefin 
and Gyorgy Vitez (real name Gyorgy Nemeth), both of Montreal. 
Kemenes Gefin (b. 1937) has published three volumes of poems: Frost-
works, Zenith and Pagan Diaspora.5 An experimental poet, he finds it 
inconceivable to express two ideas in identical forms. He has shown 
much talent combining the modern with the traditional by means of ex-
pressing up-to-date, complex ideas in archaic idioms. 
Gyorgy Vitez, a clinical psychologist, has been published in literary 
periodicals within and without Hungary. He has also translated Allan 
Ginsberg's Howling into Hungarian.6 Kemenes Gefin and Vitez are 
equally familiar with their native Hungarian traditions and their ac-
quired English and French Canadian cultures. Although they are urban 
and cosmopolitan, themes of Canadian nature are favoured subjects for 
them. Vitez appears to be the more conservative of the two, yet the other 
strives for greater simplicity. In Kemenes Gefin's estimation pure poetry 
is the highest achievement attainable by a poet. His poetry, with its strict 
economy of words, is somewhat akin, in its simplicity, to Bartok's ex-
perimental music. Some of his short poems called "songs" have a chance 
of becoming folksongs; this eventuality is considered by most Hungarian 
poets, since the poems of Sandor Petofi more than a century ago, as a 
great honour and achievement. 
* 
* * 
There is something courageous in someone's pledging loyalty to his 
mother-tongue in an alien land. He is likely to find himself isolated, cut 
off from the mainstream of society in a cultural world of his own. He 
might also be caught between countries, and he may exist in the possi-
bility of belonging to neither. Life in such a cultural vacuum might also 
have an adverse effect on the creative growth of the individual. Yet, a 
considerable portion of world literature has been created by authors 
living abroad, as is the case with Herodotus, Ovid, Dante, Hugo, Ra-
koczi, Joyce, Hemingway, not to mention our own Livesay, Laurence 
and Richler. 
These Hungarian-language authors, like their colleagues writing in 
others of Canada's unofficial tongues, must have weighed the odds 
against their decision before preparing themselves for long, solitary 
lives. The shortcomings arising from being a member of a minority 
group notwithstanding, the poets represented above are doing remark-
ably well. Some literary experts in Hungary, a country formerly so 
anxious to write off her expatriates, and where literary competition is 
really fierce, have lately come to the conclusion that these Hungarian-
Canadian poets are capable of adequate literary expression. They have 
even gone so far as to encourage poets resident in Hungary to study the 
forms and techniques developed by these authors. It is hoped that 
Canada also will take a close look at the works of Fay, Tuz, Kemenes 
Gefin, Vitez, or for that matter at the works of Iwaniuk, Javor, Bauer, 
Betanzos Santos, Viirlaid, and a host of others. Our cultural lives would 
be much poorer without them. 
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Concluding Remarks 
Americans and Canadians of Hungarian descent, as a rule, are not 
indifferent to the culture and history of their 'old'country, which fact 
often shows up in their reading and research interests. Thus, two papers 
represent the study of Hungary or, rather, two important aspects in the 
shaping of recent Hungarian society. The studies also help to throw light 
on the causes of newer waves of immigration from Hungary to Canada. 
While Professor Dreisziger's paper is entitled "The Hungarian General 
Staff and Diplomacy, 1939-1941," it also deals with broader aspects as 
well as some incidental processes that contributed to Hungary's gradual 
drifting into the War. 
One obvious factor that emerges is the woeful inadequacy of the 
Hungarian General Staff of the time as regards its difficult tasks. The 
higher ranks included officers who were well past their prime in terms of 
age and military strategy, being still permeated with loyalty to the "K 
und K" (Kaiserlich und Koniglich: Imperial and Royal) spirit of the 
defunct Austro-Hungarian Empire. They lacked experience with mod-
ern weapons and had been trained to keep away from politics other than 
that based on the status quo. On the other hand, the younger ones, 
owing to their quick promotions, possessed insufficient military knowl-
edge and experience. While those in command were understandably still 
influenced by the traditions of German scholarship and strategy, also 
the more junior officers found it difficult to resist tradition. The un-
spoken conclusion wants to be stated that many, or perhaps most, of 
them suffered from a corresponding lack or ignorance of British and 
American political views and methods. Another point that emerges was 
the apparent endeavor of the military (and the one-time Hungarian gov-
ernment) to divert attention from social, economic, and political weak-
nesses by the stressing of irredentism. 
Professor Blumstock, in his study "The Irrelevance of Ideology: The 
Fall of Marxism and the Rise of the Last Man," gives some hints of the 
vast changes that have taken place in Hungary in the last few decades 
and shares some of his apprehensions concerning the present and future. 
Blumstock manages to condense to a few pages his own insights com-
bined with the impressions of authors of publications on post-1956 
Hungary. He skillfully paints the picture of a growing conflict there 
between the Marxian "new man" and the Nietzscheian "last man." He 
seems to perceive, as one of the consequences of the 1956 upheaval, an 
overwhelming shift of interest among Hungarians from matters political 
to such as the satisfaction of everyday needs and the acquisition of status 
symbols. The premier, Janos Kadar, is presented as a quasi 'honest 
broker' who adroitly mediates, in the midst of conflicting demands, in-
cluding those of the common people and the political leaders. The scene 
of these developments is Hungary, formerly an easternmost member of 
the West, now a westernmost show-window for the Eastern Bloc of 
Europe. 
Two other studies address themselves to the discussion of immigra-
tional and settlement problems, mainly in Canada. The present writer 
argues in his "Searching for Land: The First Hungarian Influx into 
Canada" that important motives for many peasant immigrants to leave 
the mines and factories of the USA and settle on the Canadian plains 
derived from the laissez-faire and highly violent nature of the industrial 
scene in late nineteenth-century America. The other study, Professor 
Dreisziger's "Aspects of Hungarian Settlement in Central Canada, 1921-
1931," examines the seeming contradiction between Canada's avowed 
immigration policy "Only Farmers Need Apply" and the flocking, from 
the 1920s on, of Hungarians into the cities of Central Canada. Most of 
these people arrived in the wake of the "new immigration" of the seven 
years from 1924 on and established extensive new neighbourhoods in 
the cities of Central Canada with particular reference to Toronto and 
Montreal. This development has meant, for Hungarians, a dramatic 
shift of emphasis from the prairies to Central Canada both as regards 
numbers and in the reformulation of Hungarian identity. 
The relocation of emphasis and the reshaping of identity alike, are 
reflected in cultural creativity, with particular reference, in the present 
case, to poetry. Especially Hungarian Canadian poetry of the older type, 
constitutes the subject of the present writer's second paper, "Early Hun-
garian-Canadian Culture." The poetry of the peasant communities on 
the Canadian plain seems to have been influenced by the traditions of 
the historias of the native villages. These folk-poems still preserved their 
old-time function through recording, in an epic manner, and tersely, sig-
nificant happenings. Some poems, particularly the ones that suited com-
munal expression and were accompanied by a tune, tended to discharge 
a cathartic role, both for the community and the individual. The Beke-
var community actually reached the level of a culture centre in which 
thoughts and emotions came to be expressed in rhymes and prose alike. 
Creative writing tended to be reinforced by traditional songs, dances, 
hymns, passage rites, long-standing culinary tastes and skills, and the 
ancestral language, all forming a coherent and interacting whole. The 
culture shown in these facets was the most important characteristic of 
the prairie or old Hungarian-Canadian identity. 
John Miska, himself a writer and a poet, an almost tireless observer 
and advocate of belles-lettres among Canadians of Hungarian stock, 
provides elements for the crystallization of the new or urban Hungarian-
Canadian identity, with particular reference to the cities of Central 
Canada and British Columbia. In his "Modern Hungarian Poetry in 
Canada" he considers and interprets the literary creativity of contem-
porary Canadian Hungarian authors who, for the most part, have or-
ganized themselves into an association. They tend to be poets belonging 
to various "schools" and different age groups. Their common denomi-
nator — in addition to writing in Hungarian — appears to be that they 
are practically all urban dwellers (who, sometimes, give expression to 
their nostalgia for the distant countryside) and literati, often preoccu-
pied with the problems of the individualistic intellectual in the context of 
Canadian society. 
A significant connecting link among the six perspectives presented in 
this volume is seen in their interpretive function, between the respective 
cultures, of their authors. The papers exhibit some results of work carried 
out in different fields of competence inside the framework of Hungarian 
Canadian (American) studies, as contributions to a body of findings on 
which a more comprehensive effort may be built at some time in the 
future.* 
* The editors do not necessarily concur with opinions expressed by individual con-
tributors. 
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The Rakoczi Insurrection in 
English War Policy, 1703-1711 
John B. Hattendorf 
Hungarian liberties, religious toleration, and Habsburg absolutism 
were some of the issues which lay at the heart of the Rakoczi-led Kuruc 
revolt in Hungary. In England, most of these matters were little under-
stood and of no apparent concern. Yet, the ministers of Her Majesty's 
Government in London had the deepest interest in ending the insurrec-
tion.1 
English interest centered on two aspects: supporting the Protestants in 
Hungary and preventing the revolt from being a diversion to the use of 
imperial troops. The religious aspect of Rakoczi's cause predisposed the 
Government in London to seek a solution which favored the Calvinists 
in Hungary. A few months after the outbreak of the rebellion. Queen 
Anne stressed the point in a personal letter to the Emperor Leopold in 
which she asked particularly for freedom of religion for the Hungarian 
Protestants who supported the insurrection. . . We consider it just for 
us to beg this the more freely from your Imperial Majesty," the Queen 
wrote, 
since we ask nothing from you that we ourselves have not already 
done. Believing it not possible to compel the conscience in matters 
pertaining to religion, we have granted to our subjects professing the 
Roman Catholic faith the same peaceful, quiet and free use as is 
enjoyed by the rest of our subjects. . . .2 
Religion was the closest tie which Englishmen shared with the followers 
of Rakoczi, but they also had a common appreciation for the value of 
parliamentary power in placing limits on royal authority. Englishmen 
who were aware of events in Hungary were impressed with the similarity 
of outlook and values between their own domestic system and Rakoczi's. 
Focusing on the religious issue and with further appreciation for the 
parliamentary aspirations of the Kuruc, England based her policy to-
ward Hungary on the belief that what was appropriate in English 
domestic affairs was also a sound basis upon which to construct her 
attitude in foreign affairs. Although the Habsburg court in Vienna was a 
key ally in the War of the Spanish Succession, the English Government 
could not ignore the persecution of Protestants in Catholic lands merely 
for the sake of international power politics. Personally, Queen Anne 
considered herself the leader of Protestant Europe. For that reason, she 
and many of her ministers felt it necessary to intervene on behalf of 
Protestants. She explained to the Elector Palatine, earlier in 1703, 
We cannot but be moved by their anguish, as is meet, and by compas-
sion, nor are we capable of shunning that which we consider to be our 
duty (since we profess the same religion as they). . . ,3 
England naturally sympathized with the Hungarian rebel aims since 
they called for toleration of the Protestant minority, but the relative 
importance of the issue was determined for England by the relationship 
of the Hungarian revolt to Austria's efforts in fighting France. As the 
revolt progressed after 1703, England saw Vienna send more and more 
troops to Hungary. The English Government believed that these troop 
movements created a serious obstacle to carrying out the grand strat-
egy of the war against France. Moreover, Englishmen came to think that 
this action represented bad faith by Austria since they believed that the 
revolt could easily be quelled by acquiescing to Hungarian demands, 
particularly their demand for religious freedom. 
The English concept of grand strategy in the War of the Spanish 
Succession was based on the premise that, in order to defeat the most 
powerful single country in Europe, France's superior military strength 
had to be engaged on as many fronts as possible so that she would be 
compelled to divide and, thus, to weaken her forces. For this reason, 
England believed that it was essential for the allies to attack France from 
the United Provinces, Germany, Savoy, and from the sea while at the 
same time engaging French forces in Spain. In this way, the superior 
strength of France could be reduced to proportions which were manage-
able by the smaller allied armies. The key element in English thinking 
was the stress placed on simultaneous attack on several sides. The 
cabinet in London believed that this required the utmost effort on the 
part of each ally. In the light of this viewpoint, the revolt in Hungary was 
a serious distraction to the Austrian military effort in fighting France.4 
In 1701, the aristocratic Hungarian patriot, Prince Ferenc II Rakoczi, 
had escaped from prison in Vienna. After nealy two years of refuge in 
Poland, he returned to Hungary in June 1703 with his associate Count 
Miklos Bercsenyi and put himself at the head of the Kuruc, peasant 
revolt. Shortly after Rakoczi's return, George Stepney, the English 
envoy in Vienna surveyed Vienna's position in the war against France. 
He saw that Austria had various problems: difficulty with the elector of 
Bavaria, the lethargy of the Imperial army, and the revolt in Hungary. 
"We want but one disorder more to be in as miserable a state as 
possible," he wrote.5 In the back of his mind, he had speculated that this 
one disorder more might be Turkish support for the Hungarians and a 
renewal of the war in the east which had ended only five years before 
with the Peace of Karlowitz. The English envoy to Prussia, Lord Raby, 
sympathized with the Imperial position, "the misfortune of the poor 
Emperor is but too plain for the rebels are almost at the gates of Vienna, 
and the elector of Bavaria with the French are ready to enter his 
hereditary countries on the other side, so that he can hardly find a place 
in his dominions where he can be safe."6 
In the United Provinces, the duke of Marlborough served as com-
mander-in-chief of English forces in the Low Countries and ambassador 
to the Dutch while also a key political figure and a member of the 
cabinet at home. In his reports Marlborough assured the cabinet that he 
understood entirely the serious effect of the Hungarian problem on the 
prosecution of the war, and that he lost no opportunity in pressing the 
Imperial envoys to urge their court to bring about peace with the 
Hungarians. He believed, however, that diplomatic pressure would not 
be effective while Hungarian demands were so unacceptably high.7 At 
an informal discussion in 1704 sponsored by the English and Dutch 
envoys to Vienna, the Kuruc leaders demonstrated that they intended to 
do more than correct what they believed were immediate political 
abuses. They sought the restoration of the elective monarchy and the 
right of the Hungarian nobility to oppose with arms any violation of the 
kingdom's law and constitution. In addition, they wanted foreign powers 
to guarantee the settlement with Vienna, while at the same time suggest-
ing that Transylvania be re-established as an independent state withRa-
koczi as its prince. The Habsburg court in Vienna found the rebel leaders 
to be far too obstinate and ambitious to negotiate over these demands or 
to accept willingly anything else.8 
In 1704, the English envoy in Vienna was ordered to present Marl-
borough's campaign against Bavaria as a special favour to the Emperor, 
which could be appropriately reciprocated by quieting the disturbances 
in Hungary.9 This line of approach was repeatedly used by England, but 
it met with little success. As Marlborough progressed toward the Dan-
ube, Stepney continued to hear reports that if the confederate armies 
should defeat the Bavarian Elector Max II Emmanuel, Austria would 
probably order her leading general, Prince Eugen, to Hungary with a 
large army to suppress the revolt. Stepney diplomatically told an Im-
perial courtier that he was 
fully persuaded such designs were far f rom the Emperor 's inclinations 
and t rue interest, which was to come to a speedy conclusion with his 
own subjects, and if the Elector of Bavaria should chance to be 
defeated, then to turn all the forces that can be spared out of the 
Empire toward prosecuting the war in Italy.10 
The cabinet in London hoped that the further action which it had taken 
in sending a prestigious general, Lord Galway, with additional forces to 
Portugal would also be seen as a further assurance of English support 
for Habsburg interests. They hoped it would deserve the repayment of 
peace in Hungary. The allied success against Bavaria led London to 
believe that the Hungarians would be more willing to make peace." It 
was logical to conclude that the defeat of such a very powerful prince 
would have an effect on less powerful dissenters within the Empire, but 
the situation proved to be quite different. On the one hand, this success 
seemed to lead some in Vienna to "a persecuting spirit"encouragingthe 
use of large detachments of the Imperial army in Hungary.12 On the 
other hand, the Hungarians now seemed to be even less receptive to the 
idea of making a peaceful solution. Following the defeat of the Bavarian 
and French armies by the English, Dutch and Imperial forces at the 
Battle of Blenheim in August 1704, neither France nor Bavaria was 
likely to provide any direct military support for the Hungarian revolt. 
However, Stepney speculated that the Hungarians might now turn to 
seek support from the Turks.13 In late August 1704, Stepney and the 
Dutch envoy at Vienna, Jacob Jan Hamel Bruynincx, jointly approached 
Count Dominik Andreas Kaunitz, the imperial vice-chancellor, attempt-
ing to learn more about Imperial policy toward the Hungarian revolu-
tionaries and "to improve any fair opportunity" that the Hungarians 
might have in reaching a peaceful solution.14 But all seemed to be of no 
avail. In late November, Secretary of State Robert Harley ordered 
Stepney, at the Queen's express command, that he "in the most warm 
and engaging terms press" the Emperor to make peace in Hungary. "All 
the zeal and affection that Her Majesty hath showed to the interest of the 
House of Austria," Harley lamented, 
all the success which heaven hath blessed Her Majesty's arms with will 
be to no purpose, for not only the Turk will necessarily be brought 
into the War on one side, but the French will be strengthened on the 
other side and Her Majesty her allies will be weakened if not disabled 
f r o m affording assistance to those who will do nothing towards their 
own deliverance, but rather embarrass their own affairs and weaken 
others.15 
The remote affairs of Hungary could well have been the rock upon 
which English grand strategy foundered. In English eyes, the spectre of 
renewed war between the Turks and the Empire was increased by 
Austrian insistence on putting down the Hungarian revolt by force. The 
failure of the Imperial court to react to this situation and to put clear 
priority on the war against France caused an increasingly cynical Eng-
lish attitude toward the Empire's contribution to the war. Richard Hill, 
the English envoy to Savoy, echoed the common sentiment when he 
remarked, "we owe little, God knows, to the Emperor, who can neither 
make peace in Hungary, nor war in Lombardy."16 For the moment, the 
war in Italy was to be sustained only by the hope of the 8,000 Prussians 
for which Marlborough had negotiated.17 
By the summer of 1705, the insurrection in Hungary had reached such 
serious proportions for English plans that Lord Sunderland was dis-
patched on a special mission to establish the basis for peace between 
Austria and the Hungarians.18 The Government in London was quite 
willing to use every available argument in support of its view. Doing just 
that, Harley wrote to Vienna wishing Sunderland and Stepney success 
in the negotiations with "those Heathen magicians which oppose you" 
and suggesting that if peace could not be speedily reached in Hungary, it 
would neither be easy to give aid to Italy "nor will our Parliament here 
be ready to continue their supplies for carrying on a war to support 
those, who will not (though they can) help themelves."19 As the principal 
parliamentary manager for the Government as well as a secretary of 
state, Harley's words should have carried weight when reported in 
Vienna. 
While both the Hungarians and the Emperor had accepted English 
mediation, there seemed to be a great reluctance on the part of the 
Austrians to accept an English guarantee of Hungarian rights. Without 
that, there was little hope that the Hungarians would agree to any terms. 
Even before leaving for the continent, Lord Sunderland was pessimistic 
about the success of his mission. "I fear I am going upon a very fruitless 
errand," he wrote.20 
After arriving in Austria, Sunderland found that, despite his urgent 
pleas, there was very little hope of preventing the Imperial army from 
forcefully putting down the revolt.21 By December 1705, the situation 
had not changed. Both sides in the dispute seemed more intransigent 
than ever, and there were additional fears that disorders in Bavaria 
would further hinder the war effort against France. Prince Eugene's 
army in Italy was in need of every kind of support.22 Despite these 
difficulties, there was one ray of hope: the clash of arms in Transylvania 
during Austria's reoccupation of the area had not brought the Turks 
into the war. Sir Robert Sutton, English Ambassador at Constantinople, 
reported to Stepney that the plague, corruption, and confusion in the 
government of the Ottoman Empire allowed little opportunity for direct 
entry into the war.23 Sutton believed that the Turks would go no further 
than merely encouraging the Hungarians to persevere in their revolt and 
"favouring them underhand" with arms in Wallachia and Moldavia.24 
By late spring 1706, Stepney had been able to make progress in mediat-
ing a two-month truce between the Hungarians and the Habsburgs.25 
The English and the Dutch had great expectations for the success of the 
conference convened at Tyrnall on 25 May 1706. This was the first 
formal peace talk between the Emperor Joseph and his Hungarian 
subjects after three years of war. Despite English optimism, the confer-
ence foundered on Rakoczi's uncompromising demand for the restora-
tion of complete independence for Transylvania. George Stepney and 
his Dutch colleague worked hard to obtain a compromise, however the 
Emperor's claim to sovereignty in Transylvania backed by the success of 
his army in subduing the province gave little reason for the Habsburg 
court to concede to Rakoczi's demands. At the expiration of the truce in 
mid-July, the negotiations broke down and the armistice was not re-
newed. The Dutch and English mediators were optimistic about reach-
ing a settlement in due course, but the prolonged period required would 
delay and obstruct the Imperial military campaign in Hungary. Viewing 
the negotiations as only a delay, the Habsburg court broke them off and 
resumed military operations.26 
The English and Dutch mediators were outraged at the failure of these 
negotiations. They interpreted Habsburg intransigence as evidence of 
insincerity, not only in its dealings with the Hungarians, but with the 
wider aims of the Grand Alliance against France. The continued pres-
ence of thousands of Austrian troops in Hungary weakened the allied 
effort against France. To Englishmen this appeared to be a weakness 
caused only by the selfish and unwarranted aims of the Habsburg 
monarch. Given English perceptions of the situation, the government in 
London could not support Vienna in suppressing protestantism or the 
rights of the Hungarians. In one respect, English support for Rakoczi 
only prolonged the agony of his inevitable defeat, yet the suppression of 
the Rakoczi insurrection was no more in England's interests than its 
continuation as a drain on Austrian resources. 
Shortly after the collapse of the peace talks at Tyrnall, Stepney was 
transferred to The Hague to replace the incapacitated Alexander Stan-
hope as envoy. Soon after his arrival there, Stepney learned that the 
Dutch had ordered their envoy in Constantinople to exhort Turkey to 
carefully adhere to the treaty of Karlowitz, the treaty which had brought 
an end to the Turkish war in 1699. Stepney held little hope that such a 
course of action would be effective. "In my poor opinion the most 
natural method of preserving the peace would be by persuading the 
Emperor to be reconciled with the Hungarians," he wrote.27 The Hun-
garians were the key to preserving the peace in east central Europe, and 
Stepney went so far as to suggest that in order to prevent war, the 
Emperor should relinquish Transylvania entirely to Rakoczi. Unknown 
to the English, Rakoczi's envoys were already in Constantinople seeking 
aid from the Turks, but in Stepney's opinion, Turkey was not a natural 
ally for the Hungarians. Prince Rakoczi, himself, had told Stepney that 
he would not have recourse to the Turks unless there was no other 
alternative in attaining his goals.28 With this advice in mind, the cabinet 
approved the instructions to the new English Ambassador to Vienna. 
Sir Philip Meadows was told that his major concern would be to prevent 
diversion from the war against France, stop the war in Hungary, and 
avoid Turkish interference. "It can not but give us and our allies much 
concern," the royal instructions stated, "if we should have any ground to 
apprehend that there will be less force employed against France the next 
year than was this. The only way to prevent that is to procure an 
honourable peace in Hungary."29 English representations in this matter, 
however, had little effect. By the autumn of 1707, there were reports that 
additional Imperial troops were to be withdrawn from Italy and sent 
directly to Hungary.30 Some of the forces mentioned included the Hessian 
and Saxe-Gothans in English pay serving in Italy.31 In February, reports 
were received in London that the Emperor intended to send some of the 
Danish troops in Austrian service to Hungary.32 Although these troops 
were paid by Austria, the English diplomats in both Vienna and Copen-
hagen were instructed to protest against this action and to ensure that 
the troops were used against France. However, when it was learned in 
London that Denmark had agreed to the Emperor's proposal to use 
Danish troops in Hungary, England acquiesced in order to prevent 
further stress within the alliance.33 
From 1708, the English Government appeared to take little interest in 
the Hungarian situation, enduring it as best they could. The envoy in 
Vienna admitted at one point that he never troubled London with news 
from Hungary although the court in Vienna seemed "more concerned 
for the success of that war, than at what may happen on any frontier of 
France."34 In January 1711. the new Government in London under 
Robert Harley which replaced the Godolphin ministry renewed appeals 
for a peaceful accommodation in Hungary. Seeking support from the 
States-General, Lord Townshend was ordered to ask the Dutch to join 
in England's plea for an end to a war which risked Turkish interference 
and which served French interests.35 Despite continued assurances from 
Constantinople that war was unlikely, London suspected that these 
were only pretenses for the Turks to put themselves in a good military 
posture before attacking the Habsburg Empire. The safest course to 
follow, Secretary St. John believed, was to procure peace in Hungary.36 
In 1710. the chances for English grand strategy to succeed had been 
reduced following the defeat and capture of General James Stanhope at 
Brihuega in Spain and the continued lack of a vigorous attack on France 
from Savoy. In London, however, the cabinet continued to believe that 
a military solution to the war could only be won by carrying through the 
original concept of war strategy. The plans for the campaign of 1711 
stressed the full use of the Imperial army against France and an active 
campaign by Victor Amadeus II, the duke of Savoy, complementingthe 
other allied armies in the Low Countries and in Spain. 
As war weariness and financial pressures stretched allied military 
resources to the utmost, English ministers believed that the Hungarian 
situation must be settled quickly in order to win the war. Hungary, in 
St. John's words, had become "the great hinge of the war."37 Without 
the settlement there, he could see "no prospect of reducing France, and 
of obtaining an honourable Peace."38 
The military situation in Spain had fallen to such a level that it 
appeared far too difficult a situation for the allies to retrieve. Secretary 
of State St. John outlined the dilemma: 
Suppose what number of t roops you please sent into Catalonia, they 
will have hardly ground at first to stand upon or provisions with any 
tolerable convenience, neither can they hope easily or in any reason-
able time to be able to extend themselves blocked up by such an army, 
and in such a corner of the country.39 
The situation might be saved, the Government believed, by strong 
action in the other theatres. As St. John put it, "if we were able to gain a 
footing in France whilst we lost it in Spain, we might hope to have the 
opportunity of making a safe and honourable peace."40 English troops 
in Flanders were substantially increased to offset the preparations of the 
French.41 The best opportunity appeared to be an attack in Provence or 
Dauphine.42 However, the ability of the allies to gather a strong army in 
either of those places clearly depended on peace in Hungary and the 
subsequent transfer of Imperial forces to the French front. 20-30,000 
troops had been deployed in Hungary during the insurrection and by the 
end of 1711, this figure may have been more than 50,000 or nearly half of 
the entire Austrian army. 
England's expectations were raised by the conclusion of a peace 
agreement between the Hungarian insurgents and the Habsburg ruler in 
May 1711. The peace which England had sought for so many years 
seemed to be at hand. The revolt was over, and English ministers moved 
quickly to encourage the movement of Imperial troops out of Hun-
gary.43 They watched the results of their efforts carefully for they were 
designed to be a test of Vienna's intentions and of the viability of English 
grand strategy in achieving a military victory in the war. The new 
government which had come to power under Robert Harley in 1710 was 
committed to ending the war. The new English government pursued the 
same basic war strategy which had been followed since the war against 
France had broken out in 1702 44 If possible, they wished to achieve a 
military victory along the lines which the Marlborough-Godolphin 
government had followed. The new leaders saw the difficulty of achiev-
ing success with a purely military strategy and, at the same time, they 
were exploring other alternatives. They believed that short of a clear cut 
military defeat on the battlefield, the alliance could still achieve its goals 
by using allied military preparations as a means of negotiating from a 
position of strength with France. Failing even allied agreement or co-
operation to do that, English leaders believed that they could achieve 
their own national aims through a separate peace. In any case, the 
Government in London needed an effective Austrian army attacking 
France on her borders as part of England's conception of grand strategy 
for the war. Now that the Rakoczi insurrection had been put down, the 
English cabinet could see no further excuse for Austrian failure to join 
fully in the war against France. Secretary of State Henry St. John put 
the issue clearly when he wrote, 
The Malcontents have hitherto been the scapegoats which have borne 
the blame of all deficiencies we have had to charge the House of 
Austria with. Hungary has been the gulf wherein the plunder of 
Bavaria, and of Mantua, the revenues of Milan and Naples, and the 
contributions of the Italian princes, all gained by the assistance of the 
Queen and States, have been swallowed up. But these excuses can no 
longer be pleaded. . . ,45 
The obstacle which the Rakoczi-led insurrection in Hungary had 
presented to English grand strategy had been removed, yet the English 
did not see the desired results after the end of the revolt. The cabinet in 
London concluded that the Emperor's removal of the troops from 
Hungary which had formerly been used to suppress the revolt would be 
"a final test of their good or their bad intentions to that Common Cause 
where the greatest stake is their own."46 Consequently, opinion in 
London became bitter. After peace had been achieved in Hungary, the 
Imperial army remained there and it seemed England must pay even 
greater subsidies to Austria at a time when English finances were 
precarious. If that would be the case, St. John concluded bitterly, "the 




The Hungarian revolt most certainly weakened the Grand Alliance by 
increasing tension between Vienna and London. Englishmen showed 
little appreciation for the realities of the situation in Hungary or for 
Habsburg objectives in Hungary. There was a lack of understanding and 
a clash of basic interests. For the English officials, the Rakoczi Insurrec-
tion was an obscure problem in a distant land, yet the diversion of troops 
to Hungary was the principal reason which prevented Austria from 
participating in the war against France in the manner and to the degree 
which England wished. The Habsburg court had other competing in-
terests which distracted it in other areas as well, but the lack of co-
operation which England felt in regard to Hungary was the situation 
which London used to test Vienna's sincerity in the Grand Alliance. The 
Habsburg court's unwillingness to achieve a speedy peace with the 
Hungarians, in part, spelled the failure of England's strategy for military 
victory against France. 
England was sympathetic toward the rebel cause in Hungary, although 
she provided little beyond diplomatic support for Rakoczi. The rebels 
attracted England by a broad similarity in ideology, but English motives 
in pressing the issues were based in realpolitik. England was probably 
correct in thinking that the Grand Alliance needed to employ all of its 
armed force in order to defeat France in battle. However, England 
calculated allied victory on a number of factors which included the full 
and undiverted employment of the Austrian army on the French border. 
English leaders believed that the revolt in Hungary was the major 
diversion for Austria. They concluded that peace in Hungary would free 
the Austrian army to operate in the west without hindrance. This con-
clusion was unrealistic since it would have involved the abandonment of 
long standing Habsburg ambitions in Hungary. Furthermore, it meant 
that Austria would refrain from military involvement in Hungary and 
would, in fact, yield that country of Rakoczi's forces. English plans also 
presumed that the victorious Hungarians would not align themselves 
with France or with Turkey in any way that would create a threat for 
Vienna. Perhaps the only situation which would have satisfied English 
aspirations was the creation of a Hungary which would be uninvolved in 
international politics, and whose laws, constitution—and Protestants 
—were somehow protected from the power of an absolute monarch. But 
such a Hungary could only be conjured up by Englishmen who held a 
curiously incomplete and unrealistic vision of that country as an isolated 
and distant nation whose external and internal problems had no in-
fluence on the general European situation. The greatest weakness in 
England's war policy was the dichotomy between her keen appreciation 
for power politics in constructing a war strategy, and her failure to 
understand Allied domestic affairs which militated against that strategy's 
implementation. 
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Marriage and Internal Migration in 
Moson County: Feltorony as a Case Study: 
1827-1920 
Blair R. Holmes 
While geographers, historians and demographers frequently employ 
registers of births and deaths and census records in their examinations 
of society's trends and changes, there has generally been considerably 
less implementation of the detailed information contained in marriage 
registers.1 In the case of the village of Feltorony (present-day Halbturn, 
Burgenland), the register of marriages encompasses the period from 
1827 to 1920 inclusively and contains details which can be used in 
describing the lives of the inhabitants of this rural village in extreme 
eastern Austria. With the exception of the years 1865, 1866, 1881, which 
are missing, the records usually contain the names, ages, occupations 
and places of birth and residence of the bride and groom; the names and 
occupations of the parents of the marriage partners; and, in some cases, 
birthdates of the bride and groom and the names and occupations of the 
witnesses to the marriage. Prior to 1896 the marriage records, being 
under ecclesiastical jurisdiction, were written in Latin; while the intro-
duction of civil registration in 1896 required the information to be 
recorded in Hungarian. Examples of the aspects of the daily life of the 
village's inhabitants which are possible to examine are the percentage of 
intra-village marriages (which provides an index of the community's 
isolation); the distance and direction of inter-village marriages; and the 
role of age, occupation and marital status in determination of spouse 
selection.2 
Located in the Hungarian border province of Moson, part of which 
was incorporated into the Austrian Burgenland following World War 
One, Feltorony was selected at random and is assumed to have been 
representative of the predominantly German villages in western Hun-
gary.3 The population of the village rose from 1150 in 1821 to 2449 in 
1920, an increase of 112.9%, which was a much greater rate of increase 
than was experienced by the surrounding region.4 Between the years 
1827-1920 there were 1657 marriages. Few women had occupations 
listed, but of the men 57% were engaged in agriculture; approximately 
19% were artisans; 9% followed commercial pursuits such as merchants, 
innkeepers or carters; 5% has pastoral occupations; while the remaining 
10% was comprised of day-laborers, domestic servants, public officials, 
school teachers, military personnel or other miscellaneous livelihoods. 
Primary among the factors which influenced a person's selection of a 
mate were the population of the surrounding territory, the distance from 
neighboring villages and local customs governing marital choice.. If, for 
example, the nearest village was at a greater distance than the average 
person could walk or ride within the space of a few hours, it is unlikely 
that there would have been much long-range courtship and few inter-
village marriages.5 If the average person did not possess the means to 
travel great distances, there would have been little social contact outside 
one's own village or its immediate environs.6 The population of one's 
native village and the nearby area was also significant. If the population 
was dense, this provided a large number of potential partners and 
reduced the desire or necessity to search elsewhere. Also, the belief of the 
TABLE 1 
NUMBER OF MARRIAGES AND THE DISTANCE OF 
BIRTHPLACE FROM FELTORONY, 1827-1920 
Distance (km) Male Female 
2-3 64 18 
3-4 113 166 
4-5 44 23 
5-6 6 3 
6-7 24 21 
7-8 0 0 
8-9 0 0 
9-10 44 15 
10-11 44 14 
11-12 28 31 
12 13 27 5 
13-14 8 10 
14-15 22 22 
15-16 31 30 
16-17 15 8 
17-18 13 9 
18-19 5 3 
19-20 10 10 
Total 498 388 
Hungarian peasants that "everyone should choose a fitting mate within 
the village"7 militated against selecting a mate who was not well known 
to one's family and friends. 
Tables 1 and 2 demonstrate that the relationship between the number 
of marriages and distance decreased sharply as the distance from Fel-
torony became greater. It is evident, when the places of birth and 
residence are compared, that there was a general tendency for move-
ment toward Feltorony and, hence, more spouses were chosen from 
those who resided within a small radius. Table 3 reveals the tendency for 
a close proximity of residence to determine spouse selection. More of 
the brides and grooms were residing outside of Feltorony than were 
born outside and their residences were closer to the village. A large 
portion either resided in Feltorony or within a small radius. More than 
half of the men and two-thirds of the women were village residents, 
while an additional one-quarter of both genders resided within five 
kilometers. Very few persons lived at a distance exceeding twenty kilo-
meters.8 
TABLE 2 
NUMBER OF MARRIAGES AND THE DISTANCE OF 
RESIDENCE FROM FELTORONY, 1827-1920 
Distance (km) Male Female 
2-3 50 10 
3 4 352 399 
4-5 40 14 
5-6 3 1 
6-7 30 17 
7-8 10 0 
8-9 26 31 
9-10 20 2 
10-11 33 7 
11-12 17 3 
12-13 23 4 
13-14 6 2 
14-15 16 3 
15-16 31 21 
16-17 9 1 
17-18 3 1 
18-19 2 0 
19-20 4 1 
Total 675 517 
TABLE 3 
NUMBER OF MARRIAGES AND DISTANCES OF 
BIRTH AND RESIDENCE, 1827-1920 
BIRTH RESIDENCE 
Men Women Men Women 
Distance No. % Cum% No. % Cum% No. % Cum% No. % Cum% 
Feltorony 741 51.7 51.7 947 64.5 64.5 905 55.7 55.7 1092 67.3 67.3 
0-5km 221 15.4 67.1 207 14.1 78.6 442 27.2 82.9 423 26.1 93.4 
5-10km 118 8.2 75.3 53 3.6 82.2 122 7.5 90.4 58 3.6 97.0 
10-20km 149 1 1.1 86.4 128 8.7 90.9 111 6.8 97.2 36 2.2 99.2 
These figures, however, do not take into account the important factor 
of population distribution around the village. Because the probability of 
Feltorony residents marrying each other was a function both of distance 
and population, it is necessary to standardize the number of marriages 
for the surrounding area. This is accomplished by dividing the number 
of marriages, according to residence within a particular radius, by the 
corresponding population of the same area. Because the population 
structures of the neighboring villages are not known, it is assumed that 
they were similar to Feltorony. The average size of the population of 
each community and area was determined by calculating the running 
and weighted averages from years in which censuses were taken.9 (Table 
4.) 
When the standardized number of marriages is multiplied by 1000 
(M = 1000s/y2p) and the logarithm of the resulting product is plotted 
against the distance from Feltorony, as in Figure 1, the relationship 
approximates a straight line, which indicates a constant rate of change. 
The correlation coefficient (r) of the distance (D) and the logM gives 
further strong and nearly equal evidence of the relationship between the 
place of residence of a marriage partner and the distance of that resi-
dence from Feltorony. For males r = -0.79; while for females r = -0.74. 
The information contained in the marriage registers varied in amount 
and nature according to the proclivities of the village priest and the 
demands of the church or state. On occasion, the earliest years of the 
register excluded the place of birth or residence, while the entries for the 
years following 1907 periodically omitted the birthplace of those not 
born in Feltorony or the neighboring villages of Albert Casimir and 
Wittmannshof.10 As a result, the calculations for the years following 
1907 are somewhat distorted and could be misleading." 
Although the earliest parish register entries sometimes failed to list 
SPOUSES, ESTIMATED POPULATION, AND 
STANDARDIZED NUMBER OF SPOUSES IN 
THE VICINITY OF FELTORONY, 1827-1920 
Distance (km) Spouse(s) 
from Feltorony Male Female 
2-3 50 10 
3-4 352 399 
4-5 40 14 
5-6 3 1 
6-7 30 17 
7-8 10 0 
8-9 26 31 
9-10 20 2 
10-11 33 7 
11-12 17 3 
12-13 23 4 
13-14 6 2 
14-15 16 3 
15-16 31 21 
16-17 9 1 
17-18 3 1 
18-19 2 0 
19-20 4 I 
Feltorony 905 1092 
Average Standardized Spouses 
Population (p) Mate Female 
1416 0.0706 0.0141 
473 1.4884 1.6871 
2454 0.0326 0.0114 
2048 0.0029 0.0098 
missing 
— — 
145 0.1379 0.0000 
missing 
— — 
2234 0.0179 0.0018 
2533 0.0261 0.0055 
2757 0.0123 0.0022 
3995 0.0115 0.0010 
1710 0.0070 0.0023 
4577 0.0070 0.0013 
6894 0.0090 0.0061 
4056 0.0044 0.0005 
1605 0.0037 0.0012 
799 0.0050 0.0000 
3290 0.0024 0.0006 
1857 0.9747 1.1761 
s 
Standardized Spouses = 
ViP 
the place of birth or residence, it is evident that slightly more than half 
(52.3%) of the grooms and two-thirds (65.4%) of brides were born in 
Feltorony. When the place of residence is considered, a slightly larger 
percentage of the grooms (55.7%) and brides (67.4%) were living in Fel-
torony at the time of marriage. The lower percentage of male spouses 
resident in Feltorony stems, in part, from the fact that it was more 
common for men than women to leave the community to obtain employ-
ment. Men who changed their residence were also less inclined than 
women to return to the village of their birth for the marriage ceremony. 
More often, it was the bride's town of birth or a different village to which 
both had moved where the wedding occurred. When the neighboring 
villages of Albert Casimir and Wittmannshof are included, the trend for 
women to change residence less than men becomes more clear. While 
three-fifths (60.2%) of the men were born in one of the three villages, in 
excess of three-fourths (76.9%) of the women were native. Of the men 
RELATIONSHIP OF LOGARITHM OF STANDARDIZED NUMBER OF 
MARRIAGES TO DISTANCE FROM FELTORONY, 1827-1920 
D (distance in km) 
who married in Feltorony, three-quarters (77.5%) were resident in one 
of the villages, while more than nine-tenths (91.9%) of the women were 
residents. (Table 5.) 
When it is considered that nearly 40% of the men and 23% of the 
women who were married in Feltorony were not born there or in the 
adjacent villages of Albert Casimir and Wittmannshof, it becomes ap-
parent that there was a significant amount of residential change in 
Moson county during the period being studied. This hypothesis is given 
further credence when a comparison is made between those who spent 
their lives from birth to marriage in Feltorony and those wed in the 
community who had either been born there and moved elsewhere or had 
been born elsewhere and moved into the village. Nearly half of the men 
and forty per cent of the women who were married in Feltorony were not 
natives, i.e., persons who were born and resident in the village. (Table 6.) 
The amount of residential change, however, was less than apparent 
because of those who were born and resident in a single village other 
than Feltorony. Approximately one-fifth (18.8%) of the grooms and one 
bride in nine (11.4%) who were wed in Feltorony were natives and 
residents of some other village. As a result, a high and similar percentage 
PERCENTAGES OF SPOUSES BORN OR RESIDENT IN 
FELTORONY, CASIMIR A N D WITTMANNSHOF, 1827-1920 
BIRTH PLA CE 
Date Feltorony Casimir/ Wittmannshof Total 
Men Women Men Women Men Women 
1828-1838 58.3 80.2 1.6 5.8 59.9 86.0 
1839-1849 53.9 73.8 4.6 9.7 58.5 83.5 
1850-1860 43.6 61.3 2.6 5.8 46.2 67.1 
1861-1871 52.0 69.5 9.1 7.3 61.1 76.8 
1872 1882 50.7 55.7 7.2 14.2 57.9 69.9 
1883-1895 47.5 63.7 5.9 7.4 53.4 71.1 
1896-1908 51.7 60.1 9.3 13.4 61.0 73.5 
1909-1920 66.7 69.4 25.4 25.4 92.1 94.8 
Total 
Average 52.3 65.4 7.9 11.5 60.2 76.9 
RESIDENCE 
Date Feltorony Casimir/ Wittmannshof Total 
Men Women Men Women Men Women 
1828-1838 68.6 77.0 10.1 10.9 78.7 87.9 
1839-1849 62.2 73.4 13.4 15.4 75.6 88.8 
1850-1860 57.7 73.3 23.7 22.4 81.4 95.7 
1861-1871 63.1 79.3 20.1 19.6 83.4 98.9 
1872-1882 54.6 66.5 24.8 30.7 79.4 97.2 
1883-1895 54.3 70.6 26.0 27.6 80.3 98.2 
1896 1908 52.1 59.6 23.6 29.6 75.7 89.2 
1909-1920 39.9 48.9 28.5 32.3 68.4 81.2 
Total 
Average 55.7 67.4 21.8 24.5 77.5 91.9 
of men (68.1%) and women (72.3%) had never changed village of resi-
dence prior to marriage.12 
Approximately one-third (31.4%) of the men married in Feltorony 
were migrant, i.e., had changed village of residence prior to marriage. Of 
these 436 persons, only 47 (10.8%) had been born in Feltorony, moved 
elsewhere and returned to their native village to marry. With only one 
exception, each returned to Feltorony to marry a native girl. The single 
exception married a person who had moved from her village of birth and 
settled near Feltorony. One-third (144) of the migrants had moved to 
Feltorony, while 245 (56.2%) had been born and changed residence 
outside of Feltorony. When the number of men who were either born 
PERCENTAGES OF SPOUSES BORN A N D 
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Average 49.3 60.9 
and/or resident in the village are totaled, it is somewhat surprising to 
learn that 37% of the men wed in Feltorony were neither born nor 
resident there. This high figure becomes more credible and is reduced 
when the figures of those who were born or resident in Albert Casimir 
and Wittmannshof are added. With the three villages treated as a unit, 
the percentage of married men who were born and/or resident increases 
to 74.4%, while those who were born and maintained residence in either 
Feltorony, Albert Casimir or Wittmannshof totaled 56.3% of the grooms. 
It was relatively rare for a woman to marry outside of the village in 
which she resided, as less than one in twenty did so, whereas men were 
more likely to wed outside their village of residence. Even so, a large 
majority of both sexes was married in the village of residence. Of the 
women, three of four (75.4%) were either born or resident in Feltorony. 
Taking in addition Albert Casimir and Wittmannshof, 86.9% of the 
brides were born and/or resident in at least one of the three villages, 
while 70.5% of the women were born and resided in the communities. In 
comparison to the men, a slightly smaller number of women (399), 
which is 29.8% of all brides whose birthplace and residence are known, 
were migratory. Of this group, 142 had moved to Feltorony, which was 
only slightly higher (35.6% women; 33.0% men) than the percentage of 
grooms who had done the same. A larger number of women (66) than 
men (47) had been born in Feltorony, moved elsewhere and returned to 
marry. In the case of both genders, most of those born in Feltorony who 
left the village settled in Albert Casimir or Wittmannshof. Of the 943 
brides born in Feltorony, only 18 did not establish residence in one of 
these villages, while only 11 native-born men did likewise. Only 1.9% of 
the women and 14.4% of the men married in Feltorony were born and 
residing outside the three associated villages. A total of 945 (67.7%) of 
the men wed in Feltorony never changed residence. Of these non-
migrants, slightly more than one-quarter (27.2%) were neither natives 
nor residents of Feltorony, but 98 of the grooms who had never moved 
were residents of Albert Casimir or Wittmannshof. A total of 16.8% of 
the non-migratory men lived outside the three communities. A higher 
percentage (72.3%) of the women wed in Feltorony had never changed 
residence, but of the 1040 non-migratory brides, only 25 (2.4%) were not 
natives of Feltorony, Albert Casimir or Wittmannshof. 
It is apparent that the various economic, social and technological 
changes introduced during the nineteenth century had a minimal effect 
upon the migratory trends of the population of Feltorony and its 
environs. One could expect that an increasingly dynamic regional econ-
omy and improved transportation systems would result in a marked 
increase in residential change, but such was not the case. Between 1827 
and 1860 the mobility of both males and females tended to increase, but 
afterward, with one exception, there was a steady decline. When linear 
regressions are plotted, it emerges that both sexes tended to decrease 
their residential mobility between 1827 and 1920, although female mo-
bility was always less than that of the men and decreased at a faster 
rate.13 This decrease in migration can be attributed partially to the 
increase in the village's population and the economic growth of the 
surrounding area. Greater employment opportunities and a larger choice 
of mates would logically contribute to the decline in residential change. 
Women displayed a more consistent pattern of mobility with less pro-
nounced fluctuations than men. The men ranged between 45.6% and 
17.6%, a difference of 28%; while the females ranged between 36.5%and 
18.6% mobility, a difference of 17.9%. (Table 7.) 
Because of the limited possibility that a person would marry someone 
who was not a resident of his own village or a nearby community, the 
likelihood of stable, i.e., non-migratory, natives marrying each other 
was closely related to the amount of inter-village migration. In Fel-
torony slightly more than half (54.5%) of the marriages were between 
persons who were non-migratory. However, nearly two-thirds of both 
sexes (men 67.5%; women 69.8%) had never changed residence. Of the 
stable women, then, three of four (78.1%) married non-migratory men; 
while a higher percentage (80.7%) of the stable men married non-
migratory women. Nearly one marriage in six (17.2%) was between 
mutually migratory persons, while 28.3% involved one stable and one 
migratory spouse. However, short-range migration did not preclude 
PERCENTAGES OF MIGRATORY SPOUSES 
1827-1920 
Years Men Women 
1828-1838 23.8 23.4 
1839-1849 26.5 32.2 
1850-1860 45.6 36.5 
1861-1871 35.7 29.3 
1872-1882 34.1 33.0 
1883-1895 35.4 32.1 
1896-1908 33.5 29.9 
1909-1920 17.6* 18.6* 
Average 32.4* 29.8* 
* After 1907 the parish register frequently failed to list the birthplaces of the 
grooms who were not born in Feltorony. Consequently, the mobility of men was 
likely higher for the 1909-1920 period. When this period is omitted from the 
calculations, the average percentage of male mobility is 34.0. When the same 
period is omitted for the brides, the average percentage of female mobility is 
31.3. 
marriage between village natives. The percentage of marriages between 
village natives was higher than is indicated due to the practice of one 
partner (usually the groom) obtaining employment in a neighboring 
village and returning to wed someone in the village of his birth. Al-
though nearly half (45.5%) of the marriages contained at least one 
migratory partner, the distance of migration played a major role in 
determining whether the persons born in Feltorony married each other. 
Throughout the century the majority of marriages was composed of 
persons who had never changed residence. Only in the period from 1850 
to 1860 were less than half of the marriages constituted of mutually 
stable spouses. Otherwise, there was an increase in the percentage of 
mutually non-migratory partners. For the mutually migratory couples 
there was a substantial variation of percentage with a slight increase, i.e., 
increasingly more marriages were composed of migrants as the century 
progressed. Overall, there was a trend for both marriage partners to be 
persons who had changed residence or persons who had not. Increasing-
ly fewer marriages were contracted in which only one member had 
changed residence. There was also an increase in marriages between 
non-migratory village natives, which decreased the likelihood that a 
migrant would marry a non-migrant. Throughout the century there was 
an increasing trend for fewer persons to return to their native village to 
marry, while stable natives became less inclined to marry migrants and 
fewer persons were changing community of residence. The number of 
mutually migratory and mutually stable couples increased by 20.2% 
during the century. In the 1827-1838 period, one-third of the marriages 
had one member who had changed residence, but by 1909-1920 only 
one-fifth of the marriages had a partner who had moved. (Table 8.) 
Residential change was dependent upon several factors. Age was one 
partial determinant of the frequency and distance of migration. Young 
men, who had a potentially larger selection of marriage partners than 
older men and less apparent reason to choose a spouse from outside the 
village, were less migratory. Until the age of 36, more than two-thirds 
(69.0%) of the grooms had not changed residence, but half (53.8%) of the 
older men had moved. Older men were more likely to be seeking a 
second wife and were under greater economic pressure to marry, so the 
goal of finding the ideal spouse would have been less important.14 Few 
young men were married under 20 years of age and none had changed 
residence. The majority of men (70.2%) married for the first time be-
tween the ages of 21 and 30, with the average age being 27.5 years. As the 
century progressed, there was a tendency for the mobility of the men in 
the 21-25 age group to increase while the older men decreased their 
migration. In the 1827-1838 period 92.3% of the men between 21 and 25 
years of age were stable, but by 1883 the percentage had dropped to less 
than 57% and remained at that level until after 1908. Beginning at the 
age of 26, there was a trend for mobility to decrease at a faster rate, i.e., 
TABLE 8 
PERCENTAGES OF MIGRATORY AND 
NON-MIGRATORY SPOUSES, 1827-1920 
Years Mutually Mutually Husband Husband 
Stable Migratory Stable Migratory 
Couples Couples Wife Wife 
Migratory Stable 
1827-1838 58.9 7.4 14.7 18.9 
1839-1849 52.9 11.0 20.6 15.4 
1850-1860 42.7 24.8 12.1 20.4 
1861-1871 51.4 16.0 13.3 19.3 
1872-1882 54.4 21.2 11.5 12.9 
1883-1895 54.3 21.7 10.4 13.6 
1896-1908 54.9 17.8 13.1 14.1 
1909-1920 72.4 7.3 11.4 8.9 
Average 54.5 17.2 13.0 15.3 
men between 26 and 30 years of age experienced a slight decrease in 
mobility, while each successive older age group witnessed a greater 
decrease in mobility than the former group. 
The relationship between age and migration for women differed from 
that of the men. Whereas most men (84.4%) were married between the 
ages of 21 and 35, women entered into marriage younger, within a 
narrower age span, and with less difference in mobility between age 
groups. The average age for the first marriage of women was 23.6 years. 
Nearly two-thirds (65.7%) of the women were married between the ages 
of 21 and 30, which was less than the men (70.2%), but whereas less than 
14 per 1000 of the males were married under the age of twenty, 205 per 
1000 of the women did so. Thus 86.6% of the women were married 
before the age of thirty. With the exception of those over 40 years of age, 
the brides revealed a relatively constant and low level of migration for all 
ages. As in the case of the men, there was a trend for those in the 21-25 
age group to change residence increasingly often, but unlike the men, the 
older women (those over 30) also increased their mobility throughout 
the century. The least amount of migration occurred within the 21-25 
age bracket (23.8%) for women and the 26-30 year-old men (30.2%). 
For both sexes those beyond 40 years of age experienced the greatest 
amount of residential change (51.4% women; 46.0% men). The higher 
percentage of migration by persons in the upper age levels could partial 
ly be explained by their relative economic freedom. Because they would 
be less likely to have small children and could pass their holdings on to 
their heirs, older persons would find it easier to change residence. Also, 
older persons, because of their longevity, would have had more oppor-
tunity to change residence. (Table 9). 
Remarriage was a relatively frequent phenomenon in the village. 
Slightly more than one-sixth (17.0%) of the grooms and exactly one 
bride in eight (12.5%) had previously been married.15 The average age of 
widowed men who chose to remarry was slightly more than 38, with the 
women of a similar status averaging 37 years. Because few women 
beyond the age of 35 and men beyond the age of 40 remarried (only 6.4% 
of all brides and 8.4% of all grooms), those who chose to marry later in 
life or remarried, apparently needed to search a wider area to locate a 
spouse and thus evidenced a higher degree of mobility. On the other 
hand, those who remarried were limited in their mobility because of 
children, property holdings or other obligations and would be inclined 
to select a mate from among the local populace. Most of the inhabitants 
of Feltorony who had lost a spouse chose not to remarry. Those with 
adult children or who did not require a marriage partner to manage the 
PERCENTAGES OF NON-MOBILITY ACCORDING TO 
AGE GROUP, 1827-1920 
Age Groups 
Years 16 -20 21--25 26-30 31--35 36--40 41 -50 50+ 
M* M F M F M F M F M F M F 
1827- 1838 100 85.7 92.3 100 80.0 75.0 50.0 75.0 66.7 100 — — — — 
1839 1849 100 57.1 70.8 83.3 76.9 84.6 33.3 80.0 00.0 100 66.7 — — — 
1850- I860 100 70.3 75.0 72.7 54.9 34.6 33.3 50.0 11.1 50.0 61.5 — 50.0 33.3 
1861 1871 100 76.9 60.4 76.5 75.0 66.7 66.7 73.7 33.3 50.0 42.9 — — 0.0 
1872 1882 — 65.5 71.4 74.2 71.0 55.6 65.4 70.6 47.4 55.6 36.4 30.0 50.0 100 
1883- 1895 — 64.3 56.8 74.5 65.9 65.9 77.8 50.0 80.0 57.1 66.7 55.6 25.0 66.7 
1896 1908 — 66.7 59.4 74.1 67.3 61.9 80.8 66.7 100 50.0 53.8 66.7 100 100 
1909- 1920 
— 
75.0 86.1 81.3 83.3 95.3 81.8 66.7 83.3 66.7 66.7 50.0 50.0 
— 
Totals 100 68.8 67.4 76.2 69.8 67.2 67.6 65.9 52.9 60.5 55.6 45.8 47.4 54.5 
*M = Male 
** p = :
 Female 
home and children or direct the farm or workshop had less reason to 
wed again. This is demonstrated by the small number of men beyond the 
age of 50 and women older than 45 who remarried.16 This also explains 
why there was only a slight difference in the percentages of migration 
between single men and widowers. Approximately two of every three 
men, regardless of marital status (single men 68.2%; widowers 64.1%), 
did not change residence. These nearly equal percentages are mislead-
ing, however. Until 1860 those who had previously been married were 
slightly less migratory than single men, although both groups revealed 
the same trend. Between 1861 and 1883 the single men were less apt to 
change residence. From 1883 to 1908 the situation was reversed, with the 
widowers becoming increasingly less mobile at a sharp rate. After 1908, 
however, the movement of previously married men increased rapidly 
while single men revealed an extreme degree of stability. Considering 
the period 1827-1920 as a whole, there was a slight tendency for single 
men to lessen their mobility, while men who had previously been married 
becoming increasingly migratory.17 
Marital status was a stronger determinant of the mobility of women 
than it was of men. There were also greater differences between single 
women and those previously married. On the average, nearly three of 
every four women (71.1%) who married between 1827 and 1920 had 
never changed residence, while less than half (49.4%) of the previously 
wed had never moved. Throughout the century there was little variation 
in the percentage of single women who were mobile, although there was 
a slight trend for residential stability to increase. The range of single 
female stability was between 66.9% and 82.4%, a difference of 15.5%; 
whereas the non-movement of widows fluctuated between 77.3% and 
23.1%, a range of 44.2%. In spite of such widespread fluctuations, there 
was only an extremely slight decline in the mobility trend by previously 
married women.18 (Table 10.) 
TABLE 10 
PERCENTAGES OF STABILITY 
ACCORDING TO MARITAL STATUS, 1827-1920 
MEN WOMEN 
Years Single Previously Single Previously 
Married Married 
1827-1838 75.3 83.3 76.3 72.7 
1839-1849 71.4 77.5 66.9 77.3 
1850-1860 59.7 53.5 67.2 50.0 
1861-1871 67.5 48.4 74.4 23.1 
1872-1882 66.9 61.1 68.4 58.1 
1883-1895 63.9 68.8 69.8 50.0 
1896-1908 66.2 78.6 69.7 73.3 
1909 1920 86.3 36.4 82.4 69.2 
Average 68.2 64.1 71.7 49.4 
It is logical to assume that a person's occupation would influence his 
mobility. Those with extensive property holdings, for example, would 
likely find it much more difficult to change residence than an itinerant 
day-laborer or artisan. The village's parish records list numerous occu-
pations for men, but relatively few for women. Of the 1657 brides wed in 
Feltorony, only 142 had occupations attributed to them. Ninety of the 
brides were servants, 38 were day-laborers or cottagers, seven were 
bondswomen, six were cooks, and one was a midwife. For the male 
population a large number and variety of occupations were recorded, 
which this author has categorized in seven groups: commercial, artisan, 
agriculture, service (including domestic servants, day-laborers and bonds-
men), professional, pastoral and miscellaneous.19 
A slightly disproportionate share of the men who did not change 
residence were engaged in agriculture. While composing 47.6% of the 
grooms, the tillers of the soil accounted for 57.3% of those who were 
non-migratory. Four of every five (80.7%) farmers had not moved prior 
to marriage, while 65.8% of the artisans, 41.7% of the commercial class 
and 55.7% of the service category were stable.20 Until 1895 those in 
agriculture maintained a high and dominant level of stability, but be-
tween 1896 and 1908 only slightly more than half did not change resi-
dence. Following 1908 the non-mobility of farmers rebounded to near 
its previous level. Throughout the century the non-mobility of those 
practicing agriculture declined at a rate nearly equal to that of the entire 
male population, while the stability of the artisans and those in the 
service and commercial categories increased after experiencing substan-
tial fluctuations. Between 1827-1838, 68% of the artisans had not changed 
residence and each subsequent decade (except for 1872-1882) until the 
end of the nineteenth century witnessed a decline in their mobility. By 
1895 only 42.9% of the artisans in the preceding decade had not moved. 
After 1900, however, there was a sharp increase in the stability of 
artisans. The most migratory occupational category included the do-
mestic servants, day-laborers, manual laborers, cottagers and the like. 
From 1827 until 1895, 53% of those in the service occupations were 
migratory. Like the artisans, they too, after the turn of the century, 
witnessed a tremendous change and became much more residentially 
stable. Between 1896 and 1902, 80.6% of the service group were non-
migratory. During the years 1827-1920 those in agriculture declined 
only slightly in their residential stability, whereas the artisan and service 
groups tended to increase their residential permanence at a much faster 
rate.21 (Table 11.) 
TABLE 11 
PERCENTAGES OF MALE MIGRATION 
ACCORDING TO OCCUPATION, 1827-1920 
Years Agriculture Artisan Service Commercial 
1827-1838 16.7 32.0 — — 
1839-1849 14.5 31.8 45.7 — 
1850 1860 22.8 38.5 59.6 — 
1861-1871 17.9 50.0 44.8 — 
1872-1882 8.2 35.7 52.7 68.8 
1883-1895 2.9 57.1 54.9 63.2 
1896-1908 42.2 21.7 18.9 50.0 
1909-1920 18.5 6.2 21.1 
— 
Average 19.3 34.2 44.3 58.3 
The amount of migration between Feltorony and the surrounding 
area between 1827 and 1920 clearly indicates that inter-village contact 
was common and that the possibility of marrying someone from another 
community was substantial. The alteration of one's residence, however, 
did not necessarily lessen the likelihood of marrying a person from one's 
own village. In spite of the frequency of residential change, most of those 
born in Feltorony married someone from their native village. A total of 
852 marriages were conducted of which one or both spouses were stable 
natives of Feltorony, had moved from the village prior to being wed, or 
had been born elsewhere but had immigrated to the village. In 66.3% of 
the cases both partners were natives who had not changed residence. In 
the neighboring villages of Albert Casimir and Wittmannshof a large 
majority of those who had moved into or emigrated from one of the two 
hamlets married someone else who has also migratory. In Albert Casimir 
slightly more than one marriage in six (17.6%) was between stable 
natives, while only two per cent of the marriages in Wittmannshof were 
between natives who had not moved. It is evident that Feltorony, whose 
population grew rapidly, exercised a strong attraction for persons resid-
ing in small or declining communities. In Feltorony only one male 
native in eight (12.4%) and one female native in approximately six 
(17.4%) married someone who had moved, even if only to a neighboring 
village to work. In Albert Casimir 56.2% of the men and 47.7% of the 
women who were stable natives married someone who had moved. 
There was little tendency for those born in Feltorony or any of the 
surrounding villages who had moved elsewhere to return to their own 
community of birth to marry. It was exceptionally rare for a non-
migratory native of Feltorony to marry someone who was neither born 
nor residing in the community. Only seven of 645 men (1.1%) and 29 of 
684 women (4.2%) did so. In Albert Casimir, the stable, native males 
found one-fifth of their spouses from among those who had never 
resided in the community, while only 6.8% of the native women took 
their husbands from among outsiders. 
A person's age also partially determined whether one wed a non-
migratory native, someone who had migrated locally, or an outsider. 
Only one of the native Feltorony men who married prior to the age of 20 
had changed residence. Between the ages of 21 and 35 an average of 
69.5% of the native men who wed had not migrated. After the age of 35, 
however, the percentage of non-migratory males native to Feltorony 
dropped to an average of 55.3%. As age increased, males born in 
Feltorony became increasingly likely to move from the village prior to 
marriage. When all age groups are considered, a majority (68.4%) of the 
women residing in Feltorony married non-migratory village natives. 
Stable, native Feltorony women constituted a higher percentage of 
marriage partners for a wider span of ages. Between 16 and 40 years of 
age, non-migratory Feltorony women comprised three-quarters (75.2%) 
of all brides. After 40 years of age the percentage of stability decreased 
sharply. On the average, 72.1% of the men married in Feltorony wed 
native, non-migratory women. (Table 12.) 
TABLE 12 
PERCENTAGES OF STABILITY OF FELTORONY NATIVES 
ACCORDING TO AGE, 1827-1920 
AGES MALE FEMALE 
16-20 92.3 65.8 
21-25 67.3 76.1 
26-30 69.9 70.9 
31-35 73.3 74.0 
36 40 54.8 76.7 
41-50 56.1 42.1 
50+ 53.3 50.0 
Average 68.0 72.1 
The selection of a mate from one's own native village, in spite of the 
change of residence, was also a function of the distance of migration. A 
change of residence within only a short distance of one's village would 
not effectively remove someone from the influence of friends or family, 
nor would the choice of potential mates, due to continued contact with 
one's native village, be greatly altered. Also, because parents commonly 
participated in the choice of mates for their children, the selection would 
often fall on someone already well known to the family, usually some-
one who lived nearby. Obviously, those whose distance of migration was 
small were less likely to find mates outside their home village. Although 
age or occupational group might have a high percentage of members 
who changed residence, a greater understanding of such migration is 
received when related to the distance of migration. In the case of Fel-
torony, the strong propensity of the village's natives to inter-marry is 
attested to by the fact that the vast majority of spouses born in the village 
did not relocate outside of it. For both sexes an overwhelming portion 
(93.6% men; 93.0% women) of those born in the community did not 
change residence prior to marriage. The native women of Feltorony who 
migrated but returned to the village to marry demonstrated a higher 
incidence and distance of outward migration than men. Of 688 grooms 
born in Feltorony, 47 changed residence, but only 11 settled at a distance 
greater than five kilometers; whereas 66 brides emigrated, 18 moving 
more than five kilometers. (Table 13.) 
TABLE 13 
DISTANCE OF OUTWARD MIGRATION 






















Migration from the village by Feltorony natives was rare and largely 
limited to those of younger ages. Of the 39 men whose ages are known, 
who moved from the village, all except five were between 21 and 35 years 
of age. Nine of the males settled at a distance of more than five kilo-
meters. Thirty female natives migrated from the village, most being 
between 16 and 35 years of age. Only five brides established residence 
further away than five kilometers. (Table 14.) 
Marital status had a slight effect upon emigration. While single men 
constituted 83.0% of the grooms, they were a higher percentage (87.2%) 
of the Feltorony emigrants. For the women there was a slight opposite 
trend. Single females comprised 87.5% of the brides and 86.2% of the 
out-migrants. Women, whether single or previously married, tended to 
move further than men. Whereas over three-fourths (76.6%) of the out-
migrant native men remained within five kilometers, 72.3% of the women 
remained equally close. Of the single women born in Feltorony, 93.3% 
remained in the village, while an additional 4.9% did not move more 
than five kilometers. Only 15 of 836 single, native-born brides moved 
further than five kilometers, and only two emigrated more than 20 
kilometers. Of the previously married women born in Feltorony, 90.8% 
remained in the village and 6.1% moved five kilometers or less. Three 
moved a greater distance, but none more than 30 kilometers. 93.4% of 
the single men born in Feltorony remained in the village until marriage; 
EMIGRATION FROM FELTORONY 
ACCORDING TO AGE, 1827-1920 
MA LES 
Age Groups 0-5 km 5-10 km 10-20 km 20-30 km over 30 km Totals 
16-20 0 0 0 0 0 0 
21-25 6 1 0 0 0 7 
26-30 13 0 1 2 0 16 
31 35 6 0 1 1 2 10 
36-40 2 0 0 0 0 2 
41-50 2 0 0 1 0 3 
50+ 1 0 0 0 0 1 
Total 30 1 2 4 2 39 
FEMA LES 
Age Groups 0-5 km 5-10 km 10-20 km 20-30 km over 30 km Totals 
16-20 5 1 0 0 0 6 
21 25 15 0 2 0 0 17 
26 30 7 0 0 0 0 7 
31-35 3 0 2 0 0 5 
36-40 1 0 0 0 0 1 
41-50 2 0 0 0 0 2 
50+ 2 0 0 0 0 2 
Total 35 1 4 0 0 40 
5.0% settled within five kilometers. Only ten of 617 single, native-born 
grooms moved further. Of the previously married men born in Fel-
torony, 94.6% remained in the village and 4.5% moved five kilometers or 
less. Only one widower, native to Feltorony, moved more than five 
kilometers. (Table 15.) 
Of the native-born Feltorony men who emigrated for whom occupa-
tions were listed, more than three-quarters (76.7%) remained within five 
kilometers of the village. Only six men moved more than 20 kilometers 
and returned to wed. The largest percentage (41.9%) of the emigrants 
were day-laborers or domestic servants. There was virtually no emigra-
tion of farmers from Feltorony. In fact, 95.9% of those engaged in 
agriculture, whether owners of land, tenants, or share-croppers, who 
were born in Feltorony never moved. Of those in agriculture who did 
move from the village, 81.3% remained within a radius of five kilo-
meters. Artisans born in Feltorony were also highly stable. Only four of 
71 left the village and in all cases established residence at least ten 
RESIDENCE A N D OUT-MIGRATION OF FELTORONY 
NATIVES ACCORDING TO MARITAL STATUS, 1827-1920 
FEMA LE 
Fehuronv 0-5 km 5-10 km 10-20 km 20-30 km over 30 km Total 
Single 780 41 5 5 3 2 836 
Previously 
Married 89 6 0 2 I 0 98 
MALE 
Feltorony 0-5 km 5-10 km 10-20 km 20-30 km over 30 km Total 
Single 576 31 1 2 3 4 617 
Previously 
Married 105 5 0 I 0 0 i l l 
kilometers distant. Persons engaged in commercial activity displayed a 
different pattern. Few (14.5%) were born and resident in Feltorony. 
Instead, a majority (60.9%) resided within five kilometers and were not 
natives of the village, although choosing to be wed there. Those village 
natives classified in the service category were slightly more migratory. 
10.1% moved from Feltorony, but only one person relocated his resi-
dence a distance greater than five kilometers. (Table 16.) 
In contrast to those few natives who emigrated from Feltorony, the 
in-migrants traveled greater distances and constituted a larger percen-
TABLE 16 
EMIGRATION FROM FELTORONY 
ACCORDING TO OCCUPATION, 1827-1920 
Non- 0-5 km 5-10 km 10-20 km 20-30 km over 30 km Total 
Occupation Migrants 
Agriculture 375 13 1 1 1 0 391 
Artisan 67 0 0 2 0 2 71 
Commercial 10 2 0 0 1 0 13 
Pastoral 6 1 0 0 0 1 8 
Professional 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Service 160 17 0 0 0 1 178 
Miscellaneous 6 0 0 0 0 0 6 
Total 625 33 1 3 2 4 668 
tage of the marriage partners. Of 832 men residing in Feltorony at the 
time of marriage, 144 (17.3%) had migrated into the village, as had 142 
(13.9%) of the resident brides. The women who immigrated into Fel-
torony came from within a smaller radius than the men. Nearly one-
third (31.0%) of the women and one-fifth (20.1%) of the men who were 
in-migrants came from within five kilometers; while three-quarters 
(76.8%) of the women and five of eight (62.5%) men had immigrated 20 
kilometers or less. The cumulative figures reveal that 95.1% of the 
grooms and 97.7% of the brides residing in Feltorony between 1827 and 
1920 were either indigenous to the village or had immigrated from 
within a radius of 30 kilometers; 89.5% of the men and 92.1% of the 
women were natives or immigrants of less than ten kilometers. (Table 17.) 
According to age, men who moved into Feltorony revealed a pattern 
similar to those who emigrated. No groom under twenty years of age 
and only six men under 25 had moved into the village. Those who were 
TABLE 17 
IN-MIGRATION TO FELTORONY, 1827-1920 
MALES 
Years 0-5 km 5- 10 km 10-20 km 20-30 km over 30 km Total 
1827-1838 2 2 1 4 4 19 
1839-1849 6 2 3 0 6 17 
1850-1860 2 3 8 1 1 1 25 
1861-1871 3 10 7 1 3 24 
1872-1882 5 3 1 2 4 15 
1883-1895 2 7 2 4 7 22 
1896-1908 7 1 5 1 6 20 
1909 1920 2 0 0 0 0 2 
Total 29 28 33 13 41 144 
FEMA LES 
Years 0-5 km 5- 10 km 10-20 km 20-30 km over 30 km Total 
1827-1838 2 2 3 1 2 10 
1839-1849 3 3 7 0 1 14 
1850-1860 4 5 10 I 5 25 
1861-1871 4 3 10 0 3 20 
1872-1882 8 1 8 6 2 25 
1883-1895 8 1 4 1 7 21 
1896-1908 8 3 5 1 3 20 
1909 1920 7 0 0 0 0 7 
Total 44 18 47 10 23 142 
immigrants, however, continued to change residence over a greater span 
of ages than did Feltorony's emigrants. The village's emigrants usually 
moved between 26 and 40 years of age. Immigration, though also 
declining after age 35, continued at a relatively significant rate beyond 
50 years of age. Men over age 40 constituted one-fifth (21.6%) of the 
male in-migrants, but only 10.3% of the male emigrants. There was also 
a more equitable distribution of in-migrants among the age categories. 
Two-thirds of the males who emigrated from Feltorony did so between 
the ages of 26 and 35, whereas the same age groups accounted for 59.5% 
of the immigrants; 84.6% of the emigrants were between 21 and 35 years, 
but immigrants of similar ages totaled 64.9% of the grooms migrating 
into the village. 
Women who moved into Feltorony changed residence at younger 
ages and over a shorter span of life than men. Eight brides had moved 
into the village prior to the age of 20, and more than one-third (34.4%) 
had settled in Feltorony prior to age 25. Most female immigration 
(80.3%) occurred between 21 and 35 years of age. By the age of 40,92.6% 
of the women who were to move into Feltorony had done so. While the 
majority (75.4%) of the immigrant brides came from within 20 kilo-
meters, there were some differences, depending upon age, in the distance 
of migration. (Table 18.) 
Age, however, apparently had only a slight influence upon the dis-
tance of in-migration. When the average distance of each in-migrant is 
calculated, interesting patterns emerge. For both sexes the members of 
two consecutive age groups moved less distance than their respective 
percentages of in-migrants would appear to warrant. Men between the 
ages of 26 and 35, while 59.4% of the male immigrants, accounted for 
slightly less (53.1%) of the total cumulative distance of male in-migra-
tion. The women between 21 and 30 years of age totaled 57.4% of the 
female immigrants, but only 46.8% of the total distance moved. The 
youngest immigrant age group of each gender displayed a surprisingly 
lengthy distance of in-migration. Among the men, the 21-25 age group 
members, on the average, immigrated further than any other group 
prior to age 40; whereas the youngest group of female immigrants 
(16-20 years) migrated further than all other females. Migrating the 
least distance for their respective genders were men aged from 26 to 35 
and women between 21 and 30 years; while persons over 50, for both 
groups, moved distances similar to those of the youngest. (Table 19.) 
In consideration of their marital status, men who moved into Fel-
torony differed from the village's emigrants. First, a high proportion 
(17.7%) of the male immigrants had previously been married. Second, 
IN-MIGRATION TO FELTORONY 
ACCORDING TO AGE, 1827-1920 
MA LES 
Age Groups 0-5 km 5- 10 km 10-20 km 20-30 km over 30 km Total 
16-20 0 0 0 0 0 0 
21-25 1 0 3 0 2 6 
26-30 12 7 7 3 7 36 
31-35 5 9 6 3 7 30 
36 40 2 5 2 3 3 15 
41-50 3 1 2 1 7 14 
over 50 1 2 2 1 4 10 
Total 24 24 22 1 1 30 111 
FEMA LES 
Age Groups 0-5 km 5- 10 km 10-20 km 20-30 km over 30 km Total 
16-20 3 0 1 1 1 3 8 
21-25 11 6 ii : > 4 34 
26-30 15 3 13 0 5 36 
31-35 8 3 6 i 5 6 28 
36-40 1 0 5 ] 1 0 7 
41-50 1 1 1 0 1 4 
over 50 1 1 1 0 2 5 
Total 40 14 38 < ) 21 122 
men moving into Feltorony usually traveled greater distances. Over 
three-fourths (76.6%) of the male emigrants remained within five kilo-
meters, but only one-fifth (19.8%) of immigrants came from within the 
same radius. Nearly three of five immigrants moved more than ten 
kilometers, with nearly one-third (31.2%) moving more than 30 kilo-
meters. Generally, single men tended to move shorter distances than 
widowers, although the difference was minor. 
As in the case of the men, previously wed women constituted a 
significant portion (16.2%) of the immigrants and migrated greater 
distances than those who moved from Feltorony. Nearly three-quarters 
(72.7%) of the brides who emigrated from Feltorony remained within 
five kilometers, while only 31.0%of the immigrants came from within an 
identical radius. For the female immigrants, marital status had virtually 
no influence upon the distance of immigration. 
The largest (34.6%) group of male immigrants was made up of those 
in the service category, e.g., servants, day-laborers. Persons engaged in 
AVERAGE DISTANCE OF IN-MIGRATION 
TO FELTORONY ACCORDING TO AGE, 1827-1920 
MALES 
Age Groups %(P) of %(d) of Difference Avg. Distance 
Grooms Distance ( p - d ) 
Moved 
21-25 5.4 6.2 +0.8 17.9 km 
26-30 32.4 27.2 -5.2 13.1 
31-35 27.0 25.9 -1.1 15.0 
36-40 13.5 13.6 +0.1 15.8 
41-50 12.6 16.1 +3.5 20.0 
Over 50 9.0 11.1 +2.1 19.3 
FEMA LES 
Age Groups %(P) of %(d) of Difference Avg. Distance 
Brides Distance ( p - d ) 
Moved 
16-20 6.6 8.9 +2.3 17.2 km 
21-25 27.9 20.5 -7.4 9.3 
26-30 29.5 26.3 -3.2 11.3 
31-35 23.0 28.5 +5.5 15.6 
36-40 5.7 6.7 + 1.0 14.6 
41-50 3.3 3.6 +0.3 13.8 
over 50 4.1 5.5 +1.4 17.0 
agriculture constituted 29.2% and the artisans were one-sixth (16.9%) of 
those who moved to Feltorony. While these groups supplied 80.7% of 
the immigrants, significant differences existed among them. The prac-
tice of agriculture had little bearing upon the distance of immigration, as 
nearly equal numbers came from the various distance radii around 
Feltorony. From the artisan class, however, only two had moved into 
the village from within ten kilometers. Approximately 90% of the 
immigrant artisans moved more than 10 kilometers and nearly half 
(45.5%) had moved more than 30 kilometers. Persons employed in some 
form of service came from a widely dispersed area, but significant 
number migrated from within five kilometers, ten to 20 kilometers, and 
more than 30 kilometers. (Table 20.) 
Most of the persons married in Feltorony apparently spent their lives 
within a small geographical area. Two-thirds (66.8%) of the men and 
three-fourths (78.0%) of the women were born and resident in Feltorony 
or within five kilometers, while a radius of ten kilometers included 
MALE MIGRATION INTO FELTORONY 
ACCORDING TO OCCUPATION, 1827-1920 
Occupation 0-5 km 5-10 km 10-20 km 20-30 km over 30 km Total 
Agriculture 8 11 8 3 8 38 
Artisan 1 I 7 3 10 22 
Commercial 1 1 1 2 1 6 
Pastoral 1 2 0 0 2 5 
Professional 3 0 1 1 2 7 
Service 12 7 14 2 10 45 
Miscellaneous 0 2 0 0 5 7 
Total 26 24 31 11 38 130 
74.1% of the men and 81.2% of the women. In addition, seven of eight 
grooms (87.8%) and 97.4% of the brides were born or resident in 
Feltorony or within five kilometers. (Table 21.) 
There was a slight correlation between age at marriage and the area of 
birth and residence for both men and women. Surprisingly, grooms 
under the age of 20 years were born and resident within a narrower 
radius than were brides of identical ages. For the increasingly older age 
groups there was a gradual broadening of the radius of existence, so that 
only slightly more than half of the men between 36 and 50 years of age 
and women over 40 years were confined to Feltorony or a five-kilometer 
radius. For each gender there was little difference in the radius of birth 
and residence for those between the ages of 21 and 35 (in the case of men) 
and 16 and 40 (in the case of women). Between 21 and 35 years of age, 
70.0% of the grooms; and, between the ages of 16 and 40, 78.7% were 
born in Feltorony or within five kilometers. For men over 35, however, 
only 56.8% resided within an identical area, and only 57.9% of the 
women who were over 40 years spent their lives within five kilometers. 
The age groups with the smallest percentages to spend their lives in 
Feltorony or within five kilometers were men between 36 and 40 (53.7%) 
and women between 41 and 50 (51.9%). High percentages of brides and 
grooms were either born or resident in Feltorony or nearby, which is a 
result to be expected when the amount of immigration into the village is 
considered. Of the women, 97.2% were either born or resident in Fel-
torony or within five kilometers; while 88.6% of the men did the same. 
Except for the grooms under 20 years of age, there was relatively little 
difference among male age groups. The same situation applied to the 
women, except that all of the women between 36 and 50 years of age 
AREA OF BIRTH A N D RESIDENCE 
PERCENTAGES OF SPOUSES 
0-5 km 0-10 km 
Years Men Women Men Women 
1828-1838 67.7 82.5 73.3 86.0 
1839 1849 67.7 77.8 74.5 83.4 
1850-1860 56.9 71.4 62.2 75.8 
1861-1871 67.1 77.7 78.1 80.6 
1872-1882 64.2 74.1 72.3 77.0 
1883-1895 63.0 75.6 72.2 76.6 
1896-1908 65.7 75.4 71.4 78.6 
1909-1920 87.7 92.5 93.5 98.8 
Average 66.8 78.0 74.1 81.2 
AREA OF BIRTH OR RESIDENCE 
PERCENTAGES OF SPOUSES 
0-5 km 0-10 km 
Years Men Women Men Women 
1828-1838 83.7 98.1 88.5 98.1 
1839-1849 84.7 98.1 88.1 98.1 
1850-1860 88.7 97.7 91.4 97.7 
1861-1871 90.2 99.4 95.5 99.4 
1872-1882 86.7 91J 92.5 99.6 
1883-1895 87.3 99.1 93.3 99.1 
1896-1908 86.3 94.0 88.0 95.2 
1909-1920 96.4 95.4 99.3 100 
Average 87.8 97.4 92.3 98.4 
were born or resident in Feltorony or within five kilometers. Only 34 
(2.8%) of the brides, whose ages are known, were either born or resident 
at a distance greater than five kilometers. (Table 22.) 
The marital status of those who wed in Feltorony also influenced their 
residential mobility and the area in which they were born and resident. 
For both sexes those who had never been married came from within a 
smaller radius than those who were re-marrying. Higher percentages of 
women than men, however, spent their lives closer to the village. The 
marital status of men made less difference upon their area of existence 
than was the case with females. Approximately two-thirds (68.4%) of 
the single men and three of five widowers (61.1%) were either born or 
resident in Feltorony or within five kilometers, a difference of 7.3%; 
AREA OF BIRTH AND RESIDENCE 
ACCORDING TO AGE 
PERCENTAGE OF SPOUSES 
0-5 km 0-10 km 
Ages Men Women Men Women 
16-20 100.0 74.4 100.0 79.7 
21-25 69.8 82.4 77.0 84.5 
26-30 70.5 74.9 76.8 78.8 
31-35 66.9 77.0 75.3 78.2 
36-40 53.7 75.7 64.2 78.4 
41-50 58.4 51.9 70.1 59.3 
over 50 61.1 54.5 61.1 63.6 
Average 68.2 78.0 75.6 81.1 
AREA OF BIRTH OR RESIDENCE 
ACCORDING TO AGE 
PERCENTAGE OF SPOUSES 
0-5 km 0-10 km 
Ages Men Women Men Women 
16-20 100.0 94.3 100.0 98.0 
21-25 87.8 98.3 91.8 98.8 
26-30 90.2 97.4 93.2 98.3 
31-35 89.2 96.6 92.8 97.7 
36-40 83.6 100.0 91.0 100.0 
41-50 84.4 100.0 93.5 100.0 
over 50 88.9 90.9 88.9 90.9 
Average 88.6 92.6 98.4 
while four of five single brides (79.3%) but only two-thirds (68.3%) of the 
widows, a difference of 11.0%, spent their lives within the same area. 
When a radius of ten kilometers from Feltorony is considered, there is 
an expected increase in the number who were born and resident within 
the enlarged area, but the increase is rather small, which indicates that 
most persons who wed in the village were residents of Feltorony and 
nearby communities, while the remainder were born and resident within 
a widely dispersed area. The smallest percentage of any group which had 
neither been born nor resident in Feltorony or within five kilometers 
was comprised of males who were widowers. Even so, five of six widow-
ers were born or resident in Feltorony or within five kilometers, while it 
was the same for nine of every ten single men (89.1%). For the women, 
marital status made virtually no difference and only one bride in forty 
had neither been born nor resident in the village or nearby. (Table 23.) 
TABLE 23 
AREA OF BIRTH A N D RESIDENCE 
ACCORDING TO MARITAL STATUS 
PERCENTAGES OF SPOUSES 
0-5 km 0-10 km 
Status Men Women Men Women 
Single 68.4 79.3 75.5 82.5 
Previously 
Married 61.1 68.3 68.8 71.9 
AREA OF BIRTH OR RESIDENCE 
ACCORDING TO MARITAL STATUS 
PERCENTAGES OF SPOUSES 
0-5 km 0-10 km 
Status Men Women Men Women 
Single 89.1 97.5 93.0 98.6 
Previously 
Married 83.3 97.6 89.6 98.2 
Among the men wed in Feltorony who engaged in agriculture, nearly 
two-thirds (63.5%) were native-born residents and three-fourths (78.7%) 
had always lived in the village or within five kilometers. The artisans, 
day-laborers and servants, and the commercial element, however, dis-
played different characteristics. Less than half (45.6%) of the artisans 
who married in Feltorony were natives and only 57.1% had been born or 
resident within five kilometers, with only three of five (59.9%) coming 
from within a radius of ten kilometers. Still fewer of those engaged in 
commerce or business (14.5%) were natives of Feltorony, while less than 
half (49.3%) had always lived in the village or within five kilometers. Of 
the laborers and servants, slightly less than half (45.8%) were natives, 
but nearly two-thirds (64.8%) had always lived within five kilometers of 
Feltorony. When the average distances are calculated for those who 
moved and settled in Feltorony, it becomes expectedly evident that the 
servants, laborers and agrarians were drawn predominantly from the 
nearby population, while the commercial and business elements and the 
artisans, who had fewer restraints and could travel more easily, migrated 
to Feltorony from greater distances. (Table 24.) 
TABLE 24 
AREA OF BIRTH AND RESIDENCE OF GROOMS 
ACCORDING TO OCCUPATION, 1827-1920 
Occupation 0-5 km 0-10 km 
Agriculture 78.7 86.0 
Artisan 57.1 59.9 
Commercial 49.3 52.2 
Service 64.8 70.2 
Professional 12.5 25.0 
Pastoral 38.7 45.2 
Miscellaneous 37.5 37.5 
AREA OF BIRTH OR RESIDENCE OF GROOMS 
ACCORDING TO OCCUPATION, 1827-1920 
Occupation 0-5 km 0-10 km 
Agriculture 90.5 94.2 
Artisan 81.6 83.0 
Commercial 89.9 91.3 
Service 94.8 97.4 
Professional 37.5 75.0 
Pastoral 83.9 87.1 
Miscellaneous 79.2 83.3 
There was a significant amount of migration within western Hungary 
during the period from 1827 to 1920. Except for those who permanently 
emigrated, however, there was little long-distance internal migration, 
regardless of age, sex, marital status or occupation. Also, the mobility 
and marriage patterns of the inhabitants of Feltorony were scarcely 
influenced by the general improvement of transportation during the 
nineteenth century. For most rural inhabitants of Moson life continued 
to be contained within a small area and social contact was narrowly 
circumscribed. The local populace was not likely to travel far from home 
or marry someone who had formerly been unknown to friends and 
family, or was of a dissimilar background. Clearly, the traditional 
patterns of spouse selection were largely unaffected and continued well 
into the modern age. 
NOTES 
1. Notable exceptions are the geographers Peter Perry and R. F. Peel whose 
studies of internal migration, rural isolation and marriage-distance relationships on 
New Zealand and England stimulated some of the ideas contained in this paper. 
2. Microfilm copies of the parish registers employed in this study are contained in 
the Genealogical Library of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latterday Saints in Salt 
Lake City, Utah, U.S.A. The following rolls of film were used: 
No. 0700861. Births, Marriages, Deaths, 1827-1864; Feltorony, Hungary. 
No. 0700862. Births, Marriages, Deaths, 1865-1895; Feltorony, Hungary. 
No. 0700273. Marriages, 1895-1920; Feltorony, Hungary. 
No. 0623508. 1828 Census of Feltorony, Hungary. 
No. 0719825. Census of Moson County, Hungary, 1848. 
No. 0623058. Census of Moson County, Hungary, 1828. 
No. 0700271. Births, 1895-1904; Feltorony, Hungary. 
No. 0700272. Births, 1905-1920; Feltorony, Hungary. 
No. 0700274. Deaths, 1895-1920; Feltorony, Hungary. 
3. In 1934 the portion of the Austrian Burgenland east of the Neusiedler See was 
estimated to have a population which was 84.46% German. The village of Halb-
turn's (Feltorony) population was 96.9% German, while the immediately surround-
ing area was 94.4% German. Cf. Lendl, Hubert. "Das gesellschaftliche Gefiige des 
Landvolks im deutsch-madjarischen Grenzraum ostlich des Neusiedler Sees." 
Deutsches Archivfur Landes- und Volksforschung, Jahrgang 2(1938), pp. 800-835. 













Feltorony's population increased 112.9% between 1821 and 1920, while the villages 
within a 5 km. radius, whose population change is known, increased an average of 
62.1%; villages from 5 to 10 km. increased an average of 59.1%; and villages from 10 
to 20 km. increased an average of 55.3%. 
5. Peter Laslett's observation that "before the coming of the bicycle and paved 
highway, there was a fixed distance from the labourer's cottage beyond which a full 
day's work was out of the question—it took too long to get there and back," applies 
also to the courtship process. The World We Have Lost, 2nd ed. London: Methuen, 
1971, p. 80. 
6. The 1828 census of Feltorony, which had a population of approximately 1190, 
contained 331 horses. In 1852 the parish registers began to list the occupation of 
carter, which was the occupation of 1.8% of the grooms between 1852 and 1920. 
7. Fel, Edit and Tamas Hofer, Proper Peasants: Traditional Life in a Hungarian 
Village, Chicago: Aldine Publishing Co., 1969, pp. 138-143. 
8. Because nearly every person who was wed in Feltorony was resident within 20 
km., this distance will serve as the outer limit of the study. 
9. The years of the censuses and the sources of information are as follows: 
1821 Csaplovics, Johann v. Topographisch-statistisches Archiv des Konig-
reiches Ungarn. 2 Bde. Wien, 1821. 
1833 Thiele, J. C. v. Das Konigreich Ungarn. Kaschau, 1833. 
1836 Hungary. Kozponti Statisztikai Hivatal. A nepmozgalom fohh adatai 
kdzsegenkent 1828-1900. Vol. I. Budapest, 1972. 
1842 Universalis Schematism Eccl. Budae, 1842. 
1851 Fenyes, Elek. Magyarorszag geographiai szotara. 4 Bde. Pest, 1851. 
1863 Ortslexikon des Konigreiches Ungarn. 1863. 
1869 Ungarische Statistische Mitteilungen. 
1870 same source as 1836. 





10. Wittmannshof (population in 1934—265) and Albert Casimir (population in 
1851 was 338) were so small that they had no church. As a result, all of the births, 
deaths and marriages involving residents of these villages were recorded in Feltorony 
and are included in this study. 
11. For the years following 1907 slightly more than one-fourth of the places of birth 
for males are unrecorded. The male and female places of residence and the female 
places of birth are nearly all recorded, but reveal a tendency to list few villages other 
than Feltorony, Wittmannshof and Albert Casimir. As a result, the figures for the 
post-1907 period are questionable. 
12. For the purposes of this study the terms mobile and migratory are applied to 
persons who change their village of residence prior to marriage. Those at the time of 
their marriage who were residing in the village of their birth are designated as non-
migratory or stable. Persons born in Feltorony who married elsewhere are not 
included in this study. Because of the possibility of an unusually large migration out 
of the village, it is conceivable that the trends described will not be totally accurate. 
However, the fact that the population of Feltorony increased at a much faster rate 
than other villages within a 20-kilometer radius indicates that Feltorony did not 
experience a significant loss of its native population. This conclusion is further 
corroborated by a perusal of the family groups which this author has compiled from 
the village's parish registers. When a projected study of the villages near Feltorony is 
completed, it will be more nearly possible to determine accurately the number of 
migrants in the region and the distances and directions of their moves. 
The reason for the apparent discrepancies in some of the figures quoted in this 
study results from the fact that the places of birth and/ or residence of some spouses 
was not recorded, hence rendering their inclusion in certain analyses impossible. 
Of the men who were non-migratory natives of villages other than Feltorony, 
37.3% were born and resident in Albert Casimir and Wittmannshof. Of the non-
migratory women outside of Feltorony, 84.1% were natives of Albert Casimir and 
Wittmannshof. 
13. The linear regression calculated for men from 1827 to 1920 is: y = 33.7 - 0.48x; 
and for women is: y = 32.3 - 0.65x. When the data from 1907 to 1920 is omitted, the 
mobility trends for both sexes change from negative to positive, i.e., mobility, on the 
average, increased from 1827 to 1906, with the men revealing a faster rate of increase. 
For the shorter period (1827-1906) the linear equations are: men: y = 28.5 + 1.26x; 
women: y = 28.7 + 0.56x. 
14. Indications from data not included in this study are that of a large majority of 
those who remarried did so within one to three months of the death of their previous 
spouse. The immediate need for a spouse might have contributed to a higher 
percentage of mobility. Only those in the upper age levels who remarried did so after 
an extended period of time. 
15. These figures appear to disagree with those given in note 16. The difference 
results from the fact that in some cases the ages of those who remarried are unknown. 
16. MARITAL STATUS ACCORDING TO AGE 
Men Women 
Ages Single Previously Single Previously 
Married Married 
16-20 20(1.5%) 1 (0.08%) 282* (21.4%) 1 (0.08%) 
21-25 425 (31.9%) 6 (0.5%) 604 (45.9%) 8 (0.5%) 
26-30 469 (35.2%) 39 (2.9%) 222 (16.9%) 21 (1.6%) 
31-35 160(12.0%) 30 (2.3%) 62 (4.7%) 33 (2.5%) 
36-40 39 (2.9%) 37 (2.8%) 8 (0.6%) 31 (2.4%) 
41-50 24(1.8%) 61 (4.6%) 4 (0.3%) 29 (2.2%) 
50+ 4 (0.4%) 17 (1.3%) 2 (0.2%) 10 (0.8%) 
Total 1141 (85.7%) 191 (14.3%) 1184 (89.9%) 133 (10.1%) 
* Three brides were married before the age of 16. 
17. For single men the linear regression trend was y = 64.8% + 0.93x; for widowers 
the trend was y = 77.6% - 3.15x. 
18. For single women the linear regression was y = 68.8% + 0.70x; for widows the 
trend was y = 59.4% - 0.06x. 
19. Because those classified in the professional, pastoral and miscellaneous groups 
comprised less than four per cent of all grooms and only 10.3%of those who changed 
residence, an analysis of the frequency and distance of their migration would be un-
justified. 
20. Percentages of Grooms according to Occupation and Stability 
Occupation % of Occupations % of Stable Grooms 
Agriculture 47.6 57.3 
Artisan 12.3 12.0 
Service 29.0 24.1 
Commercial 5.8 3.6 
Pastoral 2.5 1.2 
Professional 0.7 0.4 
Miscellaneous 2.1 1.3 
21. The regression trends for the major occupations were as follows: 
Agriculture y = 86.4 - 0.97x 
Artisan y = 55.7 + 2.26x 
Service y = 31.6 + 5.18x 
A possible, partial explanation for the increasing stability of the artisan and service 
categories is that the increased population of the village rendered a change of resi-
dence for employment or economic improvement less necessary, whereas the popula-
tion growth would have been disadvantageous to those needing land to cultivate. 
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Auteurism in the Modern Hungarian Cinema1 
George Bisztray 
After half a decade spent mostly in Rome, Miklos Jancso, now a 
director of international reputation, returned to Hungary in the mid-
seventies and became more accessible to cultural journalists who were 
eager to interview him about his artistic outlook and future plans. And 
Jancso was eager to answer their questions. True enough, these recent 
interviews were at least ten years behind the main current of European 
cinema, since the auteurist director Jancso was talking about issues 
which had been discussed already in the fifties and sixties, especially in 
Andre Bazin's periodical Cahiers du Cinema. But again, Jancso himself 
willingly admitted that his style was no longer in accord with his time. 
And it is also true that what he said in these belated interviews was the 
first extensive conceptualization of auteurist aesthetics by a Hungarian 
director. A review of his more significant statements will hopefully 
demonstrate that a distinct and valid definition of these aesthetics un-
folds from these interviews.2 
As most fashionable jargon terms, "auteurism," too, has a hollow 
ring. 3 From the theoretical debates of the past, it appears that we should 
first look for the essence of auteurism in the role which the movie 
director plays in the creative process. Jancso's comments on his own 
artistic method grew out of this basic view of auteurism and he defines 
the concept accordingly. 
As Jancso spells it out, the director may be a link in a production 
chain, materializing a script to which he is indifferent by manipulating 
actors and actresses whom he does not care for but must nevertheless 
feature because of the contracts binding the producer. This is the Ameri-
can model of filmmaking, a perfect prototype of the division of labour 
and of alienation. Leadership is with the producer and the distributor; 
their criteria have nothing to do with art but with production expenses, 
contracts, and expected returns on the investment. If anything marks a 
movie and attracts people to the theatre is least likely the director's 
name; most likely the name of stars featured. The director has nothing to 
do with the thousands of feet of film shot, since he is hardly allowed to 
edit his own movie, unless as a very exceptional privilege. The identify-
ing characteristic of these films is not the style but the story. 
On the other hand, there is another example which Janes o, relying on 
his Roman experience, calls the Italian model. This is a biased term but 
the way Jancso describes it clearly indicates the contrast with Holly-
wood. "Film as an art form does not permit the director to degrade his 
fellow-artists to second-rate figures," states Jancso, asserting also that 
he can make movies only with artist-friends.4 Writers help the director 
develop a script which most adequately expresses his artistic vision. 
Similarly, stage and costume designers work closely together with the 
director. Unlike in the division of labour, a co-operation of artists 
unfolds before our eyes to characterize this form of filmmaking whose 
result is not a rootless product but, rather, a collective piece of art, 
comparable to the performance of a theatre or musical ensemble. 
The term "auteurism" suggests a creative action analogous with 
"authorship." Indeed, it is the co-operation or even full identity of writer 
and director which forms the basis of this filmmaking practice. On the 
one hand, in the auteur movies it is the director claiming the one-person 
responsibility for the ultimate realization of a collective vision, and for 
giving shape to figures which appear, as Jancso states, in an abstract, 
formless way in literature. On the other hand, as the Hungarian film 
critic Istvan Nemeskiirty emphasizes, the dialogues of the film are 
inalienable properties of the writer.5 
On this point, we are confronted with an interesting phenomenon. 
Whereas virtually all great Western auteurist directors have themselves 
written the scripts for their movies, Jancso is unique with his obsession 
of working with the same scriptwriter in a row of movies. Beginning with 
"My Way Home" (Igy jottem, 1964), this writer-associate has become 
Gyula Hernadi. Based on his scripts, Jancso shot thirteen movies, in-
cluding three produced in Italy, two of these with the literary coopera-
tion of the Italian Giovanna Gagliardo. No other auteurist director is 
known for such "duplication of one function in two persons" (as Do-
mokos called the Jancso-Hernadi phenomenon in his interview). As 
Jancso describes this process, an idea is slowly shaped to a script, then to 
a visual image, in a dialogue between two akin artistic minds. 
In the last analysis, however, a genetic criterion (that is, authorship) 
alone is not sufficient to define the artistic method of auteurism. The 
question arises: How is it possible to tell an auteurist movie from a non-
auteurist one? Jancso describes his movies as "special films" in which the 
actors "express ideas and standpoints in songs, dances, and mimics." 
Nemeskiirty emphasizes that an auteurist film is a personal statement. 
The result is a certain mood, an individual visual style which permeates 
the movies of auteurists. This mood may result from a stylized reality or 
even from a venture into the surrealistic, but never from an attempt to 
create the illusion of a reified world. It is mostly from the basis of 
Gyorgy Lukacs's aesthetic principles, and especially his view of natu-
ralism, that Jancso consistently attacks what he calls the mini-psychology 
and mini-realism (that is, the small-scale and meticulous psychological 
and realistic tendencies) of the nineteen-seventies. Cinema verite, doc-
umentary techniques, the illusion that reality is as faithfully projected on 
the screen as possible are, in Jancso's eye, manipulative ways of making 
people accept conditions as they are. "Realism" in its most plausible 
meaning appears as an enemy of socialist art, because it does not let one 
see beyond the surface of social phenomena, and therefore it negates 
both human freedom and the possibility of change, excludes alternatives, 
and does not open any vistas of a better future. Showing a ritual act, on 
the other hand, breaks the superficial illusion that things are as they are 
and they cannot be changed. 
Creative sincerity, not to a reified world but to human essence, to 
artistic consciousness, is a basic principle for Jancso. One charge this 
credo can easily call upon is didacticism. Incidentally, Jancso is willing 
to face this charge, although with some reservations. He claims that his 
didacticism is never direct and obvious. He quotes the examples of 
Andras Kovacs, his Hungarian fellow-director, in whose movies (as 
Jancso puts it) two people tend to discuss politics at length; and Jean-
Luc Godard, who makes one or another of his characters read Marx. 
Jancso believes that he would be unable to cultivate this kind of didacti-
cism (making a movie of Sacco and Vanzetti would not suit him); but 
that nevertheless his films are political and manifest the French concept 
of cinema engagee. He calls his style, located between the seemingly 
apolitical and the blatantly, militantly political cinema, a "middle way." 
Yet in 1976, he also believed that he had ventured too far into the field of 
cinematic surrealism with "Agnus Dei" (Egi barany, 1970), "Red Psalm" 
(Meg keranep, 1971), "Elektreia" (Szerelmem, Elektra, 1974), and the 
films he shot in Italy. He saw a mixture of reality and an extreme 
rejection of reality in these movies of his own; admitted that it would be 
hard for him to invent anything novel after the notorious red helicopter 
in "Elektreia"; and implicitly expressed his intention to switch back to 
middle-of-the-road engagement before his surrealistic style becomes 
manneristic and boring.6 
It might be due to his didactic intention that Jancso never considered 
his movies compatible with psychology. He believes that the psychologi-
cal style means a certain way of maneuvering persons and things so that 
unbelievable phenomena should appear believable. Jancso's fascination 
with the improbable is not intended to make the improbable look 
possible. Actually, he states that his spectators are expected to be aware 
of a distance between themselves and what they experience. As he says: 
"While I am directing, 1 create a distance between reality and its reflec-
tion in the film. . . . It is precisely this distance which enchants the 
public."7 As it appears from this statement, the intellectual understand-
ing of the distance between artistic illusion and experienced reality is a 
central guiding principle of Jancso's art. 
One may ask: by what technique does Jancso express his principles in 
his movies? As an artist rooted in a fairly unique culture, Jancso is more 
than aware of the cleavage between the universal semantic code of the 
film and the cultural limitations imposed on it. He wants to express 
universal truths and situations in visual images, but constantly finds 
himself bound by the specific cultural connotations of these images. 
Referring to a frequently recurring motive of his films, we may ask: 
Since international moviegoers have been conditioned to react nega-
tively to only one kind of uniform: the black or brown Nazi outfit, how 
can the director evoke similar dislike by showing much less familiar 
uniforms? Jancso actually uses an auditory motive as an example in one 
of his interviews and asks: How many moviegoers around the world 
share the cultural connotations which some of the religious and ultra-
nationalist Hungarian songs and melodies heard in his movies raise in 
his own generation of Hungarians?8 To expand this argument, we may 
refer to the International, the Horst Wessel Lied, Rule Britannia, or 
God Bless America—these four songs alone trigger strong connotations, 
no matter whether positive or negative, in hundreds of millions of 
spectators. As such examples prove, even the most internationally 
appreciated artists of unique cultures feel the tension of an open and a 
closed cultural system quite acutely. 
Jancso is notorious for his long tracking shots. Some of his critics 
counted not more than a dozen or two shots in films like "Red Psalm" 
and "Elektreia." Jancso admits his aversion to the montage which, 
according to such classics of film theory as Eisenstein and Bela Balazs, is 
the essence of the cinema. Not without affectation, Jancso claims that 
his movies are "small-scale," "low-budget" films, which is especially 
hard to believe now when rumours are spreading about the disastrous 
draining of the Hungarian national film budget by the two most recent 
Jancso-Hernadi movies: "Hungarian Rhapsody" and "Allegro Barbaro," 
parts of the planned trilogy "Vitam et Sanguinem" which may never be 
finished. 
Repetition of basic themes as well as visual motifs is another charac-
teristic of Jancso's art. "I hate all forms of oppression,"9 he said in one of 
his interviews. Indeed, his whole intricate visual semiotic system is based 
on the leitmotifs of freedom and oppression. At the same time, Jancso 
also stated that there was a range of variations in the meaning of 
identical visual stereotypes. For instance, "men in uniform" do not 
always symbolize one and the same idea. Graham Petrie pointed out 
how nudity in Jancso's films initially expressed humiliation and vulner-
ability but later tended to become a symbol of power and defiance.10 
Also, with reference to Antonioni and Wajda, Jancso says that repeated 
motifs quite often may express the same idea with greater sophistica-
tion. In other words, the same visual motifs may express qualitatively 
different ideas, or may express the same idea in a qualitatively different 
form. 
lmprovization is a method which has a great impact on the artistic 
effect of the final, edited film. As it is widely known, Jancso lets his 
actors formulate their own text. Nor does he go to the shooting of the 
film with preconceived plans concerning camera angles, duration of the 
shots, and other directing techniques. As a result, one can compare 
Jancso's and Hernadi's scripts with the finished film in the same way as 
one compares the first drafts and the published texts in the study of 
literary creation. 
This tendency to improvize, alongside with the obsessive utilization of 
the same philosophical ideas and visual leitmotifs, characterizes virtual-
ly all auteurs of the modern cinema. This brings us to the question of 
Jancso's admitted and latent affinities with different contemporary 
auteurist directors. He admires mostly Antonioni, also Pasolini, Glau-
ber Rocha, and Wajda, but dislikes Ingmar Bergman. No matter what 
his personal views are, his works are organic parts of the international 
auteurist production of the past two decades. Improvizations, repeti-
tions, universal existential themes, shooting series of films with a limited 
group of actors, are methods generally shared by auteurist directors. 
Notwithstanding Jancso's dislike of Bergman, both meddled with the 
theatre, and both expressed the wish that they could make film comedies 
(Bergman repeatedly tried—the results were pathetic). 
lmprovization, repetition, the use of irony are not simply technical 
matters. They make it possible to perceive an underlying relationship 
between auteurism and an existential outlook of life. The sincerity of a 
subjectively rationalized truth, the penetration of layers of superficial 
"realities" covering the existential essence, infatuation with role-playing 
and improvization, repetition and motifs, and a Kierkegaardean use of 
the irony, are all shared characteristics of existential thought, art, and 
auteurism. Even the cult of the director, the idea of one-person respon-
sibility, is familiar from the German aesthetic concept Gesamtkunst-
werk which appeared in Schlegel's, Nietzsche's, and Wagner's philos-
ophy of art; at least the latter two were clearly identifiable figureheads of 
an existentialist aesthetics. The same holds true for scriptwriters: Her-
nadi, Mandy, Meszoly, and other Hungarian writers who collaborated 
with, or provided literary material for, more or less auteurist directors, 
have themselves at least a few recognizable existentialist trends. 
Because of the sincerity and, as any perceptive critic would assert, the 
general high quality of auteur movies, the more painful it is for an artist 
to realize that he is not being understood by the public. Jancso has 
complained repeatedly about his lack of contact with the larger masses. 
He spoke bitterly about the conservative, unsophisticated taste of Holly-
wood-fed moviegoers—a characterization which is now pertinent of the 
Hungarian public as well. Film criticism was not exempt of his attack 
either: he believed that too many of his movies were misinterpreted by 
press reviewers. He found escape in this attitude: "1 always read as much 
as I can about my movies, but accept neither favourable nor unfavour-
able criticism. 1 read criticism as if it were a story, a fiction."11 
Yet there is something fundamentally wrong about Jancso's com-
plaints against the Hungarian public. In the nineteen-seventies, a new 
national awareness dawned on Hungary, accompanied by the widely 
shared desire for an objective reinterpretation of Hungarian history. 
Jancso's masochistic view of the past derives from the two post-war 
decades when the first lines of the Hungarian Republican Anthem read: 
"Oppression, slavery: This was the order for a thousand years"; and 
when Hungary was assumed to be the first "Fascist"country and Hitler's 
"last ally." Hungarians of the nineteen-seventies find such views unjust 
and repulsive. Jancso may insist that his films are allegorical and show 
Universal Oppression and Universal Liberation—however, they also 
show just too many Hungarian uniforms, just too many very Hungarian-
looking peasants massacred. This aspect may be irrelevant for movie-
goers abroad, but in the Hungarian context it raises the question: Who 
should draw the ultimate consequence? The auteurist Jancso, who is 
undoubtedly a great artist, or fifteen million Hungarians? The same 
question also holds true of Gyula Hernadi and his scripts as well as 
"historical" dramas. 
While Jancso is the internationally best known and most celebrated 
Hungarian auteurist director, some of his younger colleagues, who had 
less opportunity to express their ideas in interviews, were equally con-
sistent and congenial in pursuing this creative principle. Istvan Gaal and 
Istvan Szabo, both in their forties (while Jancso just turned sixty), are 
held in even greater esteem by certain connoisseurs of the cinema than 
Jancso. 
Of the six movies Gaal has shot since his debut with "Current" 
(Sodrasban, 1963), three are prototypical one-person auteur produc-
tions, whereas the script of the other three was written in consultation 
with other writers. However, Gaal emphasizes as much as Jancso does 
that the authorship of the script does not make a director's film an 
auteurist work. "An auteurist movie can be the product of the fortunate 
cooperation between an author and a director. But if the director does 
not have an original artistic vision, you cannot call his film auteurist 
even if he wrote the script. Until now, films . . . resembled of prose; 
nowadays, they tend to resemble of poetry," Gaal explained in an 
interview with the reporter of a Hungarian magazine.12 
As Jancso and the great Western auteurs like Antonioni and Bergman, 
Fassbinder, Truffaut, and others, so Gaal, too, has developed his own 
symbols which, elusively enough, look unusually "realistic" and devoid 
of symbolic references. His country landscapes are hardly stylized, his 
shots of action free of ritual symbolism. Yet, the reoccurring symbols 
(the falcons in at least two movies, morning awakening as a starting shot 
of the film) and the existential preoccupation (with Angst, loneliness, 
and the metaphysical aspects of human relations) are recognizable auteur-
ist traces. It seems that of all Hungarian auteurist directors, Gaal is 
closest to Antonioni whom, by the way, all equally admired. Also, Gaal 
has taken the one-person responsibility for his films one step farther 
than Jancso: he always edits his own movies. 
More urban and more middle-class than Jancso and Gaal is Istvan 
Szabo, the youngest of the three (born in 1939). Among this group, he 
has manifested the greatest interest in the human psyche, deriving exis-
tentialist themes and situations from individual experience past and 
present. Like in Bergman's "Persona," Alma Vogler's loss of speech is 
partially explained by her obsession with the picture of a Buddhist monk 
burning himself alive in protest against the war in Vietnam, so does the 
equally famous photo of Hitler talking to teenage "soldiers" occur in at 
least two of Szabo's movies, occupying a peculiar and identical denota-
tion in both. Bergman's and Godard's "variations to a theme," that is, 
reviewing the same events in different ways in the mental cinema of the 
mind, appears most notably in Szabo's second (and as some critics 
claim, best) film, "Father" (Apa, 1966). Memory, a crucial leitmotive of 
"Father," becomes exclusive in "25, Fireman's Street" (Tuzolto utca 25, 
1973). A quasi-Freudian technique, the distorted perspective, achieved 
chiefly by wide-angle lenses and also by extreme positioning of the 
camera, never appears in Jancso and Gaal, but the more often in Szabo's 
films. 
It is perhaps because of his psychological preoccupation that Szabo 
approaches the concept of auteurism by attempting a psychological 
definition. "If the cinema is to become an art equivalent with other arts, 
those who make films shall visually record their own world outlook and 
their own concrete experiences, but the truly significant directors are 
those who develop their own artistic world."13 As it appears from this 
statement, Szabo regards auteurism as a projection of the mind—an 
outlook not entirely remote from expressionism. 
At the end of the interview in which the above quotation appeared, 
Szabo voiced his hope that such artistic subjectivism would serve as 
basis of the future method of filmmaking. Although auteurism has left 
its permanent mark on Hungarian (and world) cinema, the method as it 
was typically practiced in the nineteen-sixties is now passe everywhere. 
What we experience instead is "mini-realism," to use Jancso's critical 
term.14 Also, this trend of the seventies could not be farther from Szabo's 
wish to make the film a projection of mental states or processes. 
One may, naturally, find superficial similarities between auteurism 
and the documentary style of the Hungarian film during the 1970s. 
Several of the younger directors also write their scripts or co-operate 
with the same writers; and they let actors and actresses improvize their 
roles. Should we accept the fashionable cliche that the director's "per-
sonal style" is a central criterion of the auteurist cinema, we could call 
almost the entire new Hungarian film production auteurist. Yet it is 
impossible to ignore that the cinema of Peter Bacso, Istvan Darday, 
Imre Gyongyossy, Zsolt Kezdi Kovacs, and Rezso Szoreny, also rep-
resent styles, techniques, and world outlooks different from those of 
auteurism. The ideology underlying cinema verite (namely, social criti-
cism disguised as detachment but evident in the selective perception of 
the director) is definitely dominating the Hungarian cinema of the 
nineteen-seventies. This ideology entirely differs from the auteurist 
philosophy that filmmaking is visualized consciousness. 
In addition, a recognizable, although not homogeneous aesthetic 
principle and stylistic sign system identify the auteurist directors and 
distinguish them from the documentarists of the 1970s. The existential-
ist allegories and absurd, seemingly incongruent symbols which charac-
terize the proto-auteurist style of the sixties, are absent from the produc-
tion of the newer generation of filmmakers. Utilizing aesthetic terms 
borrowed from Charles S. Peirce, we can call improvization in auteurist 
movie acting symbolic (the actor becomes a "persona" for a certain 
situation and verbalizes the role); in documentary moviemaking, in-
dexical (there is no role: actor and character are identical). 
In short, Jancso was right when he called the technique of the new 
generation entirely different from his own. From the perspective of four 
years, however, he was wrong when he though that moviegoers appre-
ciated the new style more than his. Recent Hungarian statistics indicate 
that 312,728 people watched "Hungarian Rhapsody," and 298,634 "Alleg-
ro Barbaro,"as of November 1, 1980. No feature film representing the 
documentary technique came close to these numbers. 
On the other hand, the two Jancso films together did not attract as 
many visitors as did "Kojak in Budapest," the Hungarian box office 
success of 1980, within just a few months (652,357).15 Jancso's scepti-
cism of the changing taste of Hungarian moviegoers was warranted. 
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Editor's Note: The purpose of this article is to provide 
some insight into American official ac-
tions during a crisis abroad by placing on 
public record two reports which previous-
ly could not be published because of their 
security classification. One, dated Octo-
ber 25, 1956 was sent to the Department 
of State by the Legation in Budapest at 
the start of the Hungarian uprising, and 
the other, dated November 4, 1956 on the 
day of its collapse under the onslaught of 
Russian armed forces. They have been 
exempted by the Department at the re-
quest of the author who was chief of the 
Hungarian section in the Division of 
Intelligence and Research on the USSR 
and Eastern Europe at the time of the 
events reported. The documents reflect a 
crisis situation in which an American 
diplomatic mission abroad and its gov-
erning agency at home were in direct and 
continuous communication about unex-
pected developments which posed a pos-
sible physical threat to the officials and 
other Americans present at the foreign 
capital, and created major policy chal-
lenges and security problems for the 
home office. 
Twenty-five years ago, through the most violent defiance of Com-
munist authority to erupt in Eastern Europe, the Hungarian people 
secured within one week the formation of a government headed by a 
man of their choice. The Communist party of nearly a million members 
in a population of ten million disappeared overnight; its principal 
leaders fled to Moscow. The new leader declared that the previous 
regime "brought the socialist reorganization of agriculture to a dead 
end, destroyed the worker-peasant alliance, undermined the pow er of 
the People's Democracy, trampled upon the rule of law, debased the 
people's living standards, established a rift between the masses of the 
party and the government; in other words, the country was swept 
toward catastrophe. "' A lifelong Communist himself, Imre Nagy pledged 
domestic policies of a socialist nature within a democratic framework, 
pursuance of a neutral foreign policy, a free press, and a multi-party 
system based on free and secret elections. He demanded the withdrawal 
of Soviet troops which were attacking throughout the city as the teletype 
conversations between the American Legation and the Department of 
State went underway. The country became the scene of a Hungarian 
civil war and a simultaneous Hungarian-Russian war in overlapping 
theatres of operations. 
[A few weeks before the date of the first document. Minister Christian 
M. Ravndal had completed his tour of duty at the head of the Legation 
and returned to Washington for reassignment. A successor, Edward T. 
Wailes, arrived shortly before the date of the second document; in the 
interim, Counselor N. Spencer Barnes acted as charge d'affaires.] 
D E P A R T M E N T O F S T A T E 
INCOMING TELEGRAM Control: 14766 
Rec"d: Oct. 25, 1956 
FROM: Budapest 
TO : Secretary of State 
NO. : Unnumbered, Oct. 25 
Following is running overseas Teletype conversation between American 
Legation and Department starting at 6:30 a.m., October 25, 1956. 
Quote 
Legation: This is clear. Communications open temporarily. Am typing 
on floor. A big battle has just taken place in front of Legation seems to 
have gone towards Parliament seems all Americans still OK and safe. 
Street fighting again flaring up with tanks fighting it out at present. 
Stand by please, chief coming down into Telex room. 
Department: Roger, will do. 
Legation: Here he is. Do you have any questions at present? Here some 
news. Parliament Square 10:45 crowded with people afternoon October 
24 continued street fighting many Soviet tanks and troops. Legation 
skeleton staff returned to homes without incident. Two officers and two 
Marines remained in Legation. Intermittent shots heard through night. 
Quieter towards morning October 25. Crowds moving in streets, center 
town especially [Buda-]Pest Danube river bank area full of Sovet tanks 
and troops. US staff with no difficulty. About 10 heavy movement of 
tanks reported on Stalin Street. 10:30 large crowd marched north past 
Legation proceeded farther towards Parliament. Heavy gun fire from 
Parliament area. Some Legation reports that of some Soviet tanks going 
over to the crowd Hying Hungarian flags from tanks with crowds. 
Budapest radio broadcasts statement that isolated groups firing in town. 
Advised people stay off streets. Large crowd dispersed before Parlia-
ment now mainly dispersed by Soviet tanks firing over crowds heads. 
Some tanks in control of crowd withdrew from Parliament area. Heavy 
firing continues hearing distance of Legation apparently tank guns. Any 
questions? 
Department: Chief Warrant Officer is contacting Budapest officer here 
for questions. Do you people believe this fighting is going to spread 
further? 
Legation: Have no way of knowing but seems very possible that it will 
spread. We all are in Telex room huddling on floor to avoid gunfire. 
Believe non-Hungary-stationed Soviet troops pulled into Budapest over-
night. Prefix on truck numbers is Soviet 'F\ Have report that no 
airplane service to or from Budapest. Train service probably interrupted 
and no information on conditions Vienna Budapest highway except 
some reports of disturbances in Gyor. Also heard reports of disturbances 
Debrecen and Szeged and Miskolc. Any questions? 
Department: Have none at present. 
Legation: Strength of Soviet troops which arrived in Budapest initially 
at 0400 hours local time 24 October estimated to be one mechanized 
infantry division. Hungarian troops held in background. Soviet doing 
bulk of fighting. Some Hungarian troops known to have joined the 
crowd. Situation in front of Legation building now quiet, fighting seems 
to have left this immediate area. 
American apartment house on Szechenyi sprayed with Russian machine 
gun fire due to presence of insurgents firing from roof. All Americans 
and domestic help safe in basement, however windows broken from 
shell fire and front of building sprayed with machine gun fire from 
Russian troops dug in, in and around the building. 
Some members in crowd before Legation have been shouting for United 
States assistance. 
Army and Legation officers have personally observed several instances 
of Soviet tanks going over to crowds just prior to firing. These were seen 
flying Hungarian flags. 
Still on floor, reason for bad typing. 
All this information given by Legation officers. 
Legation wife observed at 10:45 local time 76 Soviet trucks fully loaded 
with troops field kitchens towing howitzers proceeding from east in the 
direction of Parliament. All trucks bearing numbers beginning with 
Cyrillic letter 'F \ Agriculture attache has observed trucks bearing this 
letter by chance in Rumania. 
Situation around Legation quiet. Any questions? 
Department: None. 
Legation: Is anyone from military there? 
Department: Military will be informed. 
Legation: Have set the printer back on table. State Department are you 
still there? This is American Legation Budapest. 
Department: Yes, still with you. 
Legation: Appears to be rather quiet around the Legation area again. 
Still there. State Department? 
Department: Yes, will stay with you until you advise. 
Legation: Just so long we don't get cut off is what I'm worried about. 
Budapest radio has just announced Gero has been relieved of the party 
and has been replaced by Kadar who is to speak over radio shortly. 
Things seem a little quieter at moment and one city bus on normal run 
just passed by. In meantime John MacCormac of New York Times 
reported today to us on the basis of eye witness as follows. 
What began Tuesday as demonstration in Budapest turned late the same 
night into revolution. Yesterday it became something like a small war 
after Russian troops had been called in to 'restore order'. At noon today 
the square before Hungarian Parliament was strewn with dead and 
dying Hungarian men and women shot down by Russian tanks. But the 
revolution did not seem to be over. New crowds of youthful demonstra-
tors continued to form in Szabadsag Square near the American Lega-
tion and only a few blocks from the Parliament. They carried Hungarian 
flags and shouted, 'Down with Gero!' An hour later Gero was relieved 
as boss of Hungarian Communist party and was succeeded by Janos 
Kadar. The massacre in front of Parliament occurred after some hun-
dreds of demonstrators had come to it in trucks, armored cars and even 
riding on top of Russian tanks. They shouted to this correspondent, 
'The Russians are with us! They say they don't want to shoot down 
Hungarian workers.' The Russian tank crews seemed to corroborate 
this statement when they smiled and waved. But this love feast became 
first a disappointment and then a tragedy. Some ten minutes later 
another Russian tank roared up and opened fire on the crowd. This 
correspondent saw some dozens of prone bodies and saw a number of 
wounded men and women being carried away by rescuers who had to 
run the gauntlet of Russian fire. The tanks fired not only their machine 
guns but their big guns. Armored cars roared past but directed their fire 
mostly in the air apparently with the intention of terrorizing the fleeing 
crowd. The situation at 1:00 was completely confused. Some Hungarian 
soldiers seemed to have thrown in their lot with the insurgents. Others 
like the Russians were obeying orders to quell the insurrection. Today's 
insurgents were unarmed. All they had to oppose the mechanized might 
of the Russians and the Hungarian secret police was the Hungarian Hag 
and their own bodies. When a truck full of Hungarian soldiers appeared 
in Szabadsag Square and warned the demonstrating crowd that 'we are 
armed', one of the demonstrators held up the Hungarian flag he carried 
and replied, 'all we are armed with is this flag'. Hold on, will have more 
later. Please hang on. While we will have the circuit can inform you that 
large crowd still in front of Legation shouting for help, etc. Have you 
any questions? 
Department: None right now. Hope you can hold circuit. 
Legation: Hope so too. Appears we have friends in telegraph office. 
Very unusual. 
Department : If you speaking of us, sure you have. Any more running 
comments? 
Legation: Seems that crowd has left from in front of Legation and 
things again seem rather quiet. However, numerous times we thought 
this whole mess was over but it starts up very suddenly without any 
warning as you can well imagine. Earlier this morning 1 had the printer 
on floor typing from prone position with many more typing errors than 
appearing on this later transmission. Was rather afraid of bullets coming 
in the window since this Telex room is facing the crowd and would have 
more protection on floor. Fortunately no shells or the like came in this 
direction. I have man in back of me who was in Bogota in 1948 so 
situation we are facing is familiar. Have been informed that my own 
apartment all shot up, windows broken and a fire broken out in empty 
apartment adjacent to mine. Have not had opportunity to go see extent 
of damage but sure that some of my things are damaged from the 
numerous rifle and machine gun fire which occurred in that area when 
the Russians discovered some of the crowd on the roof of the American 
apartment. Am having bits to eat at my side and do not want to leave this 
machine while we still have contact. Any questions? 
Department: No questions. Want to hold you on, don't jeopardize 
connection. 
Legation: Believe Legation has reported situation in immediate vicinity 
as fully as possible. Barnes in snack bar, will be here momentarily. Here 
now. 
Department: What is your estimate of lmre Nagy's position now? Is 
there anything we can do to facilitate your task? We all appreciate 
magnificent job you all are doing. Sure you will be glad to know Wailes 
has applied for visas and should be departing within week or ten days. 
Legation: Thanks. Good to hear that news. Here is answer to question 
one. This is a battle situation and we have no idea what is going to 
happen. Our impression yesterday was that in view of he being blamed 
for calling in Soviet troops, he lost a great deal of popularity. Where he 
stands today and how the people would view a further retreat from 
Kadar to Nagy we do not, repeat not, know. We presume Nagy is to all 
intents and purposes premier. Should the blame for the calling in of 
Soviet troops now be placed on Gero and he made a scapegoat for all 
that is going on now, and if he made further concessions, he might have a 
chance. But we do not know enough to say anything very certainly. 
As you undoubtedly know, Foreign Minister Horvath, and Sik, 
requested visa for attending General Assembly UN. Foreign Minister 
inquired today about them, after being incommunicado yesterday. Un-
less you see objection, we will issue them this afternoon or tomorrow, 
assuming contact with Foreign Office. What can you tell us about 
Secretary's statement last night? 
Department: No objection to issuance of visas to Horvath and Sik. 
Cases of other officials will be subject of later communication. 
Legation: We assume you will report to press and close relatives soonest 
that all Americans on Legation staff are in no imminent danger. Couriers 
OK, please inform Frankfurt. So far as we know there have been no 
American casualties, but our information is very meagre. We have been 
asked by the following American citizens to inform relatives that they 
are safe (LIST). Another group of seven Americans arrived by train this 
morning and we now are attempting to remove them from station to 
hotel and will give names later if possible. 
Crowd has put up a ladder on Russian monument in front of Legation 
and is attempting to knock down red star. Otherwise rather quiet in 
front of Legation at present. In response to crowd which continued to 
grow before the Legation, demanding assistance, and as what apparent-
ly was the only way to prevent this crowd from growing into unmanage-
able proportions, we have just made the following statement and asked 
them to move away peacefully, they appeared satisfied. 'We understand 
the situation and it has been reported to our Government as fully as we 
were able. You will understand that we ourselves can take no decision, 
this is a matter for our Government and the United Nations. We have 
been in Hungary for many years and we think we understand the 
situation.' 
Department: Answer to previous question. Statement expected prob-
ably today. Secretary has asked us to pass on word to you that he is 
pleased and gratified by Legation's performance under these trying 
circumstances. 
Legation: In speech just delivered on radio, lmre Nagy has promised 
inter alia that as soon as arms laid down, Soviet troops now, repeat 
now, fighting will be withdrawn to former position in Hungary and that 
negotiations will be started to have all Soviet troops withdrawn. Dead-
line of 18:00 yesterday for laying down arms canceled. Americans re-
ferred to earlier who were to be taken from station to hotel turned out to 
be Canadians, deposited safely. All except duty officers and those who 
cannot get to apartment are rapidly pulling out as it is getting dark. We 
will have only one further brief coded message unless something very 
dramatic takes place. 
Thousands of Hungarians gathering in front of Legation again, shout-
ing for Russians to leave. They are still gathering. 
In notifying families please don't forget newlywed wife of Jerry Bolick, 
Marine Guard. 
Mass demonstration carrying Hungarian flags and black flags running 
over two thousand have sung Hungarian anthem and appealed for help 
in front of Legation. In efforts to disperse crowd we have repeated in 
essence message given earlier. Some of crowd has dispersed but others 
are attempting to enter Legation, nothing really violent. Crowd present-
ly singing, demonstrating. Time here 16:30 local time. We have just 
remade statement to crowd quoted earlier. If you have suggestions as to 
what we can say in future, we would like to have it. 
Crowd slowly dispersing, 16:40 local time. We would like to have 
suggestions for statement, however, for future use. 
Department: No suggestions for future statements except you may wish 
to reiterate our sympathy and assure crowds you are keeping your 
Government as fully informed as possible. Reluctant to keep this circuit 
tied up much longer, and unless you want to send further message we 
had better terminate. 
Legation: Following this last message we have nothing more, many 
thanks for support. Following tactical estimate 17:03 local time. Buda-
pest proper very unclear, outline seems as follows. Soviet, State security 
forces and other government units have set up downtown defense based 
on east end Margit Bridge and covering Defense Ministry and security 
headquarters and north end Parliament Square. South of Parliament, 
but unknown to what degree east, anti-government crowds freely mov-
ing. Gellert area and bridge appears under the control of anti-govern-
ment forces but tanks on Chain Bridge unknown as to allegiance. Soviet 
setting up heavy guns back in Varosliget Park. If this outline is correct, 
heavy trouble may break out. Please note that as far as Legation con-
cerned we desire to break contact and will route through Vienna if 
possible, or if very important, attempt to contact Secretary of State 
office direct. 
Department: OK, we will sign off, thanks for everything, all you guys 
doing wonderful job, take care. 
Moscow issued a momentous declaration on October 30. As carried 
by the official news agency TASS, the main points were: 
The Hungarians "are justified in raising the question of eliminating 
serious mistakes "; the USSR "deeply regrets "that events in Hungary led 
to bloodshed, and "has agreed to the withdrawal of Soviet military 
forces from Budapest"; it "is prepared to start negotiations with the 
Hungarian government and other signatories of the Warsaw Pact about 
the question of stationing Soviet troops in Hungary "; and "it is ready to 
withdraw all Soviet economic, cultural, technical and military advisers 
from Hungary." 
Order was being rapidly restored in the heavily damaged streets of the 
capital as well as in the provinces. A free press was already functioning, 
and free political parties, newly formed or resuscitated, took over the 
arena formerly occupied by a Soviet-imposed single party. 
On November I, Nagy summoned the Soviet ambassador and told 
him that he had received authoritative information of the entry of new 
Soviet army units into Hungary; he demanded their immediate with-
drawal. A t the same time he informed the ambassador of his decision to 
proclaim Hungary's withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact and to appeal to 
the United Nations to safeguard the country's neutrality. On the next 
day, additional Soviet troops were reported entering. On November 3, 
Budapest was encircled and provincial areas saturated with troops and 
tanks, and at dawn on November 4, a general assault was begun. 
D E P A R T M E N T O F S T A T E 
INCOMING TELEGRAM Control: 2536 
Rec'd: Nov. 4, 1956 
FROM: Budapest 
TO : Secretary of State 
NO. : Unnumbered, Nov. 4 
Following represents exchange of comments with the American Lega-
tion in Budapest by direct Telex connection commencing 11:45 pm No-
vember 3 and terminating 5:15 am November 4. 
Legation: The Minister is out at present. Have someone looking for him 
but in meantime, in case this circuit goes out, would like to inform you 
that it appears at 5:00 am local time Russian artillery and mortar has 
begun falling on outskirts of Budapest. Earlier note from Minister 
follows. Interesting to note firing in suburbs began exactly 05:00 local 
time. Guns are heavy caliber and to date firing appears to be going out 
from city rather than in. Garbled local broadcasts are reporting either 
Nagy or Tildy have advised people to take to cellars as the city is being 
occupied. That's all for now, but we would like to hold the circuit for a 
while yet. Please get this to watch officer immediately. Now Minister 
here. 
Department: Watch officer is here. 
Legation: Unconfirmed reports state convoy across border. Have you 
any information? 
Department: Did US dependents get out to Vienna today on second try? 
Hope you are aware of our immediate protest to Russian ambassador 
here on word that they had been turned back. 
Legation: We do not know if they are out. But someone has reported 
that the Voice of America has reported that they were out. We are 
checking now to see if any last dope on that. Tildy's secretary has just 
phoned to say Russians attacking in all Hungary. He requested us to 
report that the Hungarian Government is asking the United States for 
aid. Broadcast at 05:45 reported Nagy stated Russians advancing on city 
and presently engaged with Hungarian army. We think there is enough 
in these reports that we have started priority material destruction . . . 
Department: Here Washington, is this Legation Budapest? 
Legation: Yes, we were cut off. 
Department : Do you have any further word on American dependents 
that tried to enter Austria yesterday? 
Legation: The answer is no, but we are trying to find out. 
Department: Suggest you present your credentials. You may act on this 
immediately if feasible, and if desirable in your view. 
Legation: Things have been quiet for about ten minutes, do not yet 
know what this means. Streets patrolled and Parliament Square filled 
with Hungarian troops. As for presenting credentials, doubt that at the 
moment could find the gentleman on whom 1 should call even if 1 could 
navigate streets. Will therefore wait temporarily to see what present lull 
means. Minister of State has just rung our doorbell, will sign off for a 
minute to see what he has on his mind. 
Department: OK, we stand by here. Think you would like to know we 
are getting in touch with Lodge who is asking for a Council meeting 
immediately. No other news for moment, except good luck we still stand 
by. We will pass on to you immediately any news that comes in from 
New York. 
Legation: That would be highly appreciated here. 
Department: We also have call in to Vienna and will give you any news 
we can develop on convoy. 
Legation: That also would be highly appreciated as some of the hus-
bands are quite worried about safety of wives and children. The sooner 
you can supply information the better in order that they will know one 
way or other. 
Department: Please assure all concerned that we are highly sympathetic 
and doing all possible. 
Legation: Have examined credentials of Minister of State and find he is 
one of those appointed yesterday, will give you his name in a few 
minutes. He tells me Nagy has gone to Soviet Embassy and has not 
returned, he is thus one of two cabinet members now acting, he has a 
message he wishes to have transmitted to President. We are now trans-
lating it, he says it is most urgent. Translation proceeding as rapidly as 
possible. Meanwhile he says Soviet tanks at second bridge, in fact report 
is that they have two main bridges each about half mile from Legation, 
and we also hear that Defense Ministry completely surrounded. 
Translation coming along. Note was delivered by Bibo, Minister of 
State, member of Peasant Party, now Petofi Party. Tildy is the other 
Minister of State on the job. Here is the message. 
Hungary in its present exceptionally difficult situation turns with par-
ticular confidence to President whose love of peace, wisdom and bravery 
so often firmly shown till now. Although people of Hungary are deter-
mined to resist with desperation the attack upon them, there is no doubt 
that in this unequal struggle they will be defeated if help not received. In 
this moment the most necessary kind of help is political, not military. It 
is clear that the new phase of the intentions of USSR are related to the 
British intervention in Egypt. The subjugation of Hungary, however, 
would not only mean renewal of oppression in this country but it would 
also stop the liberation trends which have started so hopefully in the 
other East European countries. It would also bankrupt the ten year old 
American liberation policy which was pursued with so much firmness 
and wisdom. It would create a crisis of confidence for all the Eastern 
European peoples in the USA and on the other hand in view of the 
adverse effects of the Egyptian intervention it would bring to the fore 
isolationist currents which as shown by experience to date would be the 
most certain road to the inception of a world war. This is the historical 
moment to which both President Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles 
referred in earlier speeches when they said that only by risking a world 
war can a sure way be found to avert the outbreak of one. Without 
attempting in any way to give advice, we cannot forego bringing to the 
attention of the President the possibility that taking into account the 
most difficult consequences he can on the one hand bring the Western 
powers to end the Egyptian intervention by acting as intermediary in an 
armistice, and on the other hand he can call on the USSR to quickly 
withdraw its troops from Hungary. We know that the moral significance 
of the simultaneous execution of the two measures is as great as the 
practical difficulty in carrying them out.'' 
That is all that has been translated up to now. 
Department: Believe Lodge will speak very shortly at the General As-
sembly, and meeting of the Security Council will probably be held early 
today, Sunday. 
Legation: A few jets overhead but no immediate street fighting. Still no 
news from convoy, and Soviet Embassy says they do not know what is 
going on here in town. 
Rest of message from Minister of State says in brief fate of the world 
now depends on President. Just made phone contact with convoy, I will 
tell you in a minute which side of border they are on. Wait. Sorry, it was 
not convoy. Lots of action here but nothing new to give you for the 
moment. May have something in a moment. Just having coffee at 
present, sure is good. We hope soon we will have information on 
dependents, all husbands standing by for any news, when you get it 
please relay soonest. 
Department: We will certainly forward to you immediately anything we 
can develop. In meantime can you give us the rest of the text of the 
message to President? 
Legation: Here is rest except for an eight line sentence which we cannot 
make out. 
'We are not in position to further pursue these suggestions, but we 
strongly emphasize that in this moment the fate of Eastern Europe and 
the entire world depends on the action of the President. The next few 
critical days will determine whether we enter on a path of peace and 
liberation, or whether we shall increase the appetite of aggressors and 
proceed to an inevitable world catastrophe.' 
Department: The Security Council is meeting within a few minutes. 
Legation: Delighted, and hope to get to you today for Lodge as accurate 
information on Soviet buildup as possible. We have actually seen num-
bers of tanks bearing markings, stop, Cardinal is now at the door and we 
are now taking him in, I'll speak to him and be right back. 
Department: OK., standing by. 
Legation: Minister has gone downstairs, will return shortly. 
Continuing, Cardinal accompanied by his secretary, can we also take 
him in? 
Department: Will have answer in a moment. 
Legation: Waiting. 
Department: Here is reply. Let the secretary in. 
Legation: Henceforth will admit only Americans unless instructions 
from you. 
Department: Can you get statement from Cardinal Mindszenty? 
Legation : Am now asking him. In the meantime so far as we know there 
are only about eight Americans other than Legation here in city. They 
are journalists and we will take them in if they come. 
Department: Who are they, please? 
Legation: One moment, we'll see if we can get the list. 
Department: Is Garst party still there?2 
Legation: They left their hotel last Thursday and we have checked but 
we assume they are safely out of Hungary. 
Department: Any progress on Mindszenty statement? 
Legation: Please hold on. Minister has just gone down to ground floor 
to see what has developed along those lines, should be back shortly. 
Department: Have you names of journalists? 
Legation: There is a list in the Legation someplace, someone has gone 
up to third floor to see if it is still around. Anything else we can do? 
Department: What is situation outside of Legation now? 
Legation: Am here alone now, have blinds down and some safes against 
the window, cannot see a thing from here but it appears to me rather 
quiet, this room rather sealed off for over a week, we put the safes by 
window to stop any bullets from entering this room and reduce possibi-
lity of damage the Telex equipment and personnel working in this 
section of Legation. Here is translation of Cardinal's statement. 
'Under the pretense of serious negotiations the assembled Soviet troops 
at dawn occupied the Hungarian capital and the entire country. I protest 
against this aggression and ask for forceful and speedy defense of my 
country by the United States and other powers.' 
Did you get that OK? 
Department: Yes, OK. 
Legation: Several American newspapermen in group, believed to be all 
that are here have phoned from Duna Hotel they have tentatively 
decided not to take refuge in Legation unless permitted to bring a few 
German and other non-Hungarian assistants with them. What about it? 
Just heard that Russians have taken over Parliament building, about 
two blocks from Legation. 
Department: Do you have any contact with British and other Western 
diplomatic missions? 
Legation: No, not at moment, however am now trying to get British. In 
meantime here are the names of American correspondents. (LIST.) 
Department: That's fine. We are still trying to reach Vienna regarding 
convoy. Stand by, something coming up. OK, we are still awaiting a 
reply and feel quite sure husbands are very anxious to hear of their 
whereabouts as soon as possible. 
Legation: Have contacted British Legation and they know nothing 
more than we, they are sitting tight as we. 
Legation: Regret, cannot authorize further refuge for other than Ameri-
can nationals. If you are still able to communicate you may recommend 
exceptions, otherwise, must leave to your judgment. 
Legation: I think we must stick to Americans for the reason that food in 
the city is getting short and we must keep those at Legation at minimum 
from standpoint of our supplies which are sufficient for us, as well as 
possibly water shortage. 
Just heard from Cardinal that some time ago he saw white flag raised on 
Parliament building. Unable to confirm. 
We at Legation are grateful for this machine being installed when it was 
and is of great help and assistance to the cause, it is a fine bit of 
equipment and we shall protect it. We have managed to keep almost 
twenty-four hour coverage on this equipment by putting beds near the 
machine and bells would awaken operator to receipt of any and all 
urgent night-action telegrams, priorities, et cetera. By the way, what is 
the correct time there? 
Department: It is now 2:45 November 4. 
Legation: It is 8:45 am here, have just reset my watch to conform to 
yours. 
Department: We are now in touch with Vienna on a weak circuit 
somewhat garbled version follows. Convoy was waiting at border last 
night. Vienna has an officer waiting at the Austrian side and attempting 
to get word to them. No report from the officer so far this morning. We 
are trying to get a clarification of the garbles. 
Legation'. OK, we will pass this to interested parties. 
Department: Vienna is trying to reach Vienna officer by radio and 
phone. 
Legation: Fine, hope you have success and then we will probably get 
more information on latest developments on Austrian border. When 
you get the information you will I am sure pass it along to us. 
Department: You may be interested to know that Lodge broke news on 
Soviet occupation Budapest at General Assembly meeting tonight. 
Legation: When Russians surrounded Parliament building, no firing 
took place as far as we know. 
When next budget is presented we hope plenty of money put in for 
Telex expenses as this is certainly a great help at the moment. 
Assume in due course you will let out Missions in neighboring coun-
tries know what is going on as we do not have time to communicate with 
them. 
Department: We have United Press report from Vienna that Nagy 
Government captured and that Budapest radio now on air in Russian 
language. Associated Press reports from Vienna that Russians are bom-
barding and strafing city. It says Budapest radio went off the air moments 
ago. Hungarian news agency reports to Vienna that new Soviet con-
trolled government has been formed outside city of Budapest headed by 
six Hungarian Communists. Any confirmation? 
Legation: We have no confirmation. We can hear no bombing or 
strafing at this moment, if it is going on it must be well in suburbs. 
Department: We have Vienna on line, anything you wish to ask? 
Legation: We have reached American journalist group and told them if 
they wanted to come in here they may, and bring with them the German 
and other non-Hungarian assistants who definitely work for American 
press if there are not more than five. 1 said we could not take in Hun-
garian associates, which they seem to appreciate. 
Department: Security Council in session, Lodge speaking, he says 
Soviet has ring of tanks around city. While this going on, Soviet press 
says Nagy has turned out to be enemy of people. Also, Budapest radio 
heard playing national anthem, voice saying 'You are Hungarians, here 
you live and here you must die'. 
Legation: British military attache called and stated that he had heard 
officially that Soviets had given the Hungarian government an ultima-
tum at 8:00 to the effect that if the government did not capitulate within 
four hours, Budapest would be bombarded. He states he was told that 
the government would technically capitulate under those terms but that 
the insurgents would not. Do you have any information on this? 
Legation: No, we do not. 
Department: We have word from Vienna through Defense Department 
that convoy was again turned back at Austrian border by Soviets, 
convoy is staying overnight at Red Cross Hospital at Magyarovar but 
will try again to cross the border this morning. 
Legation: Thanks, we knew that but were hoping for something later. 
New subject. Bela Kovacs, Smallholder Party leader, with two associ-
ates, now at front door. Seeking asylum. We will have to turn them 
away, unless you instruct to contrary. 
Department: Lodge concluded statement before Security Council by 
asking for adoption of resolution he introduced last night. Cuban now 
speaking. 
Department: You are authorized to grant shelter tentatively to Kovacs 
and his associates. We wish to consider disposition later. 
Legation: Action being taken now to permit them to enter. Just made 
contact with head of International Red Cross to inquire what supplies 
have been coming in, as it was our opinion that road blocs had cut off 
transportation. In fact we have seen many Red Cross vehicles stopped 
from entering city. Red Cross said they have enough medical supplies 
for about ten days under present circumstances. We imagine a good 
bombing would use them up very rapidly. Food is probably a more 
critical problem as we gather that with city ringed by Soviets there is not 
more than two or three days supply. This does not apply to Legation. 
Department: Cuban reviewed events in Hungary which he described as 
'world shame' and laid it at feet of USSR. Britain's Dixon now speaking, 
he condemned 'brutal slaughter' of women and children and male 
civilians by Soviet troops in Hungary. Australian now speaking. 
Legation: Just had a good flight of jets overhead. They kept right on 
going, did not stop. 
Kovacs has apparently left but may come back and we will let him into 
vestibule with his associates with firm understanding that this is tenta-
tive and no asylum granted.3 If they do come back and we have bombing 
at noon as threatened in ultimatum, we will take them in for a few 
minutes as the vestibule is largely glass. We plan to send staff to 
basement just before twelve and if it gets really hot we will all go there for 
a few minutes but will tell you beforehand in case you can keep machine 
running. It is now ten o'clock here so there is still two hours to go. If you 
have nothing urgent, I will now give you list of Americans here. (LIST.) 
Department: Australian in UN said delegates who went to negotiate 
with Soviets for withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary have not 
returned and have apparently been taken prisoner. Said 'no need to 
multiply recitation of tragic events, we have before us American resolu-
tion and we can do nothing less than adopt it.' 
Legation: We understand that as late as 10:00 the Hungarians were 
negotiating with the Soviets, and have also heard this morning that 
Hungarian delegation has not returned, so it looks like Australian is 
correct although we have no positive proof. 
Legation: We have telephoned Soviet ambassador, got him out of bed 
and told him we expected action on convoy as promised previously. 
Ambassador said he would send another telegram on the matter. 
Some sort of press conference has been called at Parliament and we 
will let you know results when available. We do not know who called 
conference, believe all local radios now being jammed. 
Department: We are on the phone to New York and will have something 
for you in a moment on Security Council meeting. 
Legation: We now have Foreign Office on phone and will send their 
view of things in few minutes. 
Department: Peruvian said yesterday we had hopes that Hungarian-
Soviet negotiations might produce favorable results. Soviets had tried 
to force conditions which Hungary forced to reject. As result, Soviets 
understood to restore regime of 1948. A regime of force, he added, with 
all objections it produces, collides with moral forces of the world which 
will ultimately defeat it. The Soviet government has not only committed 
a 'great crime' but also a mistake in trying to restore 'Stalin tyranny'. It is 
impossible for any state to fight successfully against moral forces of the 
world which in the end prevail for all time. Soviets, he concluded, are 
guilty of slaughtering youth, women and children, and one of the 
beautiful cities of Europe, 'the pride of our culture, is now being wrecked 
in vengeance'. Further in UN, Chinese proposed change in US resolu-
tion. Proposed first point be changed to read: To call upon the govern-
ment of USSR to desist forthwith from making war on government and 
people of Hungary and from any form of intervention in internal affairs 
of Hungary'. Belgium accepted the Chinese amendment. 
We are on the line to New York again and will give you the gist as soon 
as we get it. We have all been with you in spirit on this thing and sure 
admire the way you have all held up. 
Legation: Thank you very much. We are now translating what we 
received from Foreign Office and local employee is taking down the 
substance of long talk with Minister of State, 
Military attache reports two explosions a few minutes ago, more on 
the order of dynamite than bombing, target might have been Margit 
Bridge and Chain Bridge. 
Department: Further on Security Counil meeting, Soviets are speaking, 
will give you summary of remarks shortly. Have spoken to Bohlen in 
Moscow, asking him to take up the matter with the Foreign Office here. 
Department: New York has just come in again on phone and may have 
summary of Soviet remarks. 
Vienna: This is Vienna telex operator, we were cut off again, one moment, 
we will try to get them on the other line. 
{No further contact established with American Legation Budapest.) 
* 
* * 
[One final message came through Radio Budapest, the last words to be 
heard from the head of the revolutionary government: 
"This is Imre Nagy, president of the Council of Ministers of the 
Hungarian People's Republic, speaking. Today at dawn Soviet 
forces launched an attack against the capital with the obvious 
purpose of overthrowing the legal Hungarian government. Our 
troops are fighting. The government is at its post. 1 hereby 
report this to the people of our country and of the entire world."] 
NOTES 
1. Imre Nagy, "On Communism: In Defense of the New Course" [New York, 
1957], 
2. A group of Iowa farmers led by agronomist Garst had toured Soviet agricul-
tural areas in connection with a type of hybrid corn developed by them, in which 
Russian specialists had expressed an interest. The farmers planned to return home 
through Hungary and Austria; the outbreak of the uprising found them in Budapest. 
3. ". . . the right is that of the State voluntarily to offer asylum, not that of the 
refugee to insist upon it." [Chandler v. US, Court of Appeals 1st Ct, 171 F.2d 
921935.] In American practice, each request must be dealt with on an individual 
basis, taking into account humanitarian principles, applicable laws, and other fac-
tors. In cases of such requests occurring within foreign jurisdiction, the ability of the 
US Government to give assistance will vary with location and circumstance of the 
request. It is the policy of the US not to grant asylum at its units or installations 
within the territorial jurisdiction of a foreign state. However, immediate temporary 
refuge for humanitarian reasons may be granted [except to board aircraft because of 
their vulnerability to hijacking] in extreme or exceptional circumstances wherein the 
life or safety of a person is put in danger, such as pursuit by a mob. Protection shall be 
terminated when the period of active danger is ended, except that authority to do so 
shall be obtained from the Department of State. 
PHILIP UREN 
1923-1979 
Our journal lost still another of its editorial staff when Professor Philip 
Uren died suddenly in December of 1979. In the field of Hungarian 
studies he is best remembered for his work on Hungarian agriculture 
(including a book co-authored with Louis A. Fischer), and the estab-
lishment of an exchange of academics between Canada and Hungary, 
which he negotiated while he headed Carleton University's Institute of 
Soviet and Eastern European Studies. Two other positions which he 
filled during his years at Carleton were the chairmanship of the Depart-
ment of Geography and the directorship of the Norman Paterson School 
of International Affairs. 
Professor Uren was a man of wide-ranging scholarly interests and a 
devoted promoter of international cooperation through a keener under-
standing of conflicting political aspirations in the world. His publica-
tions on subjects ranging from East-West trade to South African affairs 
and his exchange arrangements with East European, Asian, African and 
Caribbean universities stand as testimonials to his life-work and am-
bition. 
ERRATA 
A few errors appeared in Maxim Tabory's review of the work Koviilet 
(Petrification) by the late Ferenc Fay ( C A R H S , Vol. VI, No. 2). The 
editors apologize for these mistakes. 
page 119, line 28: for does seem read does not seem 
page 120, line 5: for Kutasi read Kutasi Kovacs 
page 121, line 16: for sterile read fertile 
